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A Multi-Perspective on Follow-on Funding, Funding Structure and
Investment Profitability in a Venture Capital Context†
Julian Kaboth‡*
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Germany
Abstract
In this paper, I propose a model framework to evaluate venture capital investment decisions based
on an investor’s portfolio value. The approach integrates the perspective of different investors and
the allocation of rights with respect to the venture that is determined by the shares in each investor’s
portfolio. Using a basic implementation of the model framework, I focus on the feasibility of follow-on
funding of investment projects given the underlying investment profitability. In particular, I evaluate
the minimum levels of profitability of the investment where funding is feasible. Based on the model,
I propose alternative explanations for observed phenomena in venture capital such as underinvestment
and funding of negative net present value projects which are both rooted in usual venture capital funding
structure. In a model extension, I analyze the effectiveness of pay-to-play rights with regard to the
minimum levels of profitability. Based on the results, I infer that their effectiveness is limited by the
investment approval of shareholders.
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1 Does It Pay to Play
1.1 Introduction
Venture capital (VC) represents an asset class characterized by high expected returns at sub-
stantial levels of risk. Specifics of the asset class are often related to the venture as such
e.g., disruptive products and services, strong growth and sizable funding requirements, see
Metrick and Yasuda (2011). In turn, this is reflected in the nature and special terms of fund-
ing which by themselves pose unique characteristics of venture capital as an asset class and
are hereinafter referred to as funding structure. These include, for instance, the staging of
funding, the agreement on specific contractual rights and issuance of different share classes
as well as the syndication of investments via different investors.1 Thus, thorough VC invest-
ment analysis should include a comprehensive and consistent assessment of (i) the venture
value in total as well as (ii) the different contractual rights that translate the venture value
into multiple share classes which are part of (iii) the individual investor’s portfolio and allo-
cate control across various investing parties.2 Due to the stage-based funding, an important
question in VC investment relates to the follow-on funding of investments, especially with
respect to their profitability. However, the evaluation of investment opportunities with re-
spect to their profitability and the implications of the previous funding and shareholding
structure on the feasibility of funding represents an underdeveloped research area. Most
often, research focuses either on initial funding or on the eventual exit of investors e.g., via
an initial public offering or a trade sale, each represented via total recapitalization of the
1For a more comprehensive elaboration on the specifics of VC investment as an asset class see also Sahlman (1990)
or Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
2For example Keeley et al. (1996), Schwartz and Moon (2001), Cochrane (2005) or Leisen (2012a) on the venture
value, Sahlman (1990), Cossin et al. (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Bengtsson
and Sensoy (2015) or Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) on contractual rights and Lerner (1994), Liu (2006), Schwien-
bacher (2008), Agarwal et al. (2019) or Chernenko et al. (2017) on syndication and VC portfolio structure.
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venture.3 For example, Hsu (2010) considers the initial funding of a venture that is to be
funded in stages. He does not consider any interim funding and also assumes all investors to
be alike in order to consider them all as a single investing entity.4 In contrast, Arcot (2014)
evaluates the final follow-on funding via recapitalization, i.e., the exit of the venture. He
adresses the motivation of investors to convert their preferred shares into common shares at
exit, applying a signaling framework. Similar to Hsu (2010) he takes the perspective of a
single investing entity and only considers cash-in at exit (i.e., future funding structure plays
no role). Opposed to Hsu (2010) and Arcot (2014), Leisen (2012b) provides an intermediary
view which can prove useful for researchers and practitioners who are an analyzing existing
funding structure and its impact on follow-on funding. In particular, Leisen (2012b) eval-
uates the impact of liquidation preference multiples on the feasibility of follow-on funding
when there already is an existing investor and a founder. Feasibility means the possibility to
agree on the terms of funding in accordance with the assumption of fair contracting, here-
inafter referred to as contractability. Fair contracting proposes that the amount of the capital
invested equals the fair value of the shares received in lieu. If this condition is not met, no
investment will take place and the funding of a subsequent investment is not feasible. He
thereby integrates the view on the venture, on the share class values and on the portfolio
perspective of the outside investor. Using a similar approach, I assess the feasibility of a
follow-on funding of investments focusing on the net present value (npv) of the underlying
investments. Similar to Leisen (2012b), I consider a venture at some intermediary stage
(i.e., after initial investment but before exit) and analyze the impact of the existing and sub-
sequent funding structure. In addition to Leisen (2012b), I explicitly address the profitability
3Partial exits (e.g., secondary transactions) are rarely considered.
4Lukas et al. (2016) take a similar perspective, they focuses on economic and technological uncertainty assuming an
entrepreneur and a single investor.
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of the investment in terms of the pre- and post-funding value of the venture. Besides that,
I do not restrict the existing investors from investing in follow-on funding. This allows to
analyze both, the new and the existing investor’s investment criteria. Further, I consider the
perspective of the founder in terms of her value position in order to observe if she would
approve or disapprove funding and investment. Such setting allows to infer that usual fund-
ing structures in VC by themselves provide severe frictions which can result in undesired
consequences. On the one hand, positive npv projects might not get funded, an issue also
known as underinvestment, see e.g., Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) or Nanda and Rhodes-
Kropf (2010). Other than Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2010), the explanation is not driven by
market equilibria but rather by the venture itself.5 On the other hand, there can be negative
npv projects that may receive funding. The issue of negative npv investment funding in a
VC context is also discussed in Ewens et al. (2016). However, the explanation offered by
Ewens et al. (2016) is linked to agency problems and opportunity costs of the VC investor
and abstracts from the consideration of contractual rights.
In addition to the basic model, I extend the model with respect to the analysis of a less
researched cash flow right in VC, which is actually proposed to alleviate underinvestment
and cross-subsidization, the so-called pay-to-play right. Pay-to-play rights require the re-
spective investors to invest in a subsequent funding round or to waive preferential rights of
their shares. The provided model contributes to literature in various ways: First, it allows
for a multi-perspective analysis of venture capital investment, which can be easily amended
and extended. Second, based on the basic implementation, an alternative explanation for
underinvestment can be provided that is directly linked to the usual funding structure of VC
5Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) in fact suppose that underinvestment might also be due to frictions induced by the
funding structure.
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investments and which also provides a rationale for why even negative npv projects may get
funded. Third, based on the extension of the basic model implementation, it is shown that
the effectiveness of pay-to-play rights critically depends on the approval regime, otherwise,
underinvestment is aggravated. In the next section, I introduce the underlying framework
of venture capital investment. In section 1.3, the basic model implementation is presented
based on a financial model. In subsequent section 1.4, I integrate pay-to-play rights into the
basic model implementation. Section 2.7 concludes in the form of a discussion.
1.2 Framework of venture capital investment features
Key levels of VC investment research are the venture and its value, the share classes defined
by the respective contractual rights attached to them as well as the structure of investors and
their shareholdings. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the relation between the different levels
of VC investment research. At each level, there are specifics that have an impact on the
subsequent level and which are eventually reflected in the investor’s portfolio. Before de-
scribing a basic implementation of the framework that incorporates each level and respective
characteristics, I elaborate on the relevant aspects at each level.
1.2.1 Venture value
The primary focus of VC investment is typically set on realizing capital gains upon an exit
transaction, see Cumming and Johan (2008). Such capital gains upon exit are often referred
to as exit proceeds and usually reflect the value of the venture VT at exit date T . Thus, one
of the elementary tasks in VC investment is to assess the venture value at investment date t,
6
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Figure 1.1: Venture capital investment framework
Notes: Within the figure the general setup of VC investment is depicted.
The venture is controlled and provided with funds via its investors (including venture capitalists as well as its founders,
employees etc.). The venture itself represents some value which is allocated via its share structure and respective
contractual rights. That is, the shares itself provide for value appropriaton (cash flow rights), discretional power
(control rights) and other specified rights. The share in the venture value and discretional power of each investor is
determined via his portfolio composition.
Vt. The venture value has to appropriately reflect the business and characteristics of the ven-
ture (e.g., business and operating model, market opportunities, intellectual property, assets
etc.) and is often determined by comparing metrics of performance and risk.6 In a funding
and investment context, the venture value is usually termed as pre- or post-money value.
Post-money valuation refers to the venture value after additional funds N have been raised,
whereas pre-money can be interpreted and defined differently:7 Typically, it is calculated by
deducting the additional funds from the post-money valuation. Alternatively, it can be in-
terpreted and determined as the value of the venture without having raised additional funds
and investments taken place. In the first case, pre-money value rather reflects a calculated
6See, for example, Keeley et al. (1996), Leisen (2012a) or Klobucnik and Sievers (2013).
7There are also issues about the appropriate interpretation of the post-money valuation as a fundamental value, see
Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).
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number, whereas in the latter case, the difference between post- and pre-money valuation
can be regarded as the incremental value increase or present value from the add-on invest-
ment. Such interpretation allows for an economic analysis of the investment. For this paper,
I define pre-money value to denote the value of the venture without investment, referring
to such value as pre-funding value, V
pre
t . Also, I assume the post-money value to represent




1.2.2 Contractual rights and share classes
Staging of venture funding is one of the key measures of investors to mitigate inherent risk of
the venture’s business. In essence, it allows investors to take their decision in providing cap-
ital as more information gets available, see Hsu (2010). At each stage, new shares are issued
to raise additional capital. Oftentimes, such shares are designed as preferred shares, meaning
the issued shares provide (preferential) contractual rights for the respective investors. These
rights provide another mechanism to mitigate venture specific risks where share classes at
each stage are determined by their very own set of rights, see Sahlman (1990). Most relevant
rights can be categorized as control and cash flow rights, see e.g. Berglöf (1994), Kaplan
and Strömberg (2003) or Metrick and Yasuda (2011). Control rights warrant investor’s in-
formation, voting and veto rights, where the latter are also known as protective provisions.
While voting rights determine the more general control in decision making of the venture,
protective provisions are often highly specific. For instance, they may allow investors of
a respective share class to block an upcoming funding round, even if they only possess a
minority of voting rights, see Berglöf (1994). Cash flow rights represent preferential claims
on any cash flows provided by the venture, especially in case of an exit. By using cash
8
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flow rights, the commonly known ratable allocation of proceeds (also referred to as pro rata
allocation) is intentionally skewed, typically in favor of preferred shares, see e.g. Metrick
and Yasuda (2011). For example, liquidation preferences are designed to pre-allocate exit
proceeds to the respective investors of such shares up to a pre-specified amount before any
remaining exit proceeds are allocated to any common equity shares, see Kaplan and Ström-
berg (2003). Another cash flow right is represented by pay-to-play rights. Pay-to-play rights
reverse cash flow rights, in case the respective investor of such shares does not participate
in subsequent funding rounds, see Broughman and Fried (2010) or Bengtsson and Sensoy
(2015). While control rights allow investors to assume or reject control on venture-related
decisions, cash flow rights determine the allocation of VT . Generally, the different forms of
cash flow and control rights are meant to re-allocate risk and return among investors, i.e.,
different shares from the same venture generally have different value.
1.2.3 Investors and shareholding structure
In typical VC investment setups, funding is provided via different investors, either across
rounds or within rounds in syndicated deals.8 Investors may differ in several dimensions
e.g., by their industry focus, by stages of the venture’s development or investment scope
i.e., financial versus strategic. Since funding is typically provided in stages, different in-
vestors usually hold different proportions of different share classes, in its entirety referred to
as the portfolio.9 The portfolio composition often differs by the investment focus, available
8See for example Elango et al. (1995), Liu (2006) or Schwienbacher (2008).
9Note that I refer to the portfolio of an investor as his set of shares of different share classes of a single venture. That
is, definition of portfolio within this paper is rather narrow and limited to a single venture. I do not consider a more
broad specification of an investor’s portfolio i.e., typically interpreted as his holdings of shares of various ventures.
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funding and intentions of the investor. Follow-on funding of investments generally affects
the portfolio value of the existing investors via the change in value of the underlying ven-
ture enabled through the funding of additional investments. The actual change in value of
the investor’s individual portfolio is determined by the respective rights of the underlying
shares on the one hand and by the value dilution and increase by the newly issued shares
on the other hand. Depending on her ability and based on the respective change in value,
an investor may (i) approve or disapprove the investment and/or (ii) decide to invest or not.
Regarding the approval, (existing) investors oftentimes have different impact on the funding
and investment decision. Aside from commonly known (proportional) voting rights, they
may have further channels of decision making power via individual agreements and provi-
sions, such as director’s majority on the board or protective provisions. Thus, in order to
determine the feasibility of follow-on funding of investments, each investor’s portfolio and
decision has to be analyzed with respect to the investment approval and the actual investment
decision.
1.3 Basic model implementation
The basic model implementation is based on the setup outlined in Leisen (2012b): A venture
was incorporated by its founder and funded via an initial funding round of preferred shares
by an investor at some prior date. At current date t = 0, a new funding round is taking
place, where a new series of preferred shares is to be issued in the amount of N, where
N > 0, in order to finance respective growth investments. Based on the model, I analyse
the feasibility of the upcoming funding round based on the profitability of the investment.
Feasibility means that the funding round is contractable according to fair contracting, see
10
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Leisen (2012b).
1.3.1 Modelling venture value
In line with previous VC investment research, I assume the venture value VT at exit date T
to represent the exit proceeds allocated among its shareholders; the venture value at current
date t, Vt, shall adhere to the following geometric Brownian motion under the risk neutral
measure:10
dVt = (r −
σ2V
2
)dt + σV dW (1.3.1)
Within equation 1.3.1, r refers to the risk-free rate and σV reflects the volatility of the ven-
ture value, which are both assumed to be constant. dW refers to a standard Wiener process,
where dW =
√
T − tdZ and dZ is an independent standard normal distributed random vari-
able.11 I assume that the investment project funded via the additional shares has the same
characteristics in terms of risk and return as the venture without any additional funding. That
is, the venture value without investment V
pre
t follows the same process at the same param-
eters as V
pst




t > 0. By defining the present value of the investment in
terms of N via ϕN, where ϕ ∈ [0,+∞) represents some present value factor (in percentages),





t + ϕN (1.3.2)
10That is, I assume that there is a traded twin-security, where the returns perfectly correlate with the returns on the
venture value, Vt , see e.g., Leisen (2012b) or Gornall and Strebulaev (2020). For a general approach regarding
the valuation of any (non)traded asset see Trigeorgis (1996). Note, that expectation operators are suppressed for
readability reason.
11Note, that Vt will not turn negative, implicitly assuming that the venture is structured as a limited liability company.
12An alternative definition can be found, for example, in Ewens et al. (2016).
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Deducting the invested funds from such present value yields the npv of the investment. I
refer to a profitable investment where ϕ > 100% since it reflects a positive npv. In contrast,
investments where ϕ < 100% are non-profitable.
1.3.2 Modelling share values
According to the setting, prior to date t there are two share classes: Common equity (com-
mon shares) and a class of preferred equity, referred to as Series A shares (A shares). Other
than common shares, A shares feature a liquidation preference. That is, before any common
shares participate in the exit proceeds, the A shares receive any amount up to the initial in-
vestment of the A shares, NA, where NA > 0. After such preferential claim was served, any
remaining exit proceeds will be allocated among all shareholders on a ratable basis accord-
ing to the count of shares (also referred to as ’pro rata allocation’). The percentage pro rata
share of common shares regarding V
pre
t is denoted α
pre
c , the respective pro rata share of A








= 1. The liquidation preference imposes an asymme-
try in payoffs depending on the actual exit proceeds. In order to appropriately reflect such
non-linearity, contingent claim models are used which are based on option pricing theory.13
Assuming exit date T , a standard European call option can be applied to model the explicit
preferential claims as well as the implicit claim on the remaining exit proceeds. The value
of the call option C
0






and the respective parameters. K, representing the strike-price parameter of
a standard European call option, reflects the amount of the preferential claim.14 Overall,
13See Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Leisen (2012b) or Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).
14Because in subsequent calculations, σV , r and T are exogenous, I will suppress them for readability reasons.
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the value of the standard European call option represents the value of all other claimants
on the venture value at exit, the remaining exit proceeds, after the preferential claim has
been served. In turn, the value of the preferential claim can be determined by subtracting
the value of the standard European call option from the entire venture value. Based on the
model’s basic assumptions and setting, the value of the A shares, V
pre
t,A
, and common shares,
V
pre
































t ,NA), reflects the
value of the liquidation preference of the A shares. The second term on the right hand side










t ,NA), represent the value of the allocation of the remaining exit proceeds.
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At date t the venture is about to close a new funding round, raising an amount of NB (NB >
0), via a new series of preferred shares, the Series B shares (B shares). The funds can be
provided by any investor being able to invest. The funding amount is expected to result
in a value increase of NBϕB where ϕB denotes the profitability of the investment funded in
the amount of NB where ϕB ∈ [0,+∞). Thus, the post-funding value amounts to V pstt =
V
pre
t + NBϕB. The B shares feature a liquidation preference which is senior to the one of
the A shares. The liquidation preference amounts to the investment volume NB. For their
investment, the investors of the B shares are also offered a pro rata share in the venture
15Note, that given NA gets close to zero, the usual pro rata allocation applies. Besides that, for any given investment




























= 1. Given successful funding and investment, the value of the








can be determined analogous to the approach












































t,c . Each share class has different claims on V
pst





t + ϕBNB, the value of the share classes now also depends on the profitability









related to ϕB via V
pst
t . To fully determine the value allocation, α
pst
B
has to be determined.




= NB to hold.
16 That is, for subsequent analyses I assume the following:17
Assumption 1. There is always an investor willing to invest in B shares on terms of fair
contracting.
For a funding to be contractable, I require α
pst
B
∈ (0%; 100%).18 As mentioned before, in
addition to contractability, I consider the approval of the funding via the existing investors
an important additional element to be recognized in the definition of feasibility of follow-
16See e.g. Leisen (2012b) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).
17As a consequence of assumption 1, as long as V
pst
t,B
> NB, there is an investor willing to invest the same amount at
a lower nominal B share, so that any existing premium immediately erodes and V
pst
t,B










c > 0 and the venture is neither sold or liquidated.
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on funding of investments. Hence, also the (pre-funding) control rights of common and A
shares are relevant, since they will constitute the general funding (or investment) approval of
the respective investors. Since VC contracts can stipulate different control regimes which are
not necessarily related to the nominal (pro rata) share α of shares, I consider three different
scenarios in order to reflect potential control regimes.19 For the basic model implementation,
I assume three different setups, where investment approval is characterized by the consent
that is required to approve investment, each referred to as an approval regime: First, mutual
consent shall be a regime where consent of a majority of shareholders of common and
A shares is required. Second, common consent shall refer to a regime, where consent of
a majority of shareholders of common shares is required. Third, preferred consent shall
denote a regime, where consent of a majority of shareholders of A shares is required.
1.3.3 Investors, portfolio values and investment decisions
Similar to Leisen (2012b), the following set of investors is considered: The founder (F) -
she is characterized by not being able to provide necessary funds for investment. The exist-
ing investor (VCe) who already invested required funds in the past, holds respective shares
and is able to provide funds in subsequent funding rounds. The new investor (VCn) who
has not invested in the venture yet and does not hold any shares in the venture, but she is
able to provide funds. I assume that investors are solely driven by the value maximization
of their prospective portfolio.20 Each investor takes up to two decisions: First, they ap-
19A common provision in VC contracts are protective provisions, which gives preferred shareholders the right to
block certain measures such as funding rounds, investments or hires, although they rather constitute a minority of
shareholders, see e.g. Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
20The assumption is common in the related literature, see e.g. Hsu (2010), Leisen (2012b) and Arcot (2014).
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prove or disapprove funding (F and VCe) according to the respective approval regime and
second, they decide whether to invest or not (VCe and VCn). Approval of funding means
to agree on the funding without the obligation to invest. The positive decision to invest
represents the commitment to provide required funds for the respective funding round. Fea-
sible funding requires both, funding approval according to the prevailing approval regime
(see subsection 1.3.2) and positive investment decision of at least one of the investors. Fig-
ure 1.2 illustrates feasible funding setups given approval and investment decisions for each
approval regime. For the basic model implementation, I assume that all investors (except
for the founder) are able to provide sufficient funds. This assumption contrasts with the
model of Leisen (2012b), who implicitly assumes that the existing investor is not able to
provide funds in the current funding round and funding can solely be provided by an outside
investor.
Figure 1.2: Investment approval and decision setup
Notes: The figure depicts the decision setup given the different approval regimes and represents feasible funding sce-
narios (scenarios where funding is not feasible are not shown). For common consent, the approval is solely determined
via the approval of F (i.e., it does not matter if VCe approves funding or not). For preferred consent, the approval
is solely determined via the approval of VCe (i.e., it does not matter if F approves the funding or not). For mutual
consent, the approval is jointly determined and requires VCe and F to agree on the approval of the funding. In any
case, investment is provided either via VCn or VCe. Note, that approval and investment decision are independent and
the investment criteria of VCn and VCe coincide.
16
1 Does It Pay to Play
Approval and investment criteria
Given that investors are maximizing their portfolio values, decision criteria of the investors
can be derived by comparing their portfolio values pre- and post-funding.21 Accordingly,
funding in terms of the allocated nominal B share α
pst
B
can be determined, see Leisen
(2012b). For each approval (investment) decision of each investor there exists a maximum
(minimum) level of α
pst
B
which is to be determined subsequently.
General approval criteria of the founder Let V
pre
t,F
denote the pre-funding value of the
founder’s portfolio and V
pst
t,F
denote the post-funding value of her portfolio. F will approve







General approval criteria of the existing investor The approval criteria of the existing
investor VCe can be derived in the same manner. Let the pre-funding value of the existing
investor’s portfolio be represented by V
pre
t,VCe




given that she invests and V̄
pst
t,VCe
if she does not invest. Now, VCe approves
investment whenever her post-funding value (whether she invests or not) is at least as high
21Leisen (2012b) implicitly assumes that any portfolio of shares of the venture without investment V
pre
t is equal to
zero. However, often there is some alternative towards current funding and investment planning, even if worst case
alternative is liquidation of the venture at a non-zero liquidation value.
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, if VCe does not invest
(1.3.9)
General investment criteria of the existing investor In addition to the approval crite-
ria of VCe, the setup requires an investment criteria for VCe to assess whether it pays off for
VCe to invest or not in terms of her portfolio value. A positive investment decision of VCe














General investment criteria of the new investor Similarly, VCn invests whenever her
portfolio value increases. With regard to the venture, the pre-funding value of her portfolio




denote the portfolio value of VCn post-funding, her investment criteria
(given that investment is approved) evaluates as follows:
NB ≤ V pstt,VCn (1.3.11)
In order to analyze contractability of funding and investment given different levels of ϕB,
I focus on the level of indifference of the criteria, i.e., where the left-hand side equals the
right-hand side of the criteria (equations 1.3.8 to 1.3.11). For an explicit assessment of the
18
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criteria, I assume the following allocation of the shares among investors F and VCe:22
Assumption 2. F holds all common shares and VCe holds all A shares.





































, if VCe does not invest
(1.3.13)
















Based on the investment criteria of VCe and VCn, I directly conclude the following:
Proposition 1. VCn and VCe are always willing to invest at terms of fair contracting.
That is, the investment criteria of VCn and VCe must also agree in terms of the nominal B
22This assumption represents the same shareholding structure chosen in the model of Leisen (2012b).
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share required for their investment consent. Thus their investment criteria can be evaluated
simultaneously by assessing either the investment criteria of Vn or Ve. I aggregate the as-
sessment of both criteria into a common investment criteria hereinafter referred to as fair
contracting investment criteria which in turn applies for both Vn or Ve. For an explicit com-
parison of approval and investment criteria based on the level of the underlying investment’s
profitability ϕB, I make use of the required and approved nominal B shares according to the
investment and approval criteria.
Fair contracting investment criteria Let αiv
B,FC
denote the required nominal B share
according to the investment criteria where the index iv denotes the investment criteria and









t ,NB) − V
pre
t − (ϕB − 1)NB
Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB)
(1.3.16)
According to equation 1.3.16, αiv
B,FC
directly depends on ϕB (as well as V
pre
t , NA, and NB).




is a strictly decreasing function in ϕB.
In addition, the relation given by equation 1.3.16 can be used to verify that, both investors








23As noted, the investment criteria of VCe and VCn coincide. A detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
24Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.2.
25Note, that given usual pro rata allocation, negative npv project funding would not be possible.
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can be interpreted as a cross-subsidization effect: The preferential claim of the B shares
benefits from an increase in V
pre




at all levels of ϕB.




t = 0) limits the
investment analysis in terms of contractable funding. This is illustrated in the mid plot of
figure 1.3 where V
pre
t can be interpreted as some kind of collateral for the preferential claims.
In fact the plot suggests that αiv
B,FC
gets less sensitive with respect to ϕB given higher levels
of V
pre
t . In more illustrative words, given a higher pre-funding value, the investing parties
will not change their required stake as much given changes in the underlying profitability.




different levels of ϕB and respective indifference curves. On the basis of the underlying
example and variation in the parameters, an increase in NA results in ceteris paribus higher
levels of required αiv
B,FC
. Given higher levels of NA or NB, there is less collateral available
for the B shares, i.e., there is less cross-subsidization potential of V
pre
t , wherefore the range
of contractable fundings at any level of ϕB decreases.
Approval criteria of the founder Let α
ap
B,F
denote the level of α
pst
B
at which F approves
investments according to equation 1.3.12 where the index ap refers to the approval criteria.





















t ,NA + NB)
(1.3.17)
26Actually, this effect represents the inverse effect of the idea of cross-subsidization mentioned by Bengtsson and
Sensoy (2015).
27A detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
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Figure 1.3: Fair contracting, αiv
B,FC

















































































Notes: The plots depict profitability levels ϕB and nominal share of the B shares to be issued, α
pst
B
. The plotted lines
denote the indifference curve of VCn and VCe regarding her decision whether to invest or not, i.e., which nominal
share in the B shares they at least require, αiv
B,FC
, in order to invest. The plots also indicate the impact of variations in
the previous investment amount, NA (left plot), the pre-fiancing value, V
pre
t (mid plot), and the investment amount, NB
(right plot). Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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Similar to the investment criteria represented by equation 1.3.16, α
ap
B,F
depends on ϕB via
V
pst









is a strictly increasing function in ϕB.
Besides that, equation 1.3.17 allows to infer that F would approve funding of negative net
present value investments where ϕB < 100%.
The range of negative npv investments that can obtain approval via F depend on opposing
effects. First, the additional funding increases the amount of preferential claims and also





c . Thus, the value increase via NBϕB has to increase V
pst
t in so far that the general
remainder claim (over)compensates for such decrease. The relation can also be inferred





t ,NA) needs to be smaller than
Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB). Figure 1.4 provides an illustration of the impact of V
pre
t , NA, and NB on
αiv
B,F
given variation in the levels of ϕB. On the basis of the underlying example and variation




That is, given there is a higher liquidiation preference via NA, F would approve higher levels
of B shares. In general, regarding the pre-funding value, the provided example indicates
that the potential range of contractable investments does decrease considerably when the
pre-funding value is high, which contrasts with the investment criteria, but is quite intuitive:
The higher the pre-funding value, the less F is willing to approve in the funding round for
the same range of investment projects.
28Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.2.
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Notes: The plots depict profitability levels ϕB and nominal share of the B shares to be issued, α
pst
B
. The plotted lines
denote the indifference curve of F regarding her decision whether to approve investment or not, i.e., which nominal
share in the B shares she is willing to provide at most, α
ap
B,F
, in order to approve investment. The plots also indicate
the impact of variations in the previous investment amount, NA (left plot), the pre-fiancing value, V
pre
t (mid plot), and
the investment amount, NB (right plot). Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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Approval criteria of the existing investor Based on fair contracting, the approval cri-



























t ,NA + NB)
(1 − αprec )Ct(V pstt ,NA + NB)
(1.3.18)




depends on ϕB. In addition, α
ap
B,VCe
is also affected by the relative pre-funding share-
holding (via α
pre








is a strictly increasing function in ϕB.
An illustration of α
ap
B,VCe
for variation in V
pre
t , NA and NB for different levels of ϕB is pre-
sented in figure 1.5. On the basis of the underlying example and variation in the param-
eterization, in contrast to the investment criteria and the approval criteria of F, the effect
of a variation in NA is not that straightforward. In fact, the upper plot in figure 1.5 indi-








increases. Here the model reflects another cross-subsidization effect: Higher profitability
of the underlying projects in fact represents ’collateral’ for the liquidation preferences of
the A shares. This cross-subsidization effect was originally pointed out by Bengtsson and
29A detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
30Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.2.
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Sensoy (2015) and is named as one of the reasons for new investors not to invest. Re-
garding the pre-funding value, the provided example indicates that the potential range of
fundings that are approved by VCe does decrease considerably when the pre-funding value
is high. Interestingly, the mid-plot in figure 1.5 indicates, that the existing investor would
be willing to approve funding of investment when the npv is actually negative. According
to equation 1.3.18, this would require that VCe gains more in the post-funding liquidation
preference of her A shares than she looses in her remainder participation.31 In addition,
equation 1.3.18 can be used to show a direct relation among both approval criteria: When-
ever funding is to be mutually approved, the npv of the underlying investment projects must
be positive. In other words, no negative npv investments are funded, provided that joint
approval is required. I summarize as follows:32
Proposition 5. For mutual approval of VCe and F, the minimum level of ϕB has to be at
least 100% in order to be approved i.e., the investment must have non-negative npv.
Feasible investments and minimum levels of profitability
In order to evaluate feasibility of funding at the given profitability level of an investment,
approval and investment criteria have to be assessed with respect to the prevailing approval




to the respective approval regime. Due to the homogeneous allocation of shares, the de-
termination of approval regimes is straightforward. For mutual consent, the approval of F
31The same reason applies where VCe would be actually willing to sell the venture i.e. α
ap
B,VCe
> 100% where she
gains considerably more via her preferential claim compared to the rather marginal loss in the remainder allocation
i.e., the upside potential. However, we will not consider such cases within the model.
32Respective proof is given in appendix 1.C.2.
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Notes: The plots depict profitability levels ϕB and nominal share of the B shares to be issued, α
pst
B
. The plotted lines
denote the indifference curve of VCe regarding her decision whether to approve investment or not, i.e., which nominal
share in the B shares she is willing to provide at most, α
ap
B,VCe
, in order to approve investment. The plots also indicate
the impact of variations in the previous investment amount, NA (left plot), the pre-fiancing value, V
pre
t (mid plot), and
the investment amount, NB (right plot). Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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and VCe, for common consent the approval of F and for preferred consent the approval of
VCe is required. Further, feasible funding requires investment via VCe and VCn. Figure 1.6
illustrates contrasting juxtaposition of approval and investment criteria where the criteria
represent lower bounds (investment criteria) and upper bounds (approval criteria) via re-
spective indifference curves. Comparing the indifference curves of the respective criteria
allows to identify the set of funding scenarios where funding of investment projects is ac-
tually possible and to identify room for negotiating. In particular, it can be used to assess
whether funding of negative npv investments is possible or if there are actually scenarios
where funding of positive npv investments may not occur. The illustrative example indi-
cates that investment is generally not limited by criteria in terms of a maximum profitability
level. Interestingly, there seems to be some upper threshold of ϕB, where VC
e would be
willing to provide a greater share in the venture than F would approve, indicated by the






. Such observation can be explained as fol-
lows: Generally, F solely participates in the remainder participation, whereas the payoff of
VCe is based on her A shares liquidation preference and additional remainder participation.
Given an increasing level of ϕB, VC
e participates in both, since her liquidation preference




. Thus, given relatively high levels of ϕB, VC
e would be willing to approve higher
nominal B share in the venture than F.33 The illustration in figure 1.6 also allows to inspect






are increasing in ϕB and α
iv
B,FC
is decreasing in ϕB, the intersection of each pair of graphs
determines the minimum level of ϕB, which eventually depends on the approval regime. For
33In case of convertible liquidation preference, there would have been no intersection, instead, the graph for α
ap
B,VCe
would approach the graph of α
ap
B,F
from below for an increasing level of ϕB.
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(common consent) indicates that fund-






(preferred consent) suggests that some level of positive npv (ϕB >> 0) is re-
quired in order to result in feasible funding of the investment. In fact, this characterizes a









































denote critical profitability level ϕB for all investors regarding their approval and investment criteria. Variation refers
to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.0 mln.
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Common consent and minimum profitability level Defining ϕmin
B,cc
as the minimum
level of ϕB, where funding of investment is possible given common consent, the above con-










− (Ct(V pstt ,NB) −Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB)) + (ϕB − 1)NB (1.3.19)
The equation is to be implicitly solved for ϕmin
B,cc
.35 The relation given in equation 1.3.19
allows to draw several conclusions regarding ϕmin
B,cc
. For example, assuming that the liqui-
dation preference of the A shares gets very small NA → 0, the level of ϕB that is required
to match the condition of equation 1.3.19 approximates 100% from below. In particular,




irrespective of the investment amount of the B shares NB or whether there is some pre-
funding value or not. Also, no negative npv investment gets funded via common consent
when V
pre
t is close to zero and NA > 0, in such cases we have that ϕ
min
B,cc
in fact is larger
than 100%.36 That is, V
pre
t has to compensate for the negative npv investment (ϕB − 1)NB
, for the change in the remainder allocation Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) − Ct(V
pre
t ,NA) as well as for
the increased burden imposed by the new liquidation preference −Ct(V pstt ,NB). In addition,




34This follows from the property of α
ap
B,F
being a strictly increasing function and α
ap
B,FC
being a strictly decreasing
function in ϕB see proposition 3 and 2. A detailed derivation of the results in equation 1.3.19 is given in appendix 1.D.
35An explicit solution is not available, since inversion of the underlying option formula is generally not possible, see
also Hull (2014).
36This can be verified by setting V
pre





t ,NA + NB)) + (ϕB − 1)NB. In order to hold, ϕB > 100% is a necessary condition, since (Ct(ϕBNB,NB) >
Ct(ϕBNB,NA + NB)).
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Ct(V
pst









→ 0. That is, for common consent, in-
creasing the funding volume NB will require the underlying investment to be more profitable
than investment projects at smaller scale. I summarize the following observations:
Finding 1. For common consent, given there is no liquidation preference of the A shares,
no negative npv projects are funded, ϕmin
B,cc
= 100%. Assuming some positive level of NA and
sufficient V
pre
t , negative npv projects can receive funding, ϕ
min
B,cc
≤ 100%. In contrast, given
V
pre




Preferred consent and minimum profitability level Given preferred consent, the min-
imum level of ϕB where funding is possible, referred to as ϕ
min
B,pc











−Ct(V pstt ,NB) +Ct(V
pst





(ϕB − 1)NB (1.3.20)
Again, the equation is to be implicitly solved for ϕmin
B,pc
. According to equation 1.3.20, ϕmin
B,pc
critically depends on the characteristics of previous funding structure via NA. When NA → 0,
it follows that ϕmin
B,pc
→ 100%. In contrast, given that NA > 0, ϕminB,pc lower than 100% is in
37This follows from the property of α
ap
B,VCe
being a strictly increasing function in ϕB and α
pst
B,FC
being a strictly decreas-
ing function, see proposition 3 and 2. A detailed derivation of the results in equation 1.3.20 is given in appendix 1.D.
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(1 − ϕB)NB = V pret −Ct(V
pre
t ,NA)
In a first step, I that V
pre














c > 0, there is in fact some ϕB < 100% in
order for the condition to hold. In a second step, assuming V
pre
t > 0, the set of possible
ϕmin
B,pc
< 100% gets inevitably smaller until Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) − Ct(V
pst





t ,NA); given any further increase, ϕ
min
B,pc












opposing effects can be technically explained by the opposed signs in the last terms of
equation 1.3.19 and equation 1.3.20, whereas the effect is actually scaled by the relative
nominal share of A shares and common shares. A similar contrary effect relates to NB:




does decrease given an increase in NB. That is, given preferred
consent, investments of larger volumes will receive approval at lower levels of profitability.











. That is, given there is some given
increase in NB, the decrease in ϕ
min
B,pc
is ceteris paribus smaller than the increase in ϕmin
B,cc
and
also vice-versa. I summarize the observations as follows:
Finding 2. For preferred consent, given there is no liquidation preference of the A shares,
no negative npv projects are funded, ϕmin
B,pc
= 100%. Assuming some positive level of NA, for
sufficiently low levels of V
pre
t it follows that ϕ
min
B,pc
≤ 100%. For sufficiently high levels of V pret
it follows that ϕmin
B,cc
> 100%, that is, underinvestment is actually possible. For an increase
in NB, respective ϕ
min
B,pc
decreases. Such decrease is disproportional to the change in ϕmin
B,cc
given the same increase in NB.
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According to observations 1 and 2, given unilateral consent (either via preferred or common
shares), the funding of negative npv investment projects as well as non-funding of positive
npv projects is generally possible. It was also shown that those issues are directly linked
to the funding structure (i.e., liquidation preferences of the A shares) and strictly positive
pre-funding value.
Mutual consent and minimum profitability level Lastly, I evaluate the minimum level
of ϕB given mutual consent, referred to as ϕ
min
B,mc
. Other than for common and preferred














} − αivB,VCn (1.3.21)
Thus, the approval is dominated by the criteria that approves the lower nominal B share




























that funding must feature positive npv ϕmin
B,mc
=
100% to obtain mutual approval.













actually depends on whether the value of the pre-funding liquida-
tion preference of the A shares is larger or smaller than the value of the post-funding liquidation preference
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, Common consent ϕmin
B,mc
, Mutual consent ϕmin
B,pc
, Preferred consent
Notes: The plots depict minimum profitability levels ϕB for each approval regime, given univariate variation in the
underlying parameters, NA, V
pre
t and NB. Note, that ϕ
min
B,mc
generally coincides with ϕmin
B,mc
due to the condition given in
equation 1.3.21. Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.0 mln.
34
1 Does It Pay to Play
ferred consent, previous arguments can be used that it is possible that positive npv invest-
ments might not receive funding The above observations are summarized as follows:
Finding 3. For mutual consent, ϕmin
B,mc



































For mutual consent based approval regimes, there is no value dilution among investors. As
a consequence, some of the positive npv investment projects may not get funded. The fail-
ure to fund positive npv investments characterises a situation of underinvestment, an issue
already noted in literature, see Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015).39 According to the model
provided, underinvestment is ultimately rooted in the pre-funding funding structure, in par-
ticular, in the liquidation preference of the A shares as well as in the pre-funding value.40
Thus, the model provides an alternative explanation of underinvestment in the venture capi-
tal context. Figure 1.7 provides results for the illustrative example regarding minimum level







. The plots demonstrate the change
in the minimum levels of ϕB with regard to the A shares liquidation preference amount NA,
the pre-funding venture value V
pre
t , the investment amount NB as well as the nominal pre-
funding share of the A shares α
pre
A











39There are other explanations of underinvestment, which are formost motivated via economic cycles, e.g., see Peneder
(2008), Hall and Lerner (2010) or Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2010).
40Note, that given simple pro rata allocation, any investment project of positive npv would generally be funded.
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1.4 Extended model: Pay-to-play rights
Since VC investment setups are highly specific with regard to the contractual rights and the
mix of investors, the basic model implementation has to be adjusted and amended appro-
priately. Within this section, I present an extension of the model by integrating so-called
pay-to-play rights. Pay-to-play rights are meant to motivate existing preferred share in-
vestors to stay with the venture, even when the economic outlook is strained, see LeClaire
et al. (2005) or Feld and Mendelson (2013). In essence, pay-to-play rights require existing
investors of preferred shares to invest according to their existing nominal share in preferred
shares or to waive preferential rights of previous preferred shares (i.e., to convert their pre-
ferred shares to common shares).41 In other words, pay-to-play rights usually reverse the
preferential treatment of preferred shares. Pay-to-play rights are structured by the event
(e.g., funding round), the threshold (e.g., nominal share in preferred shares) and the conse-
quence (e.g., converting to common), see Harris and Maready (2005). A common version of
the pay-to-play right is the so-called strong man play: At a (qualified) funding or financing
round, existing investors have to invest proratably on their fully diluted stake, otherwise they
will have to convert their preferred shares into common shares (i.e., loose all their preferred
rights attachted to the preferred shares), see Broughman and Fried (2010).42 To the best of
my knowledge, the mechanism and effectiveness of pay-to-play rights have not been subject
to any research from a valuation perspective yet. Starting from such general notions, I next
41In practice, pay-to-play rights are often included as a sub-section in the terms of conversion of preferred shares (e.g.,
as part of mandatory or automatic conversion, conditional on a so-called ’qualified financing/funding’ (the event).
Oftentimes, pay-to-play rights are referred to as special mandatory conversion. I include some sample provisions
obtained via VCExpert database in appendix 1.B.
42Similar to other contractual provisions, pay-to-play rights may vary in their setup e.g., conversion to less preferred
shares or loose only specific rights; however, according to the findings of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) conversion
to common shares is the most dominant mode of pay-to-play rights.
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assess how pay-to-play rights affect the funding decision and analyze in how far the intro-
duction of pay-to-play rights change the minimum level of profitability of the investment
project where funding is feasible.
1.4.1 Modelling pay-to-play rights
In terms of the basic model implementation provided in section 1.3, the pay-to-play right
results in the forfeiture of preferential rights (liquidation preference in the amount of NA) for
the A shares. Whenever an A shares investor refrains from investing in a follow-on funding
NB in the fractional amount of her series A shares, pay-to-play rights reverse the effect of
liquidation preferences conditional on the fact that the respective investor has not invested
proportionally to her fractional share of A shares in the follow-on funding of investments.
Enforcement of the pay-to-play right shall require a successful investment, i.e., an invest-
ment approval via F and a positive investment decision via VCn. Otherwise, there is no
conversion of A shares. Thus, the integration of pay-to-play rights in the basic model im-
plementation affects the value allocation among share classes (see equation 1.3.5 to 1.3.7 in
section 1.2.2) conditional upon the investment decision of the respective investors. Denoting
the percentage share of A shares converted to common shares via γA, the value allocation


































t , (1 − γA)NA + NB) (1.4.3)
37
1 Does It Pay to Play



















t,c . According to the
investment setup under consideration, VCe owns all A shares. That is, γA is either 100% or




VCe invests (the A shares are not converted) and V̄
pst,pp
t,A
if she does not invest (A shares are
converted).
1.4.2 Approval and investment criteria
Changes in the general value allocation directly affect related decision criteria. In fact, the
asymmetric nature of pay-to-play rights results in conditional decisions where the invest-
ment criteria of the existing and the new investor can diverge.
Investment criteria of the new investor given pay-to-play rights Starting with the

























, if VCn does not invest
(1.4.4)





i.e., there is no change in the






for any given level of ϕB.
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. Consequentially, VCn requires a lower nominal B share in order to make a positive
investment decision, given that pay-to-play rights of the A shares are in place and VCe
decides not to invest. In other words, the value of the B shares has increased conditional on
the conversion of the A shares. The increase in value of the B shares depends on the amount
of liquidation preference NA, that is at stake. I conclude as follows:
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Proposition 6. Given that pay-to-play rights are in place for the A shares, the required
nominal B share of VCn ᾱ
iv,pp
B,FC






Otherwise the investment criteria remains unchanged. Further, ᾱ
iv,pp
B,FC
is a strictly decreasing
function in ϕB.
In other words, VCn requires the same amount of B shares for a less profitable investment
project, as long as she gets compensated via the value increase due to the conditional con-
version of the A shares. That is, the conditional conversion increases the set of investment
projects where VCn is willing to invest in terms of the project’s npv which is in line with the
primary motivation of pay-to-play rights.
44A detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
45Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.3.
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Approval criteria of the founder given pay-to-play rights Conditional on VCe’s de-

























t,c , if VC
e does not invest
(1.4.6)
In case VCe invests, the approval criteria of F, α
ap,pp
B,F
, evaluates to α
ap
B,F
. In contrast, if VCe



























represents the nominal B share for which F is willing to approve
funding, provided that VCe does not invest. ᾱ
ap,pp
B,F






, the nominal B share at which F is willing to approve funding increases. The
increase is directly related to the A shares’ liquidation preference amount at stake due to the
pay-to-play right and results from the indirect value increase of the common shares given




is strictly increasing in ϕB. Given that pay-to-play rights are in place
for previous preferred shares and VCe does not invest, the nominal B share at which F






The foregoing proposition implies that the implemented pay-to-play right provides an in-
46A more detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
47Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.3.
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centive for F to approve investments of lower profitability levels, since she is indirectly
compensated via the conversion of the A shares.
Approval criteria of the existing investor given pay-to-play rights For the general
approval criteria of VCe I re-consider equation 1.3.13 where I take into consideration that



























, if VCe does not invest
(1.4.8)
Other than for the basic model implementation, the approval criteria of VCe is conditional




















. Compared to the basic model,
the approval of VCe does not change provided that she gets invested into the venture via the
B shares. Based on those considerations, α
ap,pp
B,VCe






























(1 − αprec )Ct(V pstt ,NB)
(1.4.10)
48A more detailed derivation can be found in appendix 1.D.
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, which is rather intuitive: Provided that VCe does not
invest, her A shares convert wherefore she is only willing to approve investments at lower












the nominal B share in the venture to be lower compared to the case where she invests.
Contrary to the basic model, the integration of pay-to-play rights results in a conditional
approval decision and different outcomes. On the one hand, given that VCe invests, there is
no change in the approved nominal B share. On the other hand, if she does not invest, she
approves a lower nominal share of the B shares. That is, opposed to the original intention of
pay-to-play rights, funding gets more difficult in that the corresponding range of approved
investments in terms of profitability gets smaller.
Investment criteria of the existing investor given pay-to-play rights The invest-
ment criteria of VCe according to equation 1.3.14 has to reflect that non-investment results














































49For the respective proof see appendix 1.C.3.
42
1 Does It Pay to Play
Similar to the basic model, the investment criteria of VCe α
iv,pp
B,VCe
is strictly decreasing in ϕB.
In contrast to the basic model, but similar to the investment criteria of VCn, the required





. That is, due to conditional conversion, VCe is
generally willing to accept a lower nominal B share at the same level of ϕB. In other words,
ceteris paribus VCe would be willing to invest at lower levels of ϕB for the same nominal B




is strictly decreasing in ϕB. Given that pay-to-play rights are in place







Note, that in contrast to the situation without pay-to-play rights, the investment criteria
of VCn and VCe do no longer coincide. In fact, I conclude the following regarding the
investment criteria:51
Proposition 10. Given that pay-to-play rights are in place for previous preferred shares,
the required nominal stake for the B shares at which VCe is willing to invest is lower than





Thus, pay-to-play rights result in different sets of contractable investments for VCe and VCn.







is larger i.e., the investment incentive for VCe is stronger. Thus,
given any level of α
pst
B
, VCe would be willing to invest at lower levels of ϕB than VC
n. Fig-
ure 1.8 illustrates the shift in criteria for the underlying numerical example regarding VCn,
50Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.3.
51Respective proof is provided in appendix 1.C.3.
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F and VCe. For the given example, the shift is relatively strong for the existing investor: On
the one hand, provided that VCe does not invest, the indifference curve shifts to the lower
right, meaning that she will accept follow-on funding at relatively low nominal stakes of the
B shares. On the other hand, there is no change with regard to her approval criteria, if she
decides to invest.
1.4.3 Feasible investments and minimum levels of profitability
Changes in the individual criteria due to the pay-to-play rights per-se do not alter the fea-
sibility of funding considering the entire approval setup or the minimum profitability level.
In order to have an impact on the feasibility of funding, a change in the individual approval
and investment criteria must translate into a change in the applicable approval regime. Fig-
ure 1.9 illustrates the change in the contrasting juxtaposition of approval and investment
criteria for the illustrative example introduced in section 1.3. The plot already indicates that
changes in the approval and investment criteria have different implications on the feasibility
of follow-on funding of investments for each approval regime.




denote the minimum profitability level required for common consent. Other than for
ϕmin
B,cc
, it has to be considered that the investment criteria of VCe and VCn are different. Given
that both investors are able to invest, the minimum level of ϕB can be evaluated by identify-
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pay-to-play. The plotted lines denote the indifference curve of the investors regarding their decision whether to approve
and/or invest or not. Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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denote critical profitability level ϕB for all investors regarding their approval and investment criteria with and without
pay-to-play rights. The plot allows to evaluate feasible investments for the given setup and model parameterization.
Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.0 mln.




























1 Does It Pay to Play
Thus, given common consent, ϕ
min,pp
B,cc
is driven by a higher approved nominal B share via
F and investments of VCe, who would be willing to invest at lower levels of ϕB than VC
n.






In case VCe does not invest e.g., because she is not able or willing to, the minimum level
of ϕB where funding is feasible (denoted via ϕ̄
min,pp
B,cc
) changes according to the investment

















. Consequentially, for common consent, pay-to-play rights indeed incentivize investors
to invest (at lower profitability levels) - no matter if VCe actually invests or not. In fig-














, the incentive seems to be







Preferred consent and minimum profitability level given pay-to-play rights In
contrast to common consent, the decision setup given preferred consent depends on the
discretion of VCe to invest or not: Provided that VCe invests, there is no change in the set
52In either case, note that due to the pay-to-play rights there are no investments of positive profitability that receive
no funding. That is, for those investments, the issue of underinvestment is indeed solved via the application of
pay-to-play rights.
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Notes: The plots depict minimum profitability levels ϕB for the approval regime of common consent, given univariate
variation in the underlying parameters, NA, V
pre
t and NB. Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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case VCe decides not to invest, the set of minimum levels of ϕB where funding of investment
































holds. In turn, the minimum
level of ϕB where follow-on funding of investment is feasible is still determined by the
scenario where VCe invests. In other words, given preferred consent, pay-to-play rights
do not incentivize the existing investor as intended, but rather lead to a higher level of




is illustrated in figure 1.11 for the numerical example, where I also depict the





. Their general impact does not change structurally.
However, the general upward shift suggests that the problem of underinvestment worsens
due to pay-to-play rights (provided that VCe does not invest). The issue may arise, for
example, due to limited funds of VCe: Provided that she is not able to invest, she will
require sufficiently higher investment project profitability to approve if preferred consent
prevails. To mitigate aggravation of underinvestment, pay-to-play rights may get waived by
the shareholders - which in turn contests the idea of negotiating on pay-to-play rights in the




the investment criteria resulting in αiv
B,FC
, it follows that the minimum levels of ϕB where funding of investment is
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Notes: The plots depict minimum profitability levels ϕB for the approval regime of preferred consent, given univariate
variation in the underlying parameters, NA, V
pre
t and NB. Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
pre
t = 1.00 mln.
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first place. In addition, the illustration indicates that there is no funding of negative npv
investments, provided that VCe does not invest but approves funding.54 This is due to the
elimination of the potential cross-subsidization of claims via the pay-to-play rights.




denote the minimum level of ϕB where follow-on funding of investment is possi-
ble given pay-to-play rights. Similar to preferred consent, the decision setup is conditional
on whether VCe decides to invest or not. In either case, investment approval is determined
by the minimum level of approved B shares via VCe and F. In case VCe decides to invest,
the investment criteria is governed by αiv
B,FC









Since there is no conversion, there is also no change in the minimum level of ϕB at which






contrast, if VCe does not invest, ϕ̄
min,pp
B,mc
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That is, eventually ϕ̄
min,pp
B,mc

























. In other words, enacting pay-
to-play rights in a mutual consent approval regime setup results in potential aggravation of
underinvestment issues if VCe is not willing or able to invest.
Similar to preferred consent approval regime, such increase is due to the motivation of VCe
to block the funding as it dilutes her share value resulting from the conversion of her A
shares. In contrast, the result of unchanged minimum levels of ϕB for mutual and preferred
consent builds on the assumption that VCe is not only willing but also able to provide suf-
ficient funds. The respective shift of ϕ
min,pp
B,mc
is illustrated in figure 1.12 for the numerical





. Their general impact
does not change structurally. Again, the general upward shift indicates the issue that the
problem of underinvestment worsens due to pay-to-play rights (provided that VCe does not
invest). Analogous to preferred consent, there is no funding approval for negative npv in-
vestments (provided that VCe does not invest), since the cross-subsidization is eliminated
due to the pay-to-play-rights’ conversion feature. Table 1.1 provides a brief summary of the
main findings, contrasting the model results with and without pay-to-play rights.
57The proof is left to the reader.
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Notes: The plots depict minimum profitability levels ϕB for the approval regime of mutual consent, given univariate
variation in the underlying parameters, NA, V
pre
t and NB. Variation refers to the basic parameters.






= 12.5%, NB = 1.00 mln, NA = 0.50 mln and V
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t = 1.00 mln.
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Table 1.1: Comparison of approval regimes and minimum level of profitability
Approval regime Basic model implementation w/ pay-to-play rights
Common consent Negative npv investment funding is
feasible; underinvestment is possible
given pre-funding value is low
Negative npv investment funding is
feasible; investment gets more attrac-
tive for new investors; existing in-
vestor is willing to invest at the same
nominal B share at lower profitability
levels
Preferred consent Negative npv investment funding is
feasible; underinvestment is possible
Underinvestment is possible; existing
investor requires higher nominal B
share at the same profitability levels if
she does not invest
Mutual consent Underinvestment is possible Underinvestment is possible; existing
investor requires higher nominal B
share at the same profitability levels if
she does not invest
Notes: Within the table the main results are summarized, whereas the basic model implementation relates to sec-
tion 1.3.3 and the last column relates to section 1.4.3.
1.5 Discussion
In this paper, I provide a model framework regarding the decision of follow-on funding in a
venture capital context, focusing on the minimum profitability level where funding of invest-
ment is possible. The model allows for an explicit consideration of the investors’ approval
criteria in addition to the general investment criteria determined by fair contracting. Given
pro rata allocation of the venture value, there would be no dissent in the respective crite-
ria and the usual investment metric of net present value would apply for each shareholder.
However, due to the common venture capital funding structure being characterized by cash
flow rights, the metric is of limited use on an investment level. In turn, approval and invest-
ment criteria and decisions of the investors no longer agree. It is shown, that the funding
of negative net present value investments is in fact feasible. Besides, the explicit consider-
ation of the funding approval in the model provides a rationale for underinvestment of VC
investments based on the underlying funding structure. Underinvestment is characterized by
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a situation where positive net present value investments obtain no funding approval and/or
no positive investment decision. Both findings illustrate the importance of considering the
pre-funding capital structure as a result of control and cash flow rights. In an extension of
the basic model, I analyze the impact of pay-to-play rights on the feasibility of follow-on
funding. Generally, pay-to-play rights result in a conditional re-allocation of the venture
value among all shares and therefore affect the approval and investment criteria of all share-
holders. The ultimate effect of pay-to-play rights strongly depends on the respective setting.
I conclude that pay-to-play rights have no or even adverse effect whenever the existing pre-
ferred investor is involved in the investment approval decision and invests. In particular, if
she decides not to invest, pay-to-play rights may even prevent (otherwise feasible) invest-
ments from getting funded; here, the shareholders may agree on waiving pay-to-play rights
to allow for funding via third-party investors, in particular, when the existing investor is not
able to invest. In contrast, when the common shareholders decide on the approval of the
funding, the pay-to-play rights can provide the desired incentive for the existing investor to
realize funding for investments of lower profitability. Overall, the model shows that pay-
to-play rights are only of use when the founder still has full decision making power, which
is likely to be the case in early stages. In other cases it may introduce further frictions
especially if the existing investor is not able to provide respective funds.
Although already featuring a rather complex structure, the underlying scenario of the basic
model implementation still represents a simplistic investment setup and may get extended
in several ways. For example, the existing investor may hold additional common shares
(and not only preferred shares) or there is an additional existing shareholder who is invested
in A shares and common shares. Likewise, the approach can be extended to address the
impact of investment syndicates in venture capital funding or other contractual rights. Such
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analyses can provide useful tools in order to determine whether their impact is as intended,
since additional provisions at best do no harm but usually result in costly frictions and tend
to obstruct negotiations. Further research may also challenge the common place assumption
of fair contracting. For example, Broughman and Fried (2012) suspect inside rounds to
be a measure to dilute the founders of a venture and to be beneficial for the existing (and




1.A Appendix: List of symbols

















(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)




(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
where the founder F approves funding of the investment given




(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
where the founder F approves funding of the investment given
that pay-to-play rights are in place and VCe does not invest
Continued on next page
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(Minimum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)




(Minimum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
required by the outside investor in order to invest given that pay-




(Minimum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
required by the outside investor in order to invest given that pay-




(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)





(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
where the existing investor VCe approves funding of the invest-




(Maximum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
where the existing investor VCe approves funding of the invest-
ment given that pay-to-play rights are in place and VCe does not
invest
Continued on next page
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(Minimum) nominal share of the Series B shares (post-funding)
required by the existing investor in order to invest given that pay-
to-play rights are in place and VCe invests
α
pre
c Nominal share of the common equity shares pre-funding
α
pst
c Nominal share of the common equity shares post-funding
γA Percentage share of A shares converted to common shares due to
pay-to-play triggered (forced) conversion





ϕ Profitability in terms of present value, ϕ ∈ (−∞,+∞)
ϕB Profitability of the underlying investment funded via the B shares
ϕmin
B,cc
Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B




Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given common consent and given that pay-to-
play rights are in place and VCe invests
Continued on next page
59
1 Does It Pay to Play





Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given common consent and given that pay-to-
play rights are in place and VCe does not invest
ϕmin
B,mc
Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B




Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given mutual consent and given that pay-to-




Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given mutual consent and given that pay-to-
play rights are in place and VCe does not invest
ϕmin
B,pc
Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B




Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given preferred consent and given that pay-to-
play rights are in place and VCe invests
Continued on next page
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Minimum level of ϕB, where funding of investment via the B
shares is possible given preferred consent and given that pay-to-
play rights are in place and VCe does not invest
Ct Plain-vanilla European call option regarding a non-dividend pay-
ing underlying with parameters r, σV , t, T , Vt and K, where the
latter needs to be specified
F Founder, shareholder/investor characterized by primarily holding
common shares, not being able to invest additional funds
K Abstract placeholder for the exercise price of a plain-vanilla Eu-
ropean call option
N Absolute investment amount
NA Absolute investment amount of the Series A Shares, also repre-
sents the liquidation preference of the A shares
NB Absolute investment amount of the Series B Shares, also repre-
sents the liquidation preference of the B shares
r Risk free rate
Continued on next page
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VT Venture value at exit
V
pre
t Venture value pre-funding
V
pst
t Venture value post-funding
VCe Existing VC shareholder/investor characterized by primarily
holding the prior preferred (Series A) shares, being able to invest
additional funds
VCn New or outside shareholder/investor characterized by not being




t,c Pre-funding value of the common shares
V
pst
t,c Post-funding value of the common shares
V
pst,pp
t,c Post-funding value of the common shares given that pay-to-play
rights are in place and VCe invests
Continued on next page
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t,c Post-funding value of the common shares given that pay-to-play












Post-funding value of the A shares given that pay-to-play rights




Post-funding value of the A shares given that pay-to-play rights








Post-funding value of the B shares given that pay-to-play rights




Post-funding value of the B shares given that pay-to-play rights








Post-funding portfolio value of the founder F
Continued on next page
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Post-funding portfolio value of the existing investor VCe, pro-




Post-funding portfolio value of the existing investor VCe, pro-




Post-funding portfolio value of the outside investor VCn, pro-
vided that he invests
dW Increment in standard Wiener process
dZ Independent standard normal distributed random variable
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1.B Appendix: Sample pay-to-play rights
• Sebacia, Inc., 4th amended and restated Certifcate of Incorporation, May 21st,
2015 - Section 5A, page 15: "In the event that any holder of shares of Series C
Preferred Stock does not participate in a Qualified Financing (as defined below) by
purchasing in the aggregate, in such Qualified Financing and within the time period
specified by the Corporation (provided that the Corporation has sent to each holder
of Series C Preferred Stock at least 10 days written notice of, and the opportunity to
purchase its Pro Rata Amount (as defined below) of, the Qualified Financing), such
holder’s Pro Rata Amount, then each share of Series C Preferred Stock held by such
holder shall automatically, and without any further action on the part of such holder,
be converted into shares of Common Stock at the applicable Conversion Price in effect
immediately prior to the consummation of such Qualified Financing, effective upon,
subject to, and concurrently with, the consummation of the Qualified Financing. For
purposes of determining the number of shares of Preferred Stock owned by a holder,
and for determining the number of Offered Securities (as defined below) a holder of
Series C Preferred Stock has purchased in a Qualified Financing, all shares of Pre-
ferred Stock held by Affiliates (as defined below) of such holder shall be aggregated
with such holder’s shares and all Offered Securities purchased by Affiliates of such
holder shall be aggregated with the Offered Securities purchased by such holder (pro-
vided that no shares or securities shall be attributed to more than one entity or person
within any such group of affiliated entities or persons). Such conversion is referred to
as a ’Special Mandatory Conversion.’"
• DirectoryM, Inc., 3rd amended and restated Certifcate of Incorporation, De-
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cember 29th, 2005 - Section 4A, page 17f: "In the event that any Qualified Series C
Preferred Holder (as defined below) does not participate in a Qualified Financing (as
defined below) by purchasing in the aggregate, in such Qualified Financing and within
the time period specified by the Corporation (provided that the Corporation has sent
a written notice to each Qualified Seriec C Preferred Holder at least 10 days’ prior
to the closing of Qualified Financing informing such Qualified Series C Preferred
Holder of the opportunity to purchase such Qualified Series C Preferred Holder’s Pro
Rata Amount (as defined below) of the Qualified Financing), such Qualified Series
C Preferred Holder shall automatically, and without any further action on the part of
such holder, be vonverted into share of Common Stock at the Conversion Price in
effect immediately prior to the consummation of such Qualified Financing, effective
upon, subject to, and concurrently with, the consummation of the Qualified Financ-
ing. For purposes of determining the number of shares of Series C Preferred owned
by a Qualified Series C Preferred Holder, and for determining the number of Offered
Securities (as defined below) a Qualified Series C Preferred Holder has purchased in
a Qualified Financing, all shares of Series C Preferred held by Affiliates (as defined
below) of such Qualified Series C Preferred Holder shall be aggregated with such
Qualified Series C Preferred Holder’s shares and all Offered Securities purchased by
Affiliates of such Qualified Series C Preferred Holder shall be aggregated with the
Offered Securities purchased by such Qualified Series C Preferred Holder (provided
that no shares or securities shall be attributed to more than one entity or person within
any such group of affiliated entities or persons). Such conversion is referred to as a
’Speical Mandatory Conversion’."
• 24M Technologies, Inc., restated and amended Certifcate of Incorporation,
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February 8th, 2016 - Section 5A, page 25: "In the event that any holder of shares
of shares of Preferred Stock does not participate in a Qualified Financing (as defined
below) by purchasing in the aggregate, in such Qualified Financing and within the
time period specified by the Corporation (provided that the Corporation has sent to
each holder of Preferred Sstocj at least thirty (30) days’ prior written notice of, and
the opportunity to purchase its Pro Rata Amount (as defined below) of, the Qualified
Financing (including that such financing is a Qualified Financing), such holder’s Pro
Rata Amount, then the Applicable Portion (as defined belo) of the shares of Series A
Preferred Stock held by such holder, the Applicable Portion of the shares of Series B
PReferred Stock held by sich holder, the Applicable Portion of the shares of Series
B-2 Preferred Stock held by such holder and the Applicable Portion of the shares of
Series C Preferred Stock held by such holder, as the case may be, shall automatically,
and without any further action on the part of such holder, be converted into shares of
Common Stock at the Series A Conversion Price, Series B Conversion Price, Series
B-2 Conversion Price or Series C Conversion Price, as applicable, in effect immedi-
ately prior to the consummation of such Qualified Financing, effective upon, subject
to, and concurrently with, the consummation of the Qualified Financing. For pur-
poses of determining the number of shares of Preferred Stock owned by a holder,
and for determining the number of Offered Securities (as defined below) a holder of
Preferred Stock has purchased in a Qualified Financing, all shares of Preferred Stock
held by Affiliates (as defined below) of such holder shall be aggregated with such
holder’s shares and all Offered Securities purchased by Affiliates of such holder shall
be aggregated with the Offered Securities purchased by such holder (provided that no
shares or securities shall be attributed to more than one entity or person within any
such group of affiliated entities or persons). Any such conversion is referred to as a
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’Special Mandatory Conversion’."
• Relay Therapeutics, Inc., restated and amended Certifcate of Incorporation,
July 26th, 2016 - Section 5.4, page 20f: "If a holder of shares of Series A Preferred
Stock fails to purchase his, her, or its Pro Rata Portion (as defined in the Series A Pre-
ferred Stock Purchase Agreement, dated on or about the Series A Original Issue Date,
by and among the Corporation and the other parties listed therein as ’Purchases’ (as
the same may be amended, restated or otherwise modified from time to time in accor-
dance with the terms thereof, the ’Purchase Agreement’) of Series A Preferred Stock
at a Closing (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) for such Closing, and such failure
is not cured by the twentiethh (20th) Business Day (as defined in the Purchase Agree-
ment) following the receipt by such Purchase of the applicable Subsequent Closing
Notification (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) or Drawdown Notice (as defined
in the Purchase Agreement), then each share of Series A Preferred Stock held by such
holder shall automatically, and without any further action on the part of such holder,
be converted into shares of Common Stock at the Series A Conversion Price in effect
immediately prior to the Closing effective upon the tweenty-first (21st) Business Day
following the receipt by such Purchaser of the applicable Subsequent Closing Noti-
fication or Drawdown Notice. For purposes of determining the Pro Rata Portion a
holder of Series A Preferred Stock has purchased in a Closing, all securities by Affil-
iates (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) of such holder shall be aggregated with
the securities purchased by such holder (provided that no shares or securities shall be
attribute to more than one entity or person within any such group of affiliated entities
or persons). Such conversion is referred to as a ’Special Mandatory Conversion.’"
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1.C Appendix: Proofs
1.C.1 General remarks
In the subsequent sections, I provide proofs for the propositions given in the paper. Thereby,
I make use of some more general results from option pricing theory, see for example Hull
(2014) or Yu and Xie (2013). Throughout the model, a European call option is used. The
European call option formula regarding a non-dividend paying underlying Vt according to
Black-Scholes can be presented as follows:
Ct(Vt,T − t,K, r, σ) = Vt ∗ N(d1) − K ∗ exp(−r ∗ (T − t)) ∗ N(d2) (1.C.1)
where
d1 =





, and d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t (1.C.2)
Vt represents the underlying’s value at valuation date t, T − t denotes the time to exercise,
K represents the strike price, r refers to the risk free rate and σ denotes the volatility of Vt.
N() refers to the standard normal distribution:
















The European call option regarding a non-dividend paying underlying has the following
properties:
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• The first order derivative of a standard European call option on a non-dividend paying
underlying Ct with regard to its underlying Vt,
δCt
δVt
is positive i.e., δCt
δVt
> 0; it is also




• The second order derivative of a standard European call option on a non-dividend
paying underlying Ct with regard to its underlying Vt,
δ2Ct
δV2t
is positive i.e., δCt
δVt
≥ 0; it












• The first order derivative of a standard European call option on a non-dividend paying
underlying Ct with regard to its strike K,
δCt
δK





= − exp(−r(T − t)) ∗ N(d2) (1.C.6)
• The second order derivative of a standard European call option on a non-dividend
58See for example Hull (2014).
59See for example Hull (2014).






. Employing the homogeneity of the European call option formula and
Euler’s Theorem61, see Yu and Xie (2013).
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paying underlying Ct with regard to its strike K,
δ2Ct
δK2






= − exp(−r(T − t)) ∗ δN(d2)
δK
(1.C.7)








Within the paper, I am interested in the call options regarding Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) and Ct(V
pst
t ,NA +
NB), where Vt is represented by V
pst
t and K via NB or NA + NB.
The first order derivative of Ct(V
pst





























NB exp (−r(T − t))
δN(d2,B)
δϕB







































. Using similar arguments, it can be shown that the first
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order derivative of Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) with regard to ϕB is as follows:
δCt(V
pst









. The second order derivative of Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) with





















Using similar arguments, it can be shown that the second order derivative of Ct(V
pst
t ,NA+NB)
with regard to ϕ is as follows:
δ2Ct(V
iv












Proposition 2: Basic investment criteria and profitability
In the following, I will provide proof of proposition 2. I start by showing that αiv
B,FC
is strictly
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NB((N(d1,B) − 1)Ct(V pstt ,NA + NB) − (Ct(V
pst





t ,NA + NB)
2
(1.C.18)
The right-hand side is negative, since (N(d1,B) − 1) < 0, because 0 < N(d1,B) < 1 due to
its property of a cumulative standard normal distribution. Furthermore, V
pst
t − NB (the inner
value of Ct(V
pst
t ,NB)) is at most equal (or less) than the option value (i.e., in case T − t = 0),
(Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) − (V
pst
t − NB)) < 0. Since NB > 0 and Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB)






Proposition 3: Approval criteria of F and profitability
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δϕB
(1.C.20)
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Since Ct(V
pre
t ,NA) > 0, NB > 0, Ct(V
pst







Proposition 4: Approval criteria of VCe and profitability
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(1 − αprec )Ct(V pstt ,NA + NB)2
(1.C.25)
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2 > 0, it
remains to show that:62
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Proposition 5: Mutual approval of F and VCe












t,c = (ϕB − 1)NB (1.C.35)




t,c , I conclude that ϕB ≥ 100%
for a follow-on funding to be feasible. 
1.C.3 Extended model
Proposition 6: Investment at fair contracting terms, given pay-to-play rights
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The left-hand side must always be negative, since (N(d1,B)−1) < 0, because 0 < N(d1,B) < 1
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represents the inner value of Ct(V
pst
t ,NB). Since the inner value is at most equal (or less)
than the option value (i.e., in case T−t = 0), I have (Ct(V pstt ,NB)−(V
pst
t −NB)) < 0. Knowing
that 0 < N(d1,B) < 1, NB > 0 and Ct(V
pst
t ,NB)
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t ,NA + NB) < Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) (1.C.41)
Since NA > 0 and Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) > Ct(V
pst
t ,NB), the relation given above always holds.

Proposition 7: Approval of F at fair contracting terms, given pay-to-play rights
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The left-hand side must always be positive, since Ct(V
pre
t ,NA) > 0, NB > 0, Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) > 0









































t ,NB) > Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) (1.C.47)
Since NA > 0, Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) is always smaller than Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) and the relation given
above must always hold. The difference diminishes as NA → 0.
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Proposition 8: Approval of VCe at fair contracting terms, given pay-to-play rights
and VCe does not invest
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The last term (last row) must be larger than zero since Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) > Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB).






























t ,NA + NB) < Ct(V
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t ,NB) (1.C.57)
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Proposition 9: Investment criteria of VCe at fair contracting terms, given
pay-to-play rights






































































































is negative. Also, Ct(V
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t ,NA + NB) > 0 and
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64Again, I make use of expressions given in equation 1.C.13 and 1.C.14.
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Due to the properties of the cumulative standard normal distribution, this must always hold,







































For NA > 0, Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) > Ct(V
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The difference diminishes as NA → 0 and will decrease (ceteris paribus) as αpreA → 100%.
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Proposition 10: Comparison of investment criteria of VCe and VCn at fair
contracting terms, given pay-to-play rights





























































t ,NA + NB) > 0 (1.C.73)
Ct(V
pst
t ,NB) > Ct(V
pst
t ,NA + NB) (1.C.74)
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1.D Appendix: Additional explanations













t ,NA + NB) (1.D.2)
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(1.D.10)
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In the following, I provide the derivation of equation 1.4.5:
NB = V
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2.1 Introduction
As commonly known, returns of venture capital (VC) investments share some special fea-
tures: First, they are highly skewed. Korteweg and Sorensen (2010) report that only about
one third of VC-backed firms go public or are acquired while the majority of the remaining
firms has been either liquidated or has become ’living zombies’ with no profitable path to
exit. In consequence, high returns on a few successful exits stand against many exits with
negative returns. Second, this translates into high average returns at high risk: Cochrane
(2005) presents lognormal average returns for VC investments of 15% p.a. with a standard
deviation of 89% p.a. implying 37% of investments end up in negative returns on an annual
base. To put these numbers into context: The average return of the MSCI World Index over
the last 30 years has been at approx. 7.5% p.a. with a standard deviation of approx. 15%
p.a.. In order to hedge themselves at least partially against adverse outcomes and to set in-
centives for the entrepreneur to be financed, VCs regularly require various rights specified in
financial contracts such as information rights, control rights, exit rights and cash flow rights
see Sahlman (1990). The latter are generally intended to allocate cash flows to shareholders
of the venture in case of an exit. Differences in those rights result in the existence of various
share classes within a venture’s equity. Ignoring such differences can result in important
consequences: First, transposing the share price of shares with special preferred rights sim-
ply proportionally to the value of the total enterprise, which is commonly done when most
recent financing rounds are published via so-called post money valuations,1 entails signifi-
cant misvaluation. Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) empirically estimate an overvaluation of
1Post money valuation is determined by multiplying the entire amount of issued shares with the share price of the
mostt recent financing round.
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37% for so-called unicorns when using post money valuation compared to reflecting those
rights correctly. Second, as investments of VCs are usually staged over several financing
rounds with different rights there are several different classes of shares. Thus, investors not
participating in a particular round have to check whether dilutions of their earlier invest-
ments due to prioritization of later investors are compensated by the increase in enterprise
value assumed in the post money valuation. Third, ignoring these differences may also yield
inflated net asset values in annual statements of VC funds. While any fair value measure-
ment compliant with IFRS or US GAAP has to account for such cash flow rights as recently
claimed by the IPEV Board in their International Private Equity and Venture Capital Val-
uation Guidelines (2018)2, investors tend to ignore cash flow rights influencing their VC
investments when communicating to the public for different reasons (see Chakraborty and
Ewens (2017) and Agarwal et al. (2019) for detailed discussions) and often publish most
recent financing round valuations, i.e., post-money values, instead. Likewise, such valua-
tion practices may have cash relevant implications in case of inheritance tax issues or in
case of ’dry-income’ for employees, management or advisors, since compensation packages
are often tied to the performance of specific share classes of the venture instead of the per-
formance of the venture as a whole.3 An illustrative example regarding the consequences
of potential misvaluation is the case of Good Technology, a mobile security startup. The
company was supposedly valued at USD 1.1 billion in 2014 with a perceived price for com-
mon stocks of USD 4.32. One year later, the company was sold at a price of USD 425
million, 61% less than the previously imposed valuation. Being exempt from special cash
flow rights, the price of common stocks even tumbled by 90% down to USD 0.44. Due to
2IPEV does not only recommend the reflection of cash flow rights that "are currently exercisable", p.46, IPEV (2018)
but also to "include [...] the likelihood of the Fund receiving their full contractual right under the preference",p. 47,
IPEV (2018).
3Dry-income refers to taxable income that is not yet received in cash.
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the existence of preferential cash flow rights, some investors and executives experienced a
significantly lower drop in value on the expense of common shareholders. Such a setup is
not an exception but the standard. Specifically in case of mediocre or poor performance,
cash flow rights result in an allocation of exit proceeds skewed away from the usual pro rata
allocation which has significant economic implications on the different shareholders.4 As a
study by Broughman and Fried (2010) reveals: 84% of ventures within their sample have in-
vestors exiting as preferred shareholders, i.e., exit proceed distribution has been determined
by cash flow rights rather than pro rata. In our paper, we develop a structured valuation
approach for such exit-relevant cash flow rights that allows to identify mispricing ex ante.
In differentiation to existing literature, our model captures all features of preferential claims
that are empirically known and distinguishes mispricing on share class level as well as on
shareholder level.5
Further, we apply the model on a sample of 49 ventures capturing 407 financing rounds and
2,098 transactions. The economic impact will be measured by the difference between the
model-based (implied) value and the (imposed) post-money value.6 By such, we do not only
confirm the results of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) but in addition reveal that:
- on average, valuation discounts on venture level grow with the number of financing
rounds and share classes.
- valuation discounts vary significantly on shareholding level within ventures with
4Pro rata allocation refers to an allocation based on the respective relative share in nominal capital. Exit proceeds refer
to the total proceeds received for the stakes sold in the event of an exit.
5See section 2.2 for a detailed literature review and table 2.1 for a structured comparison.
6We refer to the imposed post-money valuation as the number of shares outstanding times the price paid in the most
recent financing round, implicitly assuming pro rata rights, see also Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).
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growing discounts for lower, more subordinated share classes and lower entry prices.
- even valuation premia may occur on shareholding level, if one or more subsequent
investments have been made in a down round.7
- valuation discounts on shares are greater for ventures where the seniority of prefer-
ential claims is based on a ’stacking’-approach or mixed seniority in comparison to
ventures where seniority of claims is based on pari passu
- valuation discounts are greatest under shareholder-based (SHB) remainder allocation
in comparison to conversion-based (CPR) and share class-based (SCB) remainder
allocation.
Being unaware of the implications of special cash flow rights may have severe consequences:
First, communicating inflated valuations may result in disadvantageous investment deci-
sions. Second, the burden of preferential claims may be so substantial that common stocks
held by founders and employees loose their incentive function. Third, the asymmetry of exit
proceeds among shareholders may endanger the execution of beneficial exit strategies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section two, we give a brief overview
on the related literature. In section three, we introduce the elements of exit relevant cash flow
rights and present our modelling framework as well as the underlying economic concepts.
Thereafter, we develop the model by separately valuing preferential claims and the remain-
der. Within the fifth section, we introduce our sample and the assumptions with regard to the
implementation of the model. Subsequently, we summarize our results and provide compar-
7We define a down round as an investment into the venture where the entry price per share lies below the entry price
of the previous financing round.
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ative statics with respect to our exogenous parameters in the sixth section. We conclude the
paper in section seven discussing the main results and suggesting areas for further research.
2.2 Literature
This paper adds to the research stream at the crossroad of financial contract design in ven-
ture capital and option valuation. The general financial contract design in context of venture
capital provides for extensive debate in the academic literature over the last three decades
and primarily relates to the principal-agency conflicts inherent in VC investments and how
they can be mitigated using specific designs, see e.g., Sahlman (1990), Gompers (1997),
Hellmann (1998), Kaplan and Strömberg (2001) or Cumming (2005) or Bengtsson and Sen-
soy (2015). For a comprehensive review on the recent status of the corresponding literature
see Tykvová (2018). Inevitably, the specific structure of venture capital finance and prefer-
ential claims within the related contracts provide for strong non-linearities in payoffs. Thus,
it is rather impractical to assess their value using traditional, linear valuation metrics such as
net present value or internal rates of return, see e.g., Keeley et al. (1996) or Leisen (2012a).
In order to reflect asymmetric payoffs of venture capital investments more adequately, ap-
propriate models should be used. Table 2.1 provides an overview of research which has
currently used respective approaches to evaluate the respective effects of preferential claims
with regard to different research objectives on different levels.
Although the economic value of VC investments is of importance for the entire VC indus-
try, rather view academic research relates to this topic. For example, Cossin et al. (2002)
and Metrick and Yasuda (2011) propose valuation approaches to assess the value of single
VC investments. Leisen (2012b) uses a similar approach to evaluate the impact of preferred
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Liq. pref. x x x x x x
Multiple x x x x
Div./ret. x x x x x x
Seniority x x x x x x
Cap x x x
Participation x x x x x
Conversion x x x x x
Setoff x















Sample size n/a n/a n/a 135 n/a 49
Venture
size1
n/a n/a n/a >USD1bn n/a EUR2.5m-
4.3bn
Period2 n/a n/a n/a 1994-2017 n/a 2003-2017
Geography n/a n/a n/a US n/a Global










Share class x x x x x
Notes: Liq. Pref. notes the basic liquidation preference, Multiple refers to the multiple applied to the basic liquida-
tion preference amount, Div./ret. notes (accruing and/or compounding) dividends or return rates which apply to the
basic liquidation preference amount, Seniority relates to the stacking order of liquidation preferences, Cap refers to a
limitation in the total claim level of the share, Participation refers to the feature of shares participating in remaining
exit proceeds without conversion or any setoff, Setoff refers to the usual catch-up of junior shares that resembles con-
version features (by offsetting preferential claims of preferred shares against any remaining allocation of proceeds),
Cond. exit reflects the contingency of exit-scenarios i.e., the potentially different payoffs in different exit scenarios
(IPO or trade sale), IPO thres. refers to automatic IPO conversion exemptions, which generally prevent conversion
of preferred shares in case of an IPO unless the IPO fulfills specific requirements, and, IPO ratchets, which note the
right of receiving additional shares in an IPO whenever the exit proceeds are below a specific threshold; 1 Venture size
is measured in terms of post-money valuation, 2 Period is based on the incorportation date of the ventures within the
sample.
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shares on the feasibility of later-round financings. Arcot (2014) uses a principal-agent model
to analyse how information asymmetry between the venture and investors at exit can be miti-
gated by using preferential claims. Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) evaluate the overvaluation
of ventures when popular post-money valuations are applied - compared to a comprehensive
alternative fair value assessment, where cash flow rights are appropriately reflected. Similar
to Cossin et al. (2002) and Metrick and Yasuda (2011) and other than Gornall and Strebulaev
(2020), we focus on the rather granular level of the VC investment i.e., the share class level.
Based on our model, we reflect a comprehensive list of preferential claims. In addition to
the extant literature, we provide insights on a mechanism unrecognized by the related strand
of academic literature so far: share class and shareholder based setoff of preferential claims.
In most European legislations, conversion of preferred shares is rather uncommon, instead,
a catch-up of more junior shares resembles such conversion mechanism, where preferential
claims due to e.g., liquidation preferences, of respective preferred shares are setoff against
any remaining proceeds. We observed that such setoff may not be based on thhe respec-
tive preferred shares, but may also be based on the preferred shareholders (and their entire
shareholdings) themselves. Following Arcot (2014) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), our
approach reflects the scenario dependence of payoffs at exit.
We complement our model framework by its application to a hand-collected sample of 49
ventures. As is recognized throughout the VC literature, there is few available empirical
data, especially data related on the deal or share level. To the best of our knowledge Gornall
and Strebulaev (2020) is the only study which applies their model to a real-world sample of
ventures. Their empirical results are based on the data of VCExperts, who made a consider-
able effort to collect documents on the financing of ventures in the US. However, the data of
VCExperts still requires a number of assumptions to be made, especially with regard to the
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investment setup, since it does not report the investors or number of issued shares in a regu-
larly fashion. In contrast to Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), we approached VCs directly and
were able to acquire a comprehensive set of data with respect to the number of issued shares
per share class and the number of investors as well as their shareholdings. Due to the fact
that we approached solely European VCs, our sample is largely based on non-US ventures
and therefore may reflect different settings and contractual practices, contributing to empir-
ical insights on the European venture capital ecosystem. For a more detailed view on the
sample, see section 2.5.1. The dataset allows us to assess the value of each shareholding i.e.,
the value of shares of each investor held in each share class, considering the impact of their
preferential claims as well as of all other share classes of the respective venture. Comparing
such values to the most recent financing round, we identify whether and by how far VC
investments of different share classes are fairly valued by marking them to the most recent
financing round. This is of particular practical relevance, since VC investments largely rep-
resent minority interests, where different investors tend to invest in selected stages holding
different share classes, see e.g. Chakraborty and Ewens (2017), Barber and Yasuda (2017),
Chernenko et al. (2017) and Agarwal et al. (2019). They provide empirical evidence on
the prevalent practice to mark-up earlier round investments at the pricing of the most recent
round. Here, our research provides crucial support in assessing the impact of such common
practice.
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2.3 General Framework
2.3.1 Exit and investment scenario
As pointed out earlier, exit relevant cash flow rights allocate the venture’s value in case
of an exit among the investors, entrepreneurs and management, deviating from pro rata
allocation.8 The allocation of such value will be referred to as the allocation of exit proceeds,
where we use the term exit proceeds and venture value interchangeably, assuming full sale
or recapitalization of the venture.9 The specification of such a set of rights is determined by
the valuation perspective, characterized by the valuation date t, the time to exit and the type
of exit event, the so-called exit route. First, we assume the exit to occur in T , where T > t.
Thus, the time to exit amounts to T − t in years, where there is either no further financing
until exit or if there are future financing rounds, the net present value effect of those is zero
for all investors. Second, we consider two stylized exit routes, which account for the most
common exit choices in the VC context - a recapitalization via an IPO and a sale of the entire
venture to another investor, referred to as M&A-transaction. Differentiation is necessary
since in case of an IPO generally all preferential rights are waived, while the allocation of
exit proceeds in case of an M&A-transaction will be based on full application of preferential
rights. Next, we determine the investment scenario, which defines the shareholding of the
venture by each investor as per share class as well as the respective pricing. The individual
shareholding si, j,T in the venture at date T can be displayed via matrix ST, where i, i =
1, ...,m, refers to the share class index of share class S Ci and j, j = 1, ..., n, refers to the
8For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to all such entities that represent shareholders of the venture as ’investors’.
9We will assume the means of distribution, cash or shares, to be irrelevant.
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Inv1 Inv2 . . . Inv j
S C1 s1,1,T s1,2,T . . . s1, j,T
S C2 s2,1,T s2,2,T . . . s2, j,T
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Usually, S Ci=1 refers to common shares, which often do not have any preferential rights.
The corresponding share prices per shareholding at time of investment are referred to as
pi, j. As investment times deviate among investors and share classes we do not subindex pi, j
but rather capture the time of investment by θi, j ≤ t < T of each single shareholding. In
aggregation, all prices of shareholdings are summarized in P, a price matrix equivalent to
the matrix from Eq. (2.3.1). Altogether, we refer to the set of shareholdings ST and its prices
P as the investment scenario of the venture. Tab. 2.1 and 2.2 contains all notations of the
paper.
2.3.2 Set of preferential rights
In order to evaluate the economic implications of exit relevant cash flow rights, we split
the mechanisms of the exit proceed’s allocation into two consecutive phases and provide
the basic structure of our framework. The first phase corresponds to allocation due to ex-
plicit preferential claims i.e., liquidation preferences or preferential return rates, thus called
preferential claim allocation. The second phase regards the allocation of the remaining exit
proceeds after all preferential claims have been served. While this part of the allocation
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Table 2.1: Notation index
Input parameters and indices
Variable Description Variable Description
1 indicator function πM&A probability of M&A exit
h level of seniority r risk free rate p.a.
i index of share classes S Ci share class i
Inv j investor j σ annual volatility of Vt
j index of investors t time
k index of proceed steps T time of exit
m number of share classes θ time of investment
n number of investors u time span of preference return
ν lowest level of seniority w highest proceed step
πIPO probability of IPO exit
Model variables
Variable Description
capi, j preference cap of investor j in share class i at exit T
hi, j seniority index for investor j in share class i
H matrix containing each seniority index hi, j
mi, j preference multiple on a shareholding
pi, j price of a shareholding at time of investment θ
P matrix of prices of shareholdings at time of investment
pci, j,T preferential claim of investor j in share class i at exit T
PCT matrix of all preferential claims pci, j,T at exit T




total (capped) claim of investor j in share class i at exit T
rai, j,T remainder allocation share of investor j in share class i at exit T
rri, j preference return on a shareholding
si, j,t shareholding of investor j in share class i at time t
St matrix of all shareholdings of a venture at time t
S
pc,h,%




xi, j,T set-off indicator of investor j in share class i at exit T
yi, j,T preference participation indicator of investor j in share class i at exit T
Notes: This table summarizes all notations applied within the paper categorized by input parameters and indices as
well as model variables.
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Table 2.2: Notation index (continued)
Stochastic calculus and option pricing
Variable Description
BP break point of claims
Ct call option price, i.e., value of a claim, at time t





cumulative amount of preferential claims on the h-th seniority level
Vt stochastic venture value in t
VBPt value of each break point at time t
VPCt matrix of values per share for the shareholdings ST at time t
VPS t value of each proceed step at time t
VPTt value per shareholding at time t
Z standard normal distributed random variable
Notes: This table summarizes all notations applied within the paper regarding stochastic calculus and option pricing.
follows pro rata in general, it may be characterized by implicit claims, which arise due to
conversion features, set-offs of preferential claims or caps. We refer to this phase as re-
mainder allocation. Our framework for structuring the elements of preferential claims is
characterized by two dimensions, the amount and the allocation of preferential claims. The
amount of preferential claims is determined by the preference basis and can be scaled by a
preference multiple or return or can be restricted via a preference cap. The allocation of the
preferential claim and the remainder is determined by preference seniority and remainder
allocation basis and also depends on preference conversion into common and participation
(or analogous set-off for non-convertible securities). We will introduce each of the elements
in the subsequent paragraphs. With regard to exit routes, we will assume automatic conver-
sion in case of an IPO, where all preferential rights will be waived and allocation takes place
on a pro rata basis. As suggested by Arcot (2014), even if there is no explicit or mandatory
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conversion in case of an IPO, factual conversion is a reasonable assumption.10 In order to
consider automatic conversion, we will assume IPO-probability denoted by πIPO, whereas
probability of the M&A exit equals πM&A = 1 − πIPO.
Preference basis: The basis is usually linked to the initial investment amount pi, j si, j,T , where
pi, j represents the price paid per share and si, j,T reflects the number of shares acquired at exit.
Preference multiple: In general referred to as ’liquidation preference multiple’ or ’multiple’,
the preference multiple mi, j determines the general height of the preferential claim per share
by
pci, j,T = mi, j pi, j. (2.3.2)
Empirical research provides evidence that the predominant multiple amounts to one. In this
case, the respective preferential claim is often referred to as a ’simple’ liquidation prefer-
ence.11
Preference return: The preference return rri, j,u captures any cumulative dividends, preferen-
tial dividends or other rates applied to the preference amount such as inflation adjustments.
In addition to the applicable rate rri, j, a period u, starting at θ, has to be specified for the
respective calculations such that the preferential claim per share adjusts to
pci, j,T = mi, j pi, j(1 + rri, j,u). (2.3.3)
10E.g., the conversion is a costly signal for venture capitalists, which, if placed, will facilitate the public offering in
terms of higher valuation, i.e., the venture capital will be able to receive a higher payoff at exit. In addition, keeping
a complex capital structure in case of an IPO would severely affect due diligence for potential investors, whereas the
costs will be born via lower valuations at exit.
11For empirical research on the preference multiple see for example Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015).
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Oftentimes u is not agreed on explicitly but rather depends on pre-defined events such as the
next financing round or subsequent exit. For sake of simplicity but without loss of generality,
we assume u ≤ T − θ.
(Explicit) preferential claims per share are well defined by Eq. (2.3.3). By referring to
any other (implicit) claim regarding the remainder allocation per share as rai, j,T , the total
(uncapped) claim per share amounts to
pti, j,T = pci, j,T + rai, j,T . (2.3.4)
Preference cap: A preference cap capi, j limits the amount of exit proceeds allocated to
the respective investor with regard to his respective shareholding and resulting preferential





= min{pti, j,T ; capi, j}. (2.3.5)
Within the study of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), the cap was examined in combination
with subsequent participation in the remainder allocation. According to their results, a cap
was present in 23% of all investments under consideration.
Preference seniority: The central element of preferential claims and payments is the struc-
turing of claims according to an agreed-on hierarchy of claims. Although various structures
are possible, they are generally based on two distinctive schemes: pari passu treatment of
12We will assume the cap capi, j to be at least as large as any preferential claim i.e., ∀capi, j : capi, j ≥ pci, j,T .
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preferential payments (i.e., all preferential payments are served (pro rata) at once but be-
fore any common shares are served) or (strict) seniority (i.e., share classes and respective
preference claims are served in a specified order, also called ’stacking’).13 For modelling
purposes, we will set up an index hi, j with hi, j = 1, . . . , v for each shareholding and the
respective level of seniority, where hi, j = v denotes the lowest level of seniority and hi, j = 1
ranks highest with regard to seniority.14
Remainder allocation basis: After preferential claims have been served, remaining exit pro-
ceeds, if existing, will have to be distributed. Generally, we observe two different mecha-
nisms which apply to different legal settings and result in three different remainder allocation
models. First, the remainder can either be allocated on a share basis or on a shareholder ba-
sis, where respective preferential claims are pooled accordingly. Depending on jurisdiction
and legal form, companies may not issue preferred shares. However, respective provisions
have evolved which resemble the conversion feature of preferred shares. Instead of con-
verting preferred shares, the preferential claims are ’credited’ or rather ’set off’ against any
remainder allocation. Set-off takes place on a share class or share holder based level, where
conversion only applies in a share based setting. Thus, we consider remainder allocation
based on (1) conversion and (non-)participation (CPR) as well as remainder allocation based
on (2) set-off with regard to share class (SCB) and (3) set-off with regard to shareholder
(SHB).
Preference participation and conversion, CPR: Preferential claims can affect the subsequent
13See also Woronoff and Rosen (2005), p. 110. In addition, Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) found 42% of there sample
investments featuring senior preferential claims, while 57% had pari passu rights. In only 0.4% of their sample,
junior claims were observed.
14The number of seniority levels is limited by the number of shareholdings but often corresponds to the number of
share classes (strict seniority) or applies pari passu among preferred share classes and shareholdings.
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distribution in different ways: On the one hand, shares might be eligible to receive a pro rata
share of remaining exit proceeds without any consideration of previous claims, thus, called
participating convertible preferred shares. On the other hand, they might be restricted to
their preferential claim only. In this case, shareholders usually have the right to convert
to common shares, thereby waiving all their rights participating in the allocation on an as-
converted (to common shares) basis. We refer to this feature as (non-participating) con-
vertible preferred shares.15 Participation is denoted by yi, j,T for each shareholding, where
yi, j,T = 1 if the shareholding is participating and yi, j,T = 0 if not. The conversion feature
also applies whenever a cap is agreed upon the shares’ participation in the exit proceeds.
Whenever the cap is hit, the respective shareholding stops participating. However, once the
as-converted shares have ’catched up’, that is, common shares are allocated as much as the
capped participating convertible preferred shares, the investor will eventually convert her
shares.
Preference participation and set-off, SCB and SHB: Similar to conversion, set-off allows
other (more junior) shareholdings to catch up.16 Contrary to the conversion feature, set-
off applies to shareholdings regarding a specific share class or to entire shareholdings of a
specific shareholder itself. Set-off will be denoted by xi, j,T for each shareholding, where
xi, j,T = 0 if the respective preferential claims of the shareholding are to be set off and xi, j,T =
1 if not. The participation in the remainder allocation might be capped, however, the contract
usually allows for further ratable participation once all other common shares have been
allocated an amount up to the cap.
15This conversion feature distinguishes from automatic conversion by the fact that exercise is up to the investor of the
respective shareholding and therefore depends on his individual perspective i.e., his benefit.
16See Woronoff and Rosen (2005), p. 115; this applies especially for those companies, where the legal form prohibits
the issuance of dedicated convertible or preferred equity shares.
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The respective rights can be structured as shown in figure 2.1. Practically, specific elements
of preferential claims and remainder allocation have to be aligned for the entire venture:
First, seniority is a relative measure and is set in relation to all other share classes and will
generally not deviate within a share class. Second, the remainder allocation basis is also
set for the entire investment scenario, without deviations across or within shareholdings and
share classes.




























































































Figure 2.1: Modelling framework based on structured preferential claims
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2.4 Model
2.4.1 Venture value
Assessing the economic impact of the aforementioned claims and implied allocations on a
share level requires both, the determination of the value of the venture as well as of each
share. Starting with a basic model of the venture value itself, focus will be on the determi-
nation of the share value, which itself consists of the value of different explicit and implicit
claims the respective share participates in. We assume the venture value Vt to follow a
diffusion process with constant annual volatility σ and constant annual drift rate of return
r, where t denotes the valuation date and t < T . Following the idea of Leisen (2012b),









VT denotes the venture value at exit and Z is a standard normal distributed random variable.
The stochastic process is presumed to remain unaffected by the equity capital structure. In
order to determine the value of each share based on the venture value, we have to deter-
mine the value of each claim the respective share participates in. The explicit and implicit
(stacked) claims represent conditional payments with respect to the eventual venture value at
exit. As proposed by existing literature such payments are most suitable for an option-based
approach. Given our set of assumptions and following Leisen (2012b), we apply European
17For a more detailed discussion on the general assumptions see also Hull and White (1988) or Trigeorgis (1996).
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call option pricing for all of the subsequent claims where the price of the call is





















with underlying Vt, strike price KT , time to exercise T − t, standard deviation σ and risk free
rate r. Central to our analysis is the appropriate specification of KT and the integration of
these claims into a model.
Valuation of preferential claims and remainder allocation will be based on a stepwise ap-
proach, as depicted in figure 2.1: Each of the stacked explicit and implicit claims is referred
to as a proceed step PS T .
18 The ordered proceed steps constitute successive breakpoints BP
which are eventually used in the claim valuation model in order to assess the value of each
breakpoint VBP, and in turn the value of each proceed step VPS . For example, the first pro-
ceed step (i.e., the first breakpoint), represents a claim superior to any other claim regarding
the exit proceeds of the venture. In other words, all other claims have a call on the venture
at an exercise price (KT ) corresponding to the first breakpoint. The value of such call can
then be evaluated via Eq. (2.4.2), and is referred to as ’breakpoint value’. Now, the claim
value can be obtained by subtracting the breakpoint value from the venture value. Likewise
all other breakpoint and proceed step values can be determined and used to evaluate claim
values. Next, we determine the relative participation of each shareholding in each proceed
step, to evaluate the value of each shareholding and share. The latter is fully determined by
18Each proceed step is characterized by the nominal claim per share, the number of participating shares and its respec-
tive order. The latter adheres either to the seniority within the preferential claim allocation or is driven by the height
of the per share amount in case of the remainder allocation.
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aggregating the relative participation per shareholding in each proceed step. This general
approach will be followed in the preferential claim allocation as well as in each of the re-
mainder allocation models.19














































































acc. to section 2.4.3
Notes: The valuation of the calculated preferential claims is shown for a case of 1, 2, . . . ,N preferential claim with












which are used to determine the value of each proceed step PS
pc,h
T
as a difference of consecutive breakpoint
values. To determine the value of the first proceed step, the difference is taken with respect to the entire value of the
venture and the first breakpoint value. Thereafter, the proceed step values are allocated on the respective shares to
determine the value of each shareholdings preferential claim per share.
19Note, that the last proceed steps’ value in the remainder allocation will correspond to the last breakpoints’ value,
since it represents the ultimate residual call value on the venture after all preferential claims and subsequent implied
allocations have been served.
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2.4.2 Preferential claim allocation
For preferential claims the nominal claim per share is given by pci, j,T . Considering the re-
spective shares si, j,T as well as pooling and ordering those amounts by seniority h = 1, . . . , v,















denotes the cumulative amount of preferential claims on the h-th seniority
level, therefore called the h-th proceed step.20 Thereby, 1HT=h represents an indicator func-
tion for the respective seniority level h. Additionally, we define ps
pc,h,%
i, j,T
to be the percentage
share of proceeds of shareholding si, j,T regarding PS
pc,h
T
, where we describe the percentage






. Ordered proceed steps will
be stacked consecutively to determine breakpoints BP
pc,h
T













That is, the first breakpoint BP
pc,1
T
entails the first proceed step PS
pc,1
T
, which in turn repre-
sents the cumulative preferential claims with highest seniority, the second breakpoint BP
pc,2
T






, see also fig-
ure 2.1. The value of each breakpoint VBP
pc,h
T
can be determined according to the approach
20 pc denotes that PS
pc,h
T
is a proceed step of the preferential claim allocation.
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t = Ct(Vt, BP
pc,h
T
, r, σ,T − t) (2.4.6)
where h = 1, . . . , v. Ceteris paribus, an increasing amount of preferential claims reduces the
value of the residual claim VBP
pc,h




is determined by the value of the venture less the value of the residual claim on the
venture i.e., the first proceed step being fully served VBP
pc,1
t . The next proceed step values
are determined similarly by calculating the difference between the value of the residual claim
VBP
pc,h
t and the subsequent value of the residual claim VBP
pc,h+1




























t , where h = v, will usually be equal to zero since it describes the lowest
seniority level, which does not feature any preferential claims. Also, we can see that the
values of each claim represented by each proceed step VPS
pc,h
t are restricted, resembling a
so-called, ’call spread option’.21 Knowing the value of each proceed step VPS
pc,h
t as well
as the relative share of each shareholding according to S
pc,h,%
T
, we can allocate the amounts
21See Hull (2014). The short call option has a higher strike price than the one of the long call option. Since the value
of the respective proceed step h is actually determined as the sum of claims being long a call option on the venture
VBP
pc,h−1
t at an exercise price BP
pc,h−1
t and being short a call option VBP
pc,h
t at an exercise price BP
pc,h
t . Thus, any
upside potential due to a higher venture value is transfered to the next proceed step. Also, variations in volatility do
have ambigiuous effects on proceed step values: Following option-pricing theory regarding a european call option
on a non-dividend paying asset, an increase in annual volatility should generally lead to an increase of the value
of such an option, which is the basis of each of the breakpoint values. Thus, a ’call spread option’, will generally
decrease in value, given an increase in annual volatility.
110









· VPSpc,ht ) ⊘ ST (2.4.8)
where VPCt denotes the matrix of values per share for the shareholdings denoted by ST,
each referred to as the referential claim value per share vpci, j,t.
2.4.3 Remainder allocation
After the valuation and allocation of preferential claims VPCt, we have to determine the
allocation and value of the remaining exit proceeds. As already noted in section 2.3.2 ,
the remainder allocation basis and the mode of the consideration of previously allocated
preferential claims can differ. The latter stems from different jurisdictions, where the con-
version feature of convertible preferred shares can be mimicked by an equivalent set-off of
preferential claims for non-convertible shares in order to ensure subsequent catch-up. Re-
mainder allocation basis differs with respect to the level of consideration of the previously
allocated preferential claims: A conversion based approach generally applies on a share ba-
sis only, while set-off can either be pursued on a share or a shareholder level. This gives
reason for three different models. In accordance with the basic differences, we refer to them
as ’conversion-’, ’share class based-’ or ’shareholder based remainder allocation’. The key
difference raises from different levels of preferential claim consideration and technically re-
sults in different (implicit) claims. However, apart from the determination of proceed steps,
the structure and valuation approach remains the same across all models. Thus, we will
develop one model in full (conversion based) and elaborate on the determination of proceed
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steps for the other models (share class and share holder based).
Figure 2.2: Remainder allocation base
Remainder allocation basis
Allocated preferential claims of an investor
𝑆𝐶1 𝑆𝐶2 𝑆𝐶𝑚−1 𝑆𝐶𝑚…
𝑆𝐶1 𝑆𝐶2 𝑆𝐶𝑚−1 𝑆𝐶𝑚…
Share class based










▪ Remainder is allocated uniformly across all 
shareholdings in each share class
▪ Preferential claim set-off per share class basis, 𝑆𝐶𝑖
▪ Remainder is allocated uniformly across all 
shareholdings in each share class
▪ Where allocated remainder is higher as allocation of
preferential claim, the shares would convert
▪ Remainder is allocated uniformly across all 
shareholdings in each share class
▪ Allocated preferential claims are set-off on a 







Allocated remainder (w/o consideration
of previous preferential claims)
Allocated remainder (w/ consideration of
previous preferential claims)
Notes: The remainder allocation depends on the given legal framework: For some jurisdictions, the issuance of
preferred shares is not possible given specific legal forms such as private limited companies. Whereas the share class
based mechanism mimics the allocation under a conversion based regime, the share holder based mechanism considers
preferential rights and remainder allocation a share holder level. The plots above characterize the mechanisms based
on shareholdings in different share classes of a single investor.
Conversion based allocation
Conversion based allocation mechanism gives the investor the right to decide on whether to
take the preferential claim or to convert into common shares. Rationally, she would choose
the maximum thereof. The critical amounts at which a shareholder would convert her pref-
erential shares rather than retain her preferential claim depend on the actual amount of pref-
erential claims per share as well as whether it is participating or capped. At the same time,
preferential claims impose implied claims for the more junior and all participating shares.
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= yi, j,T si, j,T and s
cc,y=0
i, j,T








notes those which do not. Next, the implied claims for conversion will be determined:
Apparently, there will be no conversion of any preferred shares, unless the amount of re-
maining exit proceeds allocated to all common and participating preferred shares per share
exceeds the preferential claim amount of the lowest preferential claim amount per share.
Whenever the remaining exit proceeds exceed such an amount, the respective shares will
convert and participate ratably (on an as-converted basis). The critical amounts of remaining
exit proceeds at which conversion takes place determine implicit claims due to preferential







= pci, j,T s
cc,y=0
i, j,T
, when pci, j,T > 0. Caps can be easily implemented into this approach
by considering them as critical amounts, where respective capped convertible (participating)
preferred shares will not participate. However, as mentioned in section 2.3.2, the capped
(participating) shares will be converted to common at a certain level. That is, when all com-
mon and other participating or converted shares will receive at least as much as the amount of
the respective cap. Thereafter, capped convertible (participating) preferred shares will par-
ticipate ratably on an as-converted basis. Thus, the nominal cap per respective share capi, j,T
technically translates into two values. First, capped shareholdings of share class i will stop
participating at an amount per share of cap
ad j
i, j,T
per share, where cap
ad j
i, j,T
= capi, j− pci, j,T yi, j,T .
Second, they participate ratably on an as-converted basis, if all common and all as-converted
common shares have been allocated an amount per share equalling the nominal cap capi, j,T .
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, when capi, j,T > 0
0, else
(2.4.11)
Thus, proceed steps in remainder allocation are determined by preferential claims as well
as caps. In a next step, to fully determine proceed steps, we order related claims per share













}. Where k = 1, . . . ,w denotes the index
of ascending order. That is, pscc,1
T
denotes the preferential claim of the lowest level i.e.,
min{pci, j,T }, which usually corresponds to common shares without any preferential claim.22
w depends on the different levels of preferential claims and (adjusted) caps. Since subse-
quent modelling also applies for the other remainder allocation models, we index any model
specific terms of the remainder allocation by ra.23
As a further step in the determination of proceed steps, the cumulative amounts of shares as
22Note, that min{capi, j,T , cap
ad j
i, j,T
} >> min{pci, j,T } .
23Where ra = cc refers to the conversion based, ra = sc refers to the share class based and ra = sh refers to the share
holder based approach.
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per each implied claim pscc,k
T




























































































where 1 is an indicator function with respect to the indicated claims e.g., whenever psra,k
T
≥
pci, j,T , 1psra,k
T
≥pci, j,T
is equal to one and zero otherwise. Apparently, participating shares s
ra,y=1
i, j,T




≥ pci, j,T . Also, capped shares are subtracted whenever the implicit claim of the pro-
ceed step psra,k
T
is higher than cap
ad j
i, j,T
. The subtraction is reversed via the fourth term in Eq.
(2.4.12), whenever psra,k
T
is higher than capi, j,T i.e., when all other shares have "catched-up".
Based on S ra,k
T
, the percentage share of each shareholding sra,k,%
i, j,T
per level k can be derived
for each level of k, where we refer to the percentage of all shareholdings per level k via
matrices Sra,k,%
T
. Lastly, we will derive the total claim amount as per each proceed steps for
the conversion based remainder allocation PS ra,k
T
as an amount of the shares per proceed
step S ra,k
T
times the price differential of the current and the previous implied claim per share
24Note that the implied claim by the last proceed step k = w marks also the last step of any allocation based on explicit
and implicit claims. Thereafter, pro rata distribution applies. In order to include shares that are capped to the last





2 Same Same but Different































1 < k ≤ w
(2.4.13)





































1 < k ≤ w
(2.4.14)
Next, we will determine the corresponding values analogous to the idea described in sec-
tion 2.4.2, where we derive the value of breakpoints as follows:
VBP
ra,k
t = Ct(Vt, BP
ra,k
T
, r, σ,T − t) (2.4.15)
The value of each proceed step is subsequently determined considering the sequence of









































t 1 < k < w
VBP
ra,w
t k = w
(2.4.16)
where VBPra,wt represents the final residual claim and is allocated among all investors pro
rata, since there are no subsequent explicit or implicit claims anymore. Note that all proceed
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steps VPS ra,kt , k < w are actually restricted and even decrease with increasing volatility.
25
That is, an increase in Vt results in a limited increase in VPS
ra,k
t with k < w, since VPS
ra,k
t
equals BPra,k−1t − BP
ra,k
t . Knowing the value of each proceed step allows to calculate for
the value of remainder allocation for each shareholding: Apply Sra,k,%
T
to respective proceed
level value VPS ra,kt and sum up the amounts as per each shareholding si, j,T denoted by vpa
ra
i, j,t







· VPS ra,kt ) ⊘ ST (2.4.17)
Adding the value of preferential claim allocation as per each shareholding VPCt gives the
total value per shareholding VPTrat , which is the matrix of all shareholding values per share
reflecting preferential claims and conversion based remainder allocation.
Share class based allocation
Share class based allocation mimics the convertible based allocation mechanism. Instead of
converting, the remaining exit proceeds are allocated among all shares pro rata, but any pre-
viously allocated preferential claim pci, j,T will be credited (’set-off’) against such allocation
- depending on whether to be set off (yi, j,T = 0) or not (yi, j,T = 1). Similar to the option of
conversion, the set-off per share up to the amount of the preferential claim allows common
(and other more junior) shares to catch-up in the remaining exit proceeds, which represents
an implied claim. Analogous to section 2.4.3, we first evaluate which shareholdings will
25For a more detailed explanation see footnote 21.
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= xi, j,T si, j,T and s
sc,x=0
i, j,T




denotes the number of shares for each shareholding where preferential claims are
not to be set-off and ssc,x=0
i, j,T
where they are to be set-off. Subsequently, the determination




= pci, j,T s
sc,x=0
i, j,T
when pci, j,T > 0 and where ps
sc,pc
i, j,T
denotes the implied claims
due to the preferential claim pci, j,T . As already noted in section 2.4.3, the nominal cap per
respective share capi, j,T translates into two values: capi, j,T and cap
ad j
i, j,T
. We denote the im-






and determine them analogously to
section 2.4.3, Eq. (2.4.11). Again, amount-based ordering of proceed steps is required, con-











denotes the claim per
share related to the k-th proceed step, where k = 1, . . . ,w depicts the index in ascending
order. Based on the different levels and order of claims per proceed step, we follow the
modelling approach depicted in section 2.4.3, Eq. (2.4.12)-(2.4.17), to determine per share
values.
Shareholder based allocation
The share holder based mechanism is similar to the share class based mechanism by featur-
ing a set-off of preferential claims rather than conversion of share classes, however, it differs
with regard to the set-off mechanism itself. Instead of crediting the allocated preferential
claims as per share, the preferential claims are set off based on a shareholder level. All
preferential claims that are to be set-off for each shareholder are pooled and will be credited
against the ratable allocation of remaining exit proceeds corresponding to the total share-
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holding of the shareholder, regardless the specific share class of the shareholdings. First





= xi, j,T si, j,T and s
sh,x=0
i, j,T




denotes the number of shares for each shareholding where preferential claims are not
to be set off and ssh,x=0
i, j,T
where they are to be set off. In order to determine the implied claims
as in the modelling approach in section 2.4.3 and 2.4.3, the mechanism has to reflect the
preferential claim set-off and shares on a shareholder level rather then a share class level.
Thus, the pooled amount of preferential claims for each shareholder which has to be set-off
with regard to any participation in remaining exit proceeds has to be divided by the entire










The result reflects the amount which is to be set-off per share - on average - for the respective
shareholder regarding any allocated amounts of the remaining exit proceeds. That is, the
critical amounts after which the shares of the respective share holder will participate in the
remaining exit proceeds and thus determines the implied claims per proceed step due to the




= pc j,T (2.4.21)
26That is, any amounts of preferential claims due to shares that do not require any set-off will not be included.
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depends on the shareholding structure of investors due to the direct rela-
tion to pc j,T and the averaging of preferential claims, which represents the primary differ-
ence compared to the other remainder allocation models.27 Just as described in section 2.4.3
and 2.4.3, the existence of caps with regard to the exit proceed allocation results in implied
claims of other shares, since caps are assumed not to be pooled but rather refer to the re-







analogously to section 2.4.3, Eq. (2.4.11). Again, amount-












denotes the per share claim related to the k-th proceed step, where
k = 1, . . . ,w depicts the index in ascending order. Based on the different levels and order
of claims per proceed step, we follow the modelling approach depicted in section 2.4.3, Eq.
(2.4.12)-2.4.17, to determine per share values.
2.4.4 Deriving share values
Given the value per shareholding after Preferential claim and remainder allocation i.e.,
VPTrat , we still have to calculate the value of each shareholding in case of an IPO. Value
allocation in case of an IPO is rather straightforward, since shares will convert and the naive
approach of pro rata allocation applies, i.e. a ratable allocation of exit proceeds as per nom-
inal shareholding without any preferential rights. That is, at time t the pro rata value of each
share corresponds to Vt/
∑m,n
i=1, j=1




27However, the impact of such difference among models would decrease by increasing the concentration of sharehold-
ings of different shareholders. That is, if each shareholder would be invested in just one class of shares, there would
be no difference with regard to the share class based approach.
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Assuming IPO-probability of πIPO, the value of each share for all shareholdings, VPt, can
be derived as follows:
VPt = (1 − πIPO)VPTrat + πIPOVPT
ipo
t (2.4.22)
Where the share value is calculated as the probability weighted value for each exit scenario.
Obviously, the more likely the venture will end up in an IPO, the more the value allocation
will converge to a pro rata allocation.
2.5 Application of the model
The proposed model is able to reflect various preferential rights of different investors holding
different shares of different share classes i.e., shareholdings. Within this section, we report
the results on a share class basis of an implementation of the model based on a sample of
selected ventures.
2.5.1 Description of the sample
We retrieved data from various venture capitalists for a total sample of 49 ventures, where
financing took place between 2009 and 2017 and which were incorporated between 2003
and 2017.28 We do not have coherent industry classification, but we do know for most of
the ventures that they reflect a broad range of industries (e.g., E-Commerce, Financial Tech-
28Initially, we were provided with data on 56 ventures. However, we dropped five ventures which were actual dupli-
cates we already received data for and we also exclude two other ventures due to lack of sufficient data.
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nology, Software, Energy) and business models (e.g., marketplace/platform, services, prod-
ucts). Size of the ventures in terms of the post-money valuation varies between EUR 2.5m
to EUR 4.3bn, where the total funding amount per venture varies from as low as EUR 0.6m
up to EUR 818.8m (average approx. EUR 96.5m, median approx. EUR 21.7m).29 This
already shows, that our sample contains a broad range of general investment scenarios. It is
worth noting that the investment in the most recent financing round represents about 47%
of the total funding amount per venture on average (median approx. 44%). According to
the observation of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), high relative volumes of the most recent
funding round will result in stronger overvaluation. We provide some additional descriptives
on our sample in table 2.1. As can be seen in panel A of table 2.1, the number of investors
and share classes varies considerably. The median count of investors per venture is 20 (av-
erage approx. 29).30 The median count of share classes per venture amounts to 5 (average
approx. 6). The amount invested per investor per shareclass is around EUR 0.7m on average
across all ventures, however, respective median of EUR 0.2m shows, that the distribution
is clearly skewed, indicating that there are few investors investing large amounts. We also
derived an estimation of ’repetitive investors’: Across all ventures, each investor invests in
1.7 share classes on average (min: 1.0, max: 3.4), where the number clearly depends on the
actual number of share classes. Standardizing those numbers by the total number of share
classes per venture, we observe that across all ventures, each investor invests in 36% of share
classes on average (min: 12%, max: 72%). These numbers reflect that the ventures in our
sample are generally more early-stage, since most of them have rather few share classes. In
29We translated all foreign currency amounts (USD: 13 ventures, GBP: 6 ventures and INR: 1 venture) into EUR at
the prevailing exchange rate as of the most recent financing rounds. Note that currency generally does not effect our
empirical results since each venture is funded in one currency.
30The maximum count of investors of 356 investors relates back to the fact, that we considered each investor separately.
For the given venture, a significant count of employees were given direct shares in the company, which might
otherwhise be kept by a trust.
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addition to repetitive investment, we also evaluated the relative innvestment amount of each
investor per venture. Considering the average relative investment amount of each investor
per venture, we see that across all ventures each investor contributess 24% of the total fund-
ing amount on average and 50% at max (median approx. 20%, min: 5%). This is in line
with the general notion, that VC investments represent syndications of minority investments
and shareholders will not strive for sole investorship.
Aside from the size of the round in general, VC often concerns the respective pricing of the
financing round i.e., whether it is an up round, flat round or down round.31 According to
the data, 34.7% of the ventures in our sample include at least one down round in their fund-
ing history. More specifically, there were 14 ventures with one down round and 3 ventures
with two down rounds in their funding history. On average, the down round represented a
decrease of 38.6% in prices compared to the previous round (median 40.0%). Interestingly,
the elements of preferential claims per venture vary a lot with regard to allocation mecha-
nism and seniority, but there are just two ventures where there are participating or non-set-off
rights. Considering the allocation mechanism, we can see that shareholder based allocation
mechanism is present in more than one fifth of all ventures. However, convertible preferred
and share class based are the dominating mechanisms in our sample. With regard to se-
niority, we can observe that seniority is neither guided by a pure pari passu nor by a strict
seniority mechanism but rather by a mixture of both. Notably, there is just very few variation
within the preferential claim amount. On average, the preference multiple amounts to one
and there are just a few financing including a preference return rate and for all the ventures
31See e.g., Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015). We refer to a down round as stated by Bartlett (2003), that is, ’...the issuance
of securities [...] at a price that is below the price previously paid by the company’s investors...’, see Bartlett (2003),
p. 23. Flatrounds refer to a stagnating but stable pricing level, see also Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015). We evaluated
down rounds by comparing the (average) price paid for a given share class to the (average) price paid for the previous
share class. Whenever the pricing differential was negative, we assumed the given share class to be a down round.
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within our sample no cap was set for any share class. Implementation of the model and its
variants requires a rather detailed level of data (e.g., shareholdings per each share class for
each investor), which - to the best of our knowledge - is not systematically provided for by
any commercial database.32 Thus, in contrast to Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), we were
able to retrieve the exact number of issued shares as per the date of the last financing round
and do not have to make any assumptions regarding the number of issued shares e.g., based
on the number of shares authorized. As already stated in the literature, the number of shares
issued and shares authorized can vary significantly, Chernenko et al. (2017).
2.5.2 Exit scenario, annual volatility and risk free rate
When implementing the model with respect to the sample, we have to make assumptions
regarding the exit scenario, namely, the IPO-probability and the time to exit. We explicitly
refrain from modelling those assumptions, in order to show the impact of the variation in
such assumptions later on and to allow for a closed form solution. We applied fixed values
for both parameters: For T−t we assume a period of four years, which is in line with Gornall
and Strebulaev (2020), who derived an average time to exit of approximately four years.33
Similarly, we set the IPO-probability at a fixed rate of 25%, which is in line with the results
of a recent study of Gompers et al. (2016), which indicates that about 75% of the venture
32For the participating funds, we were obliged to sign non-disclosure agreements, which also covered non-disclosure
of data, prohibiting the dissemination of data or publication of results on a funds or venture level. We transcribed the
relevant information from contracts and capitalization tables to anonymized data frames for each venture. Hereby,
we refer to a ’share class’ as a distinct class of equity issued by the venture. We indexed share classes by order of
issuance and indexed investors by order of the provided capitalization table. We supplemented and cross-checked
the data with basic information from federal registers as well as from commercial VC data sets such as CrunchBase.
33Note, that similar to IPO-probability, the time to exit may vary significantly as reported for example by Giot and
Schwienbacher (2007) or Félix et al. (2014).
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Table 2.1: Sample descriptives
Panel A: Investment scenario





Panel B: Preferential and remainder allocation
Allocation mechanism Convertible preferred Share class based Share holder based
22 16 11
Seniority Pari passu Senior Other
15 10 24
Participation/set-off Particip. / non-set-off Non-particip. / set-off
2 47
Panel C: Preferential claim amount
Multiple Minimum Average Maximum
1.0 1.0 3.0
Return rate Minimum Average Maximum
0.0% 0.0% 12.0%
Cap Minimum Average Maximum
n/a n/a n/a
Notes: Descriptive statistics regarding the preferential rights within our sample of 49 ventures. Fundings were pursued
from 2009 to 2017.
Panel A enlists statistics regarding the investment scenarios of the ventures in our sample. Note that we recorded the
investors on a most detailed level. E.g., some ventures issued equity to employee/management directly, some bundled
those holdings into a trust.
Panel B shows the specifications regarding the elements of the allocation mechanisms of the preferential rights, de-
noted as the count of ventures within this simple, where financial contracts indicate the respective feature. For example,
47 ventures of the sample do feature solely preferential claims that are to be set off or non-participating. Preference
seniority is often a mix of pari passu and strict seniority, where some share classes are pari passu, but senior towards
other share classes.
Panel C shows descriptive statistics on the specification of the elements regarding the amount of the preferential
rights. For example, the average multiple of preferential claims across all ventures is about 1.0, whereas the maximum
multiple observed for at least one venture amounts to 3.0.
capitalists exited their investment via an M&A-transaction rather than an IPO.34 This rate is
34In contrast to our fixed rate approach, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) modelled the IPO-probability based on actual
exits observed in Dow Jones VentureSource, whereas the applied IPO-probability for each venture of their sample
depends on the future value. However, extant research shows that IPO probability critically depends on legal en-
vironment, the origin and experience of investors as well as the level of information asymmetry see e.g., Giot and
Schwienbacher (2007), Félix et al. (2014) or Espenlaub et al. (2015).
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higher compared to the findings of Cumming and Johan (2008), where an IPO was carried
out as an exit route in approximately 14% of the sample, and Espenlaub et al. (2015), where
the rate of IPOs within the sample varied by region, ranging from 8% up to 19%, but still
lower compared to the IPO probability range stated by Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) of
about 26.3% to 35.1%.35 In addition to the assumptions regarding the exit scenario, we
also have to specify the assumptions regarding expectations of the annual volatility and
the risk free rate. With regard to annual volatility, we follow Leisen (2012b) and Gornall
and Strebulaev (2020) by applying 90% annual volatility based on the results provided by
Cochrane (2005). Other researchers such as Ewens (2009) and Korteweg and Sorensen
(2010), estimated annual volatility ranging from 88% to 130%. Lastly, for the risk free rate
we apply a rate of 2.50%, thereby following Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).36 Note that,
when implementing our model, we prescind from any other terms and provisions having
an impact on the economic value of the venture or any share thereof. Further, all ventures
are assumed to be free of debt, which we checked for in capitalization tables and available
contracts.37
35According to Giot and Schwienbacher (2007), the pursued exit route as well as the time to exit, differ significantly
across stages, industries and investor characteristics.
36Basically, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) point out that besides being rather at the higher end of a reasonable range
in the ’...era of very low interest rates...’, an increase in the interest rate will yield monotonically higher implied
equity values. Other researchers such as Leisen (2012b) refer to Cochrane (2005) and apply a rate of 5.0%.
37Still, there are other limitations, too: For example, a common feature of venture capital finance is the provision of
so-called option pools. We did not get access to the contracts of such programs systematically, so that we assumed
those shares to be fully equivalent to common shares. For our analysis, we also refrain from the existence of any
deferred or forfeited shares, that is, we would assume the amount of deferred shares at exit to be zero. Also, the
vesting of the shares of founders is often an issue in venture capital financial contracts. We abstract from this feature,
since we would assume the shareholding to be fully vested at exit.
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2.6 Empirical results
In determining the implied venture values by calibration to the last funding, we assume the
most recent share class to be fairly priced.38 Thereupon, we backsolve the model for the im-
plied venture value Vt numerically and, thus, also determine the implied values of all single
shares. On venture level, we compare implied venture values with post-money values and
consider differences as over- or undervaluation. More precisely, we refer to the percentage
difference in relation to the post-money value as implied valuation discount. Such implied
valuation discounts are positive in overvaluation settings where the post-money value ex-
ceeds the implied venture value and negative in undervaluation settings vice versa.39 On
share level, we are concerned with comparing the price of the most recent share class with
the implied share values of previous classes, respectively, and with revealing individual dis-
counts borne by those shares. We start the analysis of our sample on venture level as this
motivates our subsequent examination of share level results. Thus, in figure 2.1 we plot
implied venture values versus respective post-money values in percentage terms. Based on
the definitions from above, implied valuation discounts in our sample range from as low
as 0.6% to 40.8%. In accordance to Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) our results indicate a
general overvaluation, which amounts in our sample to 22.1% on average:40
Finding 1. Ventures are generally overvalued when post-money valuations are applied,
which confirms the findings of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) for unicorns. For the ventures
in our sample, overvaluation is 22.1% on average.
38We therefore assume the valuation date of each venture to coincide with the closing date of the transaction repre-
sented by the last financing round.
39The approach is analogous to the one applied by Gornall and Strebulaev (2020).
40We provide sensitivities with regard to the valuation assumptions in table 2.A.1 in appendix 2.A.
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Distributions of implied valuation discounts on a venture level
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min Std. Dev.
Across all ventures 40.8% 27.4% 21.1% 22.1% 17.4% 0.6% 7.9%
Notes: On the left plot, we denoted implied venture values in terms of the post-money valuation. On the right plot,
we present the implied venture values in terms of a implied valuation ’discount’ i.e., implied venture value divided by
the post-money value less one. Ventures are deemed to be overvalued, whenever the implied venture values are less
than the imposed post-money valuation i.e., when the ratio implied venture value vs. post-money valuation is less than
100% or the implied valuation discount is negative. Within the table, we report statistics on the distribution of the
implied valuation discounts across all ventures.
The high dispersion of discounts in our sample demands the extension of our analysis in
order to shed light into the driving forces of these significant differences. Moreover, venture
level results per se have rather limited implications for venture capital investments since
they rarely constitute entire ventures. Instead, they usually hold minority stakes consisting
of shareholdings in a single or multiple share classes, and rather focus on discounts for their
specific shareholdings.41
As described above, we assess how over- and undervaluation translates to share level by
41VC investments generally represent minority investments procured in syndicates of several investing parties. As
noted by Chernenko et al. (2017), Barber and Yasuda (2017) or Chakraborty and Ewens (2017), even large investors
such as mutual funds usually do not invest in majority stakes, but rather hold shares in different share classes.
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comparing the implied fair values of each share with the most recent funding round.42. Fig-
ure 2.2 presents the implied valuation discounts for all shares of all ventures. According to
our results, the average discount across all share classes of all ventures in our sample is at
21.9% (median 23.8) ranging from a maximum discount of 56.8% to a maximum premium
of 36.6%.43
42For the presentation of share level results, we aggregated the share values of each shareholding on a share class level
by taking the weighted average of share values for the respective share class of each venture.
43We provide results of sensitivities regarding our valuation assumptions in table 2.A.2 in appendix 2.A.
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Distributions of implied valuation discounts
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min Std. Dev.
Across all shares 56.8% 33.7% 23.8% 21.9% 9.4% −36.6% 16.1%
Averaged by venture 43.4% 28.1% 20.3% 21.9% 15.0% −4.2% 9.9%
Notes: The plot depicts the histogram of implied valuation discounts for each share across all ventures. Implied
valuation discount is calculated as the implied share value divided by venture values in terms of a implied valuation
’discount’ i.e., implied venture value divided by the post-money value less one. Within the table, we report statistics
on the distribution of the implied valuation discounts across all shares per share class as well as implied valuation
discounts across all ventures, where we averaged implied valuation discounts for each venture. For the plot, we
exclude the calculated discounts for the most recent funding rounds, since they are equal to zero by assumption.
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Compared to venture level results the average discount is similar, but the distribution of
discounts on share level is much more dispersed with larger discounts at the lower end and
even negative discounts, i.e., premia, at the upper one (see figure 2.1 vs. figure 2.2). We
summarize our finding as follows:
Finding 2. Implied valuation discounts on share level are significant, averaging at 21.9%
and ranging from 56.8% to −36.6%. Compared to venture level results, discounts vary
considerably more and some share classes even carry negative discounts, i.e., premia.
To check for the impact of any outliers, we modify the analysis by considering average
share level discounts per venture. Results are depicted in the table of figure 2.2 and reveal
that the average discount remains while dispersion, as expected, reduces towards venture
level results. Our findings on share level offer several implications: First, there is significant
potential of over- but even of undervaluation of shareholdings when applying the most recent
funding round as a fair value estimate. Second, applying averages across different share
classes is also prone to result in erroneous fair value estimates. In consequence, we take a
closer look on what determines discounts on share level subsequently.
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Fitted linear models: Implied valuation discounts















Notes: The plot depicts implied valuation discounts regarding relative share class (left) and relative pricing (right). n
denotes the number of observations. Grey shaded areas within the plots describe standard error (SE) of the forecasts
of the fitted linear models at a 5%-confidence level, i.e. α = .05.
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Aside the significant negative relations with considerable explanatory powers of R2 greater
than 0.4, we can still observe considerable variations. In particular, the implied valuation
premia in both of the plots in figure 2.3 should be further investigated. As plots reveal, the
shares carrying premia are part of more recent financing rounds as they have relative share
class levels of at least 0.5. In addition, the original price per share is always higher than
the price per share of the most recent funding round, i.e., these shares have been affected by
a down round.44 Also, R2 of the fitted linear model indicates, that relative pricing already
explains a lot in the variation of the implied valuation discounts, when no down round has
taken place.
To gain a deeper understanding, we separate ventures with down rounds from those without
down rounds and analyze the distributions of discounts for both groups in figure 2.4. The
analysis reveals that shares of ventures with down rounds carry greater discounts on average
and are confronted with increasing standard deviations (or dispersion in general), which is
also reflected in the fitted linear models. Moreover, shares that have been placed at prices
higher than the most recent funding round account for all cases of implied valuation premia
in our sample. That is, applying the price of the most recent funding round as a fair value
estimate for such shares would result in undervaluation. In fact, they are (partially) pro-
tected against drops in pricing and implied value dilution via their preferential claims. We
summarize our observation as follows:
Finding 3. In general, shares may carry an implied valuation premia if their placement
price is above the original price of the most recent funding round and if they hold a prefer-
ential claim attached to their investment.
44As already mentioned in section 2.5.1, about 34% of our ventures have at least one down round within their funding
history.
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Down round in funding history:
No Yes
Implied valuation discounts
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
Down round in funding history 56.8% 40.4% 28.2% 25.0% 12.6% −36.6%
No down round 45.2% 27.4% 23.0% 18.9% 0.1% 0.0%
Fitted linear models: Implied valuation discounts
Dep. variable: Relative pricing n Intercept (SE) Slope (SE) Residuals SE R2










Notes: The plot depicts implied valuation discounts with respect to relative pricing, indicating whether there was a
down round in the funding history of the venture or not. Within the table, we report statistics on the distribution of the
implied valuation discounts across all shares per share class as well as simple linear regression results. n denotes the
number of observations. Grey shaded areas within the plots describe standard error (SE) of the forecasts of the fitted
linear models at a 5%-confidence level, i.e. α = .05.
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Another key characteristic of preferential claims is its seniority vis-a-vis other claims and
allocations of exit proceeds. Within our model, we considered pari passu, strict and mixed
seniority. In figure 2.5, we plot implied valuation discounts (and premia) with respect to the
prevailing seniority scheme applicable in the venture.
Within the plot and the adjacent table, we observe that average and median discounts vary
among groups, where discounts are smallest for shares of ventures with a pari passu senior-
ity. Here, we also observe the most considerable impact of relative pricing on implied valau-
tion discount. These results can be explained by the claim structure: While all preferential
claims are served in the same step under pari passu, claims are ’stacked’ i.e., the more senior
claims are served before the more junior claims in a descending order, for strict seniority.
However, average valuation discounts are highest for shares of mixed seniority, although it
represents a mix of pari passu as well as strict seniority, and we would expect mediocre im-
plied valuation discounts. One explanation to this unanticipated observation can be, again,
drawn from the occurrence of down rounds in the respective venture’s funding history as
down rounds are a well-known trigger for a change in seniority terms. More recent rounds
will get strict seniority or there is a change from pari passu to a mixed approach where ear-
lier classes are served pari passu and more recent rounds are given seniority (see Bengtsson
and Sensoy (2015)). In fact, our data shows that a mixed seniority approach applies twice as
much in ventures with down rounds.45 Thus, we suppose that higher average valuation dis-
counts for mixed seniority approaches are caused by the occurrence of down rounds rather
than by the seniority scheme itself.
45In about 72% of all cases where a down round occurred in the funding history of the venture, a mixed seniority
approach applies. On the other hand, when there is no down round, mixed seniority applies only in 35% of such
cases.
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Pari passu Strict seniority Mixed seniority
Implied valuation discounts
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
Pari passu 38.8% 22.4% 15.5% 12.9% 0.0% −36.6%
Strict seniority 45.2% 30.7% 24.6% 21.5% 9.2% 0.0%
Mixed seniority 56.8% 35.4% 27.2% 25.1% 14.3% −25.8%
Fitted linear models: Implied valuation discounts
Dep. variable: Rel. pricing n Intercept (SE) Slope (SE) Residuals SE R2















Notes: The plot depicts implied valuation discounts with respect to the seniority of preferential claims of the respective
venture. Within the table, we report statistics on the distribution of the implied valuation discounts across all shares
per share class as well as simple linear regression results. n denotes the number of observations. Grey shaded areas
within the plots describe standard error (SE) of the forecasts of the fitted linear models at a 5%-confidence level, i.e.
α = .05.
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Finding 4. Implied valuation discounts on shares are greater for ventures where the se-
niority of preferential claims is based on a ’stacking’-approach (strict seniority, average:
21.5%) or mixed seniority (average: 25.1%) in comparison to ventures where seniority of
claims is based on pari passu (average: 12.9%). Higher discounts for cases of mixed se-
niority seem to be triggered by the occurrence of down rounds.
Another characteristic that shows a lot of variation across our sample is the remainder al-
location. According to figure 2.6, implied valuation discounts are largest for shares where
SHB remainder allocation applies while standard deviations are comparable throughout all
types of remainder allocation. In order to better assess the distribution for each group, we
provide boxplots depicting implied valuation discounts as well as interquartile ranges and
median. In fact, we would have expected the distribution of implied valuation discounts for
SHB remainder allocation to be narrower compared to the other allocation regimes as share
values of different share classes held by the same investor should even out (see section 2.4.3).
One explanation to this can be found in the general shareholding structure of our sample:
On average, an investor holds shares of about 1.7 different share classes and also for ven-
tures where the SHB mechanism applies, the number only increases to 2.1. Thus, the effect
we expect might not be that strong. A second explanation are overlapping effects stemming
from other characteristics, e.g., seniority. An indication to such is given by a comparison
of CPR and SCB, where average (and median) implied valuation discounts differ although
remainder allocation is technically identical. Differences can be due to several reasons and
would require individual investigation. For instance, the difference might be due to the
pricing-performance or individual background of the respective venture: CPR is often ap-
plied for US-American or UK-based ventures, whereas SCB or SHB often applies for Euro-
pean ventures. In addition, the fitted linear models indicate considerable differences in the
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Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
CPR 38.6% 26.6% 21.6% 16.1% 0.0% −36.6%
SCB 43.5% 33.8% 25.2% 22.7% 11.4% −6.6%
SHB 56.7% 43.0% 33.3% 29.1% 18.1% −9.0%
Fitted linear models: Implied valuation discounts
















Notes: Both plots depict implied valuation discounts regarding the remainder allocation i.e., conversion-based (CPR),
share class-based (SCB) and share holder-based (SHB). In the left plot, implied valuation discounts are displayed in
terms of relative pricing, in the right plot, implied valuation discounts are displayed via boxplot. Within the table, we
report statistics on the distribution of the implied valuation discounts across all shares per share class as well as simple
linear regression results. Grey shaded areas within the plots describe standard error (SE) of the forecasts of the fitted
linear models at a 5%-confidence level, i.e. α = .05.
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explanatory power of the relative pricing regarding implied valuation discounts in terms of
R2 with respect to the different seniority structures. To summarize our findings regarding
remainder allocation, we postulate:
Finding 5. On average, implied valuation discounts are greatest under shareholder-based
(SHB) remainder allocation. Although conversion-based (CPR) and share class-based
(SCB) remainder allocation procedures are technical identical, discounts vary pointing to-
wards overlapping, dominating effects.
Overall, our univariate exploratory analysis shows that variations of valuation parameters
have different impact on the value of share classes depending on the respective relative share
class level. We also indicated multivariate or interaction effects, however, we refrained from
any multivariate or any regression analysis due to sample size and limited variation across
the sample. These limitations and subsequent analysis restrictions open a broad avenue for
future research.
2.7 Discussion
Based on our framework of preferential rights in venture capital (VC) finance, we present a
structured valuation approach to assess the impact of variations in investment, exit proceeds
and risk-return relationship on a shareholding level. Our model offers closed form solutions
for numerous realistic, complex setups of VC investments. Thus, we provide a powerful,
novel tool for decision making regarding investment and exit in VC financing. In particular,
analyses based on our approach support the explicit design of equity securities in follow-
on rounds, restructuring, down rounds or secondaries. Beyond strategic considerations, the
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model contributes to comply with regulatory reporting requirements which invoke the de-
termination of appropriate fair value estimates, such as share-based payments or net asset
value reporting to a fund’s limited partners.46 In this paper, we also apply our approach to a
hand-collected sample of 49 mainly European ventures with 407 financing rounds and 2,098
transactions in order to investigate the impact of preferential claims on venture level, share
class level and even on single shareholdings. We start by analyzing valuations on venture
level revealing a structural overvaluation bias, on average 21.9% (median 23.8%, maximum
56.8%), across all share classes and ventures in our sample, when post-money valuations
of the most recent funding round are simply extrapolated to the venture as a whole. Our
results are in line with those of the well-known study on American unicorns conducted by
Gornall and Strebulaev (2020). However, our empirical study goes beyond venture level as
the heterogeneity of our sample in terms of financing history (e.g., number of share classes
ranges from 2 to 21) and contract features (e.g., in seniority or remainder allocation) allows
us to understand dynamics on single shares and specific preferential claims features. We
infer that implied valuation discounts are higher for shares of earlier share classes, whereas
the variation is higher for shares of later share classes when considering the interquartile
ranges of discount distributions. Additional exploratory analyses indicate that results differ
considerably across different investment scenarios, sets of preferential rights and assump-
tions regarding exit scenario, annual volatility and risk-free rate. For instance, ventures
that experience down rounds can even face valuation premia for respective share classes
implying undervaluation, up to a maximum of 36.6% in our sample, in comparison to the
most recent share price. With regard to the set of preferential rights, we observe substan-
46International valuation guidelines such as International Private Equity Valuation (IPEV) guidelines 2018 and the
International Valuation Standards (IVS) 2017 explicitly require consideration of security-immanent rights which
affect the value of such securities.
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tial variation in preference and remainder allocation which also affects implied valuation
discounts. For example, strict seniority of preferential claims generally results in higher
implied discounts than pari passu. Moreover, the remainder allocation basis plays an im-
portant role as it affects the entire investment strategy. In general, investors participating
in multiple financing rounds face a basic trade off: Higher claims of a recent shareholding
may secure recent investment, but harm previous ones. Our model enables the detection
of such issues. In addition, since terms are generally not often changed across financing
rounds (see Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015)) our model can be used by early stage investors
and founders to assess the impact of subsequent financing. Those investors should prefer a
simple, non-participating (or set-off) preferential claim with pari passu seniority. Clearly,
our results are bound by certain limitations that provide avenues for further research. We as-
sume all option shares to be equivalent to common shares and we prescind from integrating
other rights such as anti-dilution or redemption provisions. Extensions of the model in this
respect may provide even more accurate discount estimates on share class level but come
with additional complexity. Since the extent of the economic impact is considerably affected
by the underlying assumptions regarding the exit scenario as well as annual volatility and
risk free rate, robust estimation will provide more accurate estimates. For the same reason,
the model could be extended technically by integrating uncertainty of time to exit or mod-
elling IPO probability as a stochastic process in order to endogenize these key indicators of
the assumption set. Apart from extensions of the model, further empirical research is de-
sirable since extant research is currently limited to large US ventures and existing samples
are rather small such that the applicability of multivariate analyses is limited. Such analyses
could validate findings of the theoretical model, help in calibrating key assumptions and
may support the creation of approximation functions to estimate valuation discounts if not
all relevant information are available.
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Table 2.A.1: Sensitivities of implied valuation discounts per venture
IPO-probability, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
5.00% 51.28% 34.17% 26.67% 27.78% 22.12% 0.74%
12.50% 47.41% 31.86% 24.59% 25.64% 20.33% 0.68%
25.00% 40.80% 27.41% 21.11% 22.05% 17.35% 0.58%
50.00% 27.24% 18.21% 14.09% 14.77% 11.51% 0.39%
75.00% 13.82% 9.05% 7.04% 7.40% 5.76% 0.19%
Time to exit, years
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
2 49.28% 33.39% 27.31% 27.95% 22.82% 0.51%
3 44.56% 30.57% 24.05% 24.96% 19.84% 0.59%
4 −40.8% −27.41% 21.11% 22.05% 17.35% 0.58%
8 26.83% 15.85% 12.43% 13.22% 10.20% 0.39%
12 16.98% 9.27% 7.35% 7.91% 5.96% 0.24%
Annual volatility, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
60.00% 50.13% 30.97% 26.18% 26.48% 21.81% 0.34%
75.00% 43.80% 30.11% 23.97% 24.79% 19.81% 0.54%
90.00% 40.8% 27.41% 21.11% 22.05% 17.35% 0.58%
105.00% 36.45% 23.11% 17.99% 18.92% 14.90% 0.54%
120.00% 31.48% 18.73% 14.88% 15.75% 12.25% 0.47%
Risk free rate, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
−1.25% 46.86% 30.30% 24.30% 25.25% 20.34% 0.74%
0.00% 44.80% 29.48% 23.21% 24.16% 19.42% 0.69%
1.25% 42.78% 28.67% 22.15% 23.09% 18.37% 0.63%
2.50% 40.8% 27.41% 21.11% 22.05% 17.35% 0.58%
5.00% 36.98% 24.69% 19.13% −0.05% 15.64% 0.49%
Notes: Within the table, we report statistics on the distribution of the implied valuation discounts across all ventures.
Values based on the basic parameter setting are highlighted in bold.
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Table 2.A.2: Sensitivities of implied valuation discounts per share class
IPO-probability, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
5.00% 67.75% 42.29% 30.03% 27.56% 11.61% −45.94%
12.50% 63.82% 39.20% 27.70% 25.45% 10.80% −42.46%
25.00% 56.75% 33.72% 23.78% 21.88% 9.39% −36.60%
50.00% 40.62% 22.51% 15.89% 14.65% 6.38% −24.66%
75.00% 21.71% 11.27% 7.99% 7.34% 3.10% −12.44%
Time to exit, years
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
2 75.72% 42.51% 31.10% 27.42% 9.79% −52.76%
3 65.61% 38.25% 27.35% 24.64% 10.00% −43.56%
4 56.75% 33.72% 23.78% 21.88% 9.39% −36.60%
8 32.10% 20.02% 14.06% 13.29% 5.80% −19.69%
12 19.91% 11.92% 8.31% 8.02% 3.45% −11.15%
Annual volatility, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
60.00% 77.02% 39.42% 29.78% 25.91% 9.02% −52.43%
75.00% 67.06% 37.87% 27.03% 24.44% 8.65% −44.20%
90.00% 56.75% 33.72% 23.78% 21.88% 9.39% −36.60%
105.00% 46.83% 28.80% 20.16% 18.88% 8.00% −29.75%
120.00% 37.73% 23.88% 16.71% 15.80% 6.90% −23.72%
Risk free rate, %
Implied valuation discount
Max 75%-Q Median Mean 25%-Q Min
−1.25% 60.07% 38.49% 27.34% 25.08% 10.46% −41.01%
0.00% 58.98% 36.74% 26.10% 23.99% 9.92% −39.52%
1.25% 57.87% 35.26% 24.93% 22.92% 9.66% −38.05%
2.50% 56.75% 33.72% 23.78% 21.88% 9.39% −36.60%
5.00% 54.45% 30.60% 21.59% 19.88% 8.73% −33.80%
Notes: Within the table, we report statistics on the distribution of the implied valuation discounts across all shares per
share class. Values based on the basic parameter setting are highlighted in bold.
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Despite its popularity, venture capital (VC) investment analysis suffers from a lack of venture specific
information and limited accessible market data. This is especially true for VC investment valuation
where common practices often rely on publicly available but in most cases insufficient data such as the
pricing of individual funding rounds. As has previously been shown, such practices generally result
in structural ’misvaluation’ primarily caused by the non-consideration of contractual rights in valuing
respective investments. In this paper, we develop a prediction model that accounts for those rights and is
intended to provide for more accurate valuations on an investment level. In order to fit such model, we
evaluate various contractual terms and their impact on the implied value for one of the largest complete
samples of venture capital investments available. Thereby, we are able to decrease average misvaluation
by up to 80.2% in terms of the share value.
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3.1 Introduction
Venture capital (VC) represents an increasingly popular asset class that attracts a broad
range of investors such as institutional investors, family offices, public investors and also
individuals. Despite the rapid upswing as an asset class, VC investment analysis remains
dissimilar opaque.1 The opaqueness is primarily rooted in the limited access to relevant
market data and pricing information and is aggravated by the common practice to invest in
several stages, whereby different classes of shares are issued. Generally, VC investments are
made in non-standardized securities and are accompanied by a framework of contracts that
includes various provisions on control, exit, information, veto and cash flow rights which
form an integral part of the investment.2 Notably, cash flow rights are a key determinant of
the investment value and generally result in different values for different share classes of the
same venture across the multiple investment stages.3 Thus, the price discovery processes of
VC investments in single share classes is severely impaired via, first, the limited liquidity
of such shares per se and, second, the complex contractual framework specifying the claims
of each share class on the venture individually. To make matters worse, the terms related to
the individual investment are rarely fully disclosed to stakeholders such as limited partners,
managers and employees as well as regulating bodies due to limited reporting requirements,
see also Jenkinson et al. (2019). In order to bridge the gap of limited information, in practice
as well as in academia, available public information is used to obtain a value estimate, most
often the post money valuation (PMV) or, correspondingly, the most recent price (MRP) of
1See e.g., Kaplan and Lerner (2016) for a more general note on availability of research data for VC.
2For a comprehensive overview on common provisions and respective categories see Zambelli (2014).
3See Broughman and Fried (2010) and Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
147
3 How Much Is Too Much
the most recent funding round (MRF).4 Unfortunately, such simple heuristics often result in
a positive valuation bias for the entire venture (see Gornall and Strebulaev (2020)) and even
more so for investments made in individual share classes (see Kaboth et al. (2020)). Albeit
such shortcomings are rather well-known, recent research shows that actual reporting of VC
investments - even of large, sophisticated investors - still seems to be based on those simple
heuristics. The application (and acceptance) of simple heuristics allows for considerable
discretion of the VC management to actively manage performance, either by being overly
conservative or by inflating values which in turn translate into the general financial system.5
In order to overcome the issue of absent liquidity and to still make use of more recent infor-
mation e.g., via a new round, respective modeling approaches evolved that allow to derive
implied value estimates for the venture itself as well as for each share class considering a
broad range of contractual rights.6 However, applying such models requires full informa-
tion on the investment setup and contractual rights. Besides that, even if full information
is theoretically available, there are often issues that impede appropriate valuation e.g., the
timeliness of information, the complexity and the costs of modeling the contractual rights in
an integrated framework.
With this paper we aim to provide a first step to fill the gap between accurate values and
simple heuristics by providing an empirically fitted prediction model based on the analysis
4See, for example, Chakraborty and Ewens (2017), Chernenko et al. (2017) or Jenkinson et al. (2019) for the applica-
tion of PMV and MRP in practice and Cochrane (2005), Hege et al. (2009) or Ewens (2009) for studies that apply
the PMV and MRP in practice. The International Private Equity and Venture Capital (IPEV) Valuation Guidelines
require to post fair values where the definition is pretty close to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
It is also worth noting that such simple metrics i.e., the PMV, MRP or OIP are no longer generally considered an ap-
propriate fair value estimate according to the latest IPEV Valuation Guidelines 2018. Similarly stated in the recently
published AICPA Accounting and Valuation Guide ’Valuation of Portfolio Company Investments of Venture Capital
and Private Equity Funds and Other Investment Companies’, chapter 8.
5For general VC investment reporting and valuation of funds see Chakraborty and Ewens (2017), Chernenko et al.
(2017), Cederburg and Stoughton (2018) or Jenkinson et al. (2019).
6See for example, Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020).
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of an extensive set of complete contract and pricing data on venture capital investments.
Therefore, we gather full information on a sample of 201 ventures, which we then use to de-
rive implied values of each share class calibrated on the MRP based on financial models also
used in Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020). Accordingly, we assume
such implied values to represent the appropriate fair value of the respective shares. Next, we
assess the accuracy of the MRP as a value estimate. On the one hand, we determine the av-
erage relative error in terms of the MRP calculated as the implied valuation discount (IVD),
see Kaboth et al. (2020), which amounts to 22.7% ’overvaluation’ on average. On the other
hand, we derived the mean absolute percentage error which represents the valuation error in
terms of the fair value and is referred to as misvaluation. Misvaluation amounts to 45.7%
with regard to our sample. Other than the IVD, misvaluation does not even out negative
and positive errors and also represents a more direct measure of the actual error since it is
defined in terms of the fair value. Still, the metrics are of complementing nature, since the
IVD is more useful in making an assessment when considering the available information
i.e., the MRP. For this reason, our prediction model is generally based and fitted using the
IVD. A set of independent variables for such model is derived employing the data on the
ventures in our sample. Thereby, we take into consideration that information is available
only on an aggregated level. That is, full information is available only for the underlying
share class and the respective share class of the MRF. Otherwise only the number of shares
outstanding and the issue prices are known. Our prediction model is based on a multiple
linear regression approach fitted by using out-of-sample validation techniques and intended
to predict the level of IVD (the predicted IVD, pIVD). Applying our model, we obtain value
estimates where misvaluation amounts to 9.1%. Compared to the MRP-based value estimate
this represents a substantial reduction in misvaluation of around 80.2%.
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In the next section, we briefly describe the relevant stream of literature and connect our
paper to the most closely related work. In section three, we discuss the data and the data re-
trieval process. This also includes a description of the implications for subsequent modeling
procedures. In section four, we outline the independent variables and present our empiri-
cal model for pIVD as well as respective performance and model limitations. Section five
summarizes the paper with a brief conclusion regarding the results and avenues for further
research.
3.2 Literature
The valuation of VC investments and its respective reporting has just recently been covered
by academic research, which usually focuses on large public (mutual) funds and their net
asset value reporting. For instance, Chakraborty and Ewens (2017) and Kwon et al. (2019)
evaluate net asset values (NAV) of VC investments made by fund management in the course
of fund raising. Similarly, Barber and Yasuda (2017) assess interim performance reporting
of private equity funds in VC assets. Chernenko et al. (2017) study the success of mutual
funds in VC investments and their impact on financial contract design. All of them report
issues in appropriately assessing economic performance, since NAVs seem to be stale or
actively managed and generally intransparent.7 Due to the lack of market data and infor-
mation on the performance of a venture as well as the respective investments via each share
7For example, Chakraborty and Ewens (2017) present empirical evidence for window dressing such as net asset value
inflation by strategic delay of write-offs or additional investments. Also, Agarwal et al. (2019) provide evidence, that
subsequent funding rounds (of shares with different rights) are used to mark-up early-on investments. Stale refers to
the fact that the reported NAV of securities does not change although new information has arrived which is supposed
to affect the NAV.
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class, analyses are often performed by applying the MRP as a value estimate.8 In investment
decision making, thorough analysis may additionally be restricted by timing and resource
issues. Despite this, it is well-known that implied value allocation assumed by using MRP
and PMV is inappropriate for most venture capital investments, see e.g. Metrick and Yasuda
(2011), Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020). In favour of such simple
metrics, there is few guidance and regulation which ensures governance and enforcement
of proper investment valuation as is pointed out in Jenkinson et al. (2019). Thus, research
regarding VC investment valuation is required in order to allow for more transparent re-
porting and decision making. Such research can also facilitate the price discovery process,
alleviating precipitous exit-based price discovery and secondary transactions.
In this vein, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020) are among the very
few which provide empirical analysis and findings regarding more adequate VC investment
valuation from an empirical perspective.9 Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) assess the level
of overvaluation of ventures when applying PMV as a value estimate for the venture’s fair
values.10 In fact, they provide evidence that PMVs are invalid estimates since they sys-
tematically overvalue the entire venture by neglecting asymmetric payoffs via contractual
cash flow rights. Using a sample of 135 unicorn ventures, they derive overvaluation in all
cases with an average of 48% across the sample. Other than Gornall and Strebulaev (2020),
Kaboth et al. (2020) provide analysis for a sample of 49 ventures on the investment level
using the MRP as a value estimate. Complementing Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), findings
of Kaboth et al. (2020) suggest that the issue of over- and undervaluation is amplified on an
8MRP is also applied in determining the well-known PMV. PMV calculates via the MRP times all issued and out-
standing shares.
9Other large scale empirical studies such as Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) focus more on the contractual rights but
less on the investment valuation or performance.
10Overvaluation is calculated based on the PMV and the fair value of the venture applying an indirect valuation model.
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investment level since implied value of shares for a given venture vary considerably where
the variation depends on the individual setup. However, the sample of Kaboth et al. (2020)
is rather small and does not allow for much inference regarding different specifications of
contracts and investment setups. Additionally, the sample consists of a mix of ventures from
different geographies involving different legislations, which neatly shows the variation but
thereby also hampers in the overall generalization of results.11
We add to the existing literature by providing an extensive and systematic study of contrac-
tual terms in VC investments on a share class level for a large sample of ventures based in
the United States. Second, we provide a thorough analysis of the implied valuation impact
of such terms. Third, via our prediction model, we provide a first empirical benchmark for
VC investment valuation on a share level. Thus, our study is intended to support researchers
as well as practitioners to better assess (interim) performance of VC investments and invest-
ment portfolios and the impact of preferential rights on them, thereby mitigating concerns
raised by the above mentioned studies such as Chakraborty and Ewens (2017), Barber and
Yasuda (2017), Cederburg and Stoughton (2018) or Kwon et al. (2019).
11See for example Cumming et al. (2010): Legality and venture capital governance around the world.
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3.3 Dataset
3.3.1 Basic data
In order to assess the value of venture capital investments, a comprehensive set of data for
each venture is required, consisting of the set of investors and shares including the respec-
tive pricing and contractual provisions. In fact, the unavailability of comprehensive, large
datasets is one of the key issues in venture capital investment research. In addition, data
is often incomplete, limited in depth and verification is often difficult, see e.g., Kaplan and
Lerner (2016). Following Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), Chakraborty and Ewens (2017),
Chernenko et al. (2017) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), we retrieve data from filed Cer-
tificates of Incorporation (COI) of individual ventures. Those filings are made and amended
whenever a venture has been incorporated or has raised a new round of financing. They
include data on investment rounds and the respective contractual provisions related to each
share class. In addition, we use complementary information retrieved from filings such as
annual tax reports, Limited Offering Exemption Notice, Form Ds12 and accompanying doc-
uments to verify data on the number of shares outstanding and pricing terms. We retrieve
these filings via access to the GENESIS database managed by Lagniappe Labs, LLC. The
GENESIS database relies on data previously managed by VCExperts, which has also been
used by, e.g., Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), Chernenko et al. (2017) or Gornall and Strebu-
laev (2020). We perform sanity checks and complement our dataset with information from
other public databases such as CrunchBase.
12A Form D has to be filed to notice of an exempt offering of securities according to security issuance under Rule 504,
505 or 506 of Regulation D of the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Table 3.1: Sample derivation
Step Remaining ventures
Total database 18, 777
Filtering proprietary valuations 1, 746
Random sampling (total sample) 800
Filtering full information (full sample) 201
Notes: The table above indicates the number of ventures remaining after each step of data filtering and sampling.
In total, GENESIS lists 18, 777 ventures,13 where, however, the database does not provide
full information for each venture. Rather, the data is gathered on request of clients or auto-
matic feeds and, thus, restricted. As we require complete information regarding contractual
provisions via COI, number of shares issued and outstanding as well as regarding pricing
terms of respective share classes for each venture, we have to stepwise collect a sample.
Since the database does not allow to filter for completeness or availability of information,
we attempt to increase the chance of full information by filtering for those ventures that fea-
ture a proprietary valuation of GENESIS. This leaves us with a sample of 1, 746 ventures.
Out of these, we draw a random sample of 800 ventures, the total sample, and evaluate
completeness of information for each venture on an individual basis. The sample of ven-
tures featuring a full set of information consists of 201 ventures representing 840 funding
rounds, the full sample.14
In contrast to Chernenko et al. (2017) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), we do not restrict
our sample to large ventures, so-called unicorns.15 Although COIs tend to be already gath-
ered and coded in the GENESIS database, we review and verify existing coding and extend
13Data retrieval as of June 28th, 2019.
14A list of required variables and parameters for each venture and share class is provided in appendix 3.A.
15Unicorns are generally defined as private companies exceeding a PMV of one billion USD.
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the available dataset as required. In particular, we use COIs to retrieve the number of shares
outstanding per share class, original issue prices (OIP) of shares and respective contractual
provisions such as liquidation preferences, dividends or conversion terms. In many cases,
COIs report the number of shares authorized for issuance. However, not all shares autho-
rized are issued and numbers can deviate significantly. Thus, we require evidence on the
number of shares issued, for instance, via tax reports, Form Ds and other documentation
available via the VCExpert database.16 If unavailable, we do not include the venture for the
full sample. In order to avoid selection bias, we compare total and full sample with respect
to key features such as prevailing industry, geography or incorporation years. Table 3.A.1
in appendix 3.A summarizes our results. Overall, we do not find any material differences
between samples. Moreover, when comparing the composition of our sample to other large
datasets on VC investments, such as Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) or Bengtsson and Sensoy
(2015), we do not identify any major differences.17
In table 3.2 we give some descriptive statistics on the general investment setup within our
sample, i.e., we report investment volumes and number of share classes of the ventures. The
descriptives indicate a considerable range of ventures within our sample with respect to age
and size. For instance, some of the ventures are very young, few are rather old. This already
16We thereby assume that the amount of shares outstanding is equal to the amount of shares fully issued i.e., represents
a fully-diluted basis.
17In particular, we analyze the distribution of ventures between West and East Coast locations, since findings of
Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) suggest that lawyers and investors tend to have different styles and terms in VC in-
vestment contracts considering each area. While in the sample of Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) 38% of ventures
are located in the pacific region (West Coast) and about 44% in the Atlantic region (East Coast), our full sample
consists of West Coast ventures with a proportion of 36% (California as a primary region of the West Coast) and of
East Coast ventures with a proportion of 41% (Massachusetts and New York as primary regions of the East Coast).
With respect to industries, approx. 43% of the ventures are active in the IT and Software sector, while Bengtsson
and Ravid (2009) have about 45% of the ventures being active in Computer (Hardware and Software) as well as in
Internet related sectors. More detailed descriptives are available on request.
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indicates that the ventures considered in our sample are quite diverse.18 Age and stage of
development of ventures are also reflected by the number of share classes. At minimum,
there are two share classes (one class of common and one class of preferred shares), while
the maximum number of preferred share classes raises up to 13.19 The notion of a broad
range is further supported by the range of total investment and average investment per share
class, where the ranges of investments are large and the relation of median and average
values suggest a right-skewed distribution. In addition, we evaluate some characteristics
regarding the MRF as it is a main input to calibrate our model data and to retrieve implied
values. Considering table 3.2, we can observe a strong variation in average investments,
especially with regard to the average investment of the last funding round.20 Thus, for the
MRF, the distribution of investment volumes seems to be more skewed than for the average
investment round. This suggests that the size of funding rounds is generally increasing. In
order to better understand this relation, we compare the average investment per share class
and the total investment for each venture. On average, we find that more than half (about
58.7%) of total funding is provided via the MRF.
3.3.2 Contractual data
Aside the general investment setup, contractual provisions relating to the exit are central
to the valuation of VC investments and thus to our database. In the following, we lay out
18The ventures of our full sample were incorporated in the period of 1993 to 2017 where the most recent funding
occurred in the period 2004 to 2019. In total, there are 24 ventures which are younger than a year and 21 ventures
of 10 years and older. Median and average venture age are quiet close, at 3.8 and 4.7 years, respectively.
19We avoid naming share classes since naming of share classes seems to be rather arbitrary.
20The average investment volume of the last funding round amounts to 25.8 being more than double the median value
11.0.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics - basic data
Overall Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
Age of venture (in years) 0.0 2.0 3.8 4.7 6.2 20.5
Number of share classes 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.2 5.0 13.0
Total investm. (in mUSD) 0.4 7.3 21.9 59.2 51.7 1,913.4
Averg. investm. / share class (in mUSD) 0.2 2.6 5.8 10.4 12.4 212.6
Last funding round Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
Averg. investm. of MRF (in mUSD) 0.2 3.7 11.0 25.8 24.1 871.7
Rel. investm. volume of MRF (in %) 3.2% 34.6% 58.7% 59.6% 88.9% 100%
Notes: Age of venture denotes the time from incorporation date to the last funding round; number of share classes includes all share
classes i.e., common and preferred share classes as defined in the COI; total investment aggregates the total investment amount, where
the investment amounts have been calculated as the sumproduct of original issue price and shares issued as per each share class; average
investment per share class and average investment of last funding round are calculated for each venture and considered across all ventures
in the sample; relative investment volume of last funding round is calculated as the fraction of the investment volume of the last funding
round with respect to the total investment volume of the venture.
the main contractual provisions of the sample considered in our model and describe their
implications on payoff-structures. A complementary summary of the descriptive statistics
regarding contractual provisions is reported in table 3.3. For all of the ventures within
our sample, payoff structures depend on the exit route, i.e., payoffs for each share may
vary considerably among scenarios due to different provisions that apply. There are two
basic types of scenarios, which are commonly known as the IPO-scenario and the M&A-
scenario.21 The IPO-scenario is characterized by automatic conversion of preferred shares
into common shares in case of an initial public offering, resulting in a ratable distribution
of exit proceeds among all shareholders. In contrast, the M&A-scenario applies in case of
any other exit route, e.g., mergers, sale, licensing, liquidation or winding-up and oftentimes
stipulates provisions that favour preferred shares. In order to reflect such conditioning in
our valuation estimates, we calculate payoffs for each scenario and weighted each payoff by
21See for example Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
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respective probabilities.22
IPO-scenario
In case of an IPO exit, preferred shares are usually automatically converted into common
shares at a given conversion ratio.23 The conversion ratio is generally calculated by dividing
the original issue price (OIP) of the share by the applicable conversion price of the share.24
Within our sample, the automatic conversion ratio is equal to one in @91.8% of all obser-
vations. Based on the sum of such as-converted common shares and actual common shares,
the exit proceeds are allocated pro rata among all shares, i.e., automatic conversion results
in the forfeiture of preferred rights of preferred shares.
In addition to the basic automatic conversion procedure, we identify three measures that are
often applied in the IPO-scenario. First, the automatic conversion depends on some quali-
fications of the IPO i.e., the qualified IPO. The respective qualifications are often linked to
the amount of IPO proceeds or IPO valuation of the company at exit. Within our sample,
97.5% of all contracts include automatic conversion exemptions which were either based on
the resulting IPO proceeds or a valuation threshold at exit.25 Whenever those qualifications
are not met, the preferred shares are exempted from automatic conversion and their prefer-
22For the modeling of such probabilities see section 3.3.3.
23Within our sample, automatic conversion is part of all contractual provisions, see table 3.3. Oftentimes, the conver-
sion ratio is determined in a separate section of the COI, where automatic conversion then links to such a section.
24The original issue price as well as the conversion price are given in the contractual provisions. Sometimes, the
provisions are formulated the other way round i.e., the conversion ratio calculates by dividing the conversion price
by the original issue price of the respective share. Conversion prices are normally used to account for dilution in
subsequent rounds.
25IPO proceeds are proceeds that realize via public offerings as usually not the entire equity of the venture will be
offered. In 74.6% of all cases of automatic conversion exemption, the qualified IPO is defined via both, IPO proceeds
and IPO valuation.
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ential rights still apply (see section 3.3.2). Another feature related to automatic conversion
is referred to as an IPO ratchet: Given that a pre-specified threshold in terms of valuation
is not met in case of an IPO, the IPO rachet adjusts the conversion ratio applicable in case
of an IPO in order to compensate respective shareholders. In contrast to the sample of uni-
corns analyzed by Gornall and Strebulaev (2020)26, such provisions are rarely applied in our
sample. A difference which is well explained by the nature of the samples: As unicorns are
more likely to go public, investors tend to focus more on cash flow rights preventing adverse
outcomes on the IPO-based exit route e.g. price dilution due to non-performing IPOs.
M&A-scenario
In case of an M&A exit, there are different measures that apply for exit-proceed allocation.
Liquidation preferences represent the central element and are structured via different ele-
ments.27 The basic amount is usually determined by the OIP, where such amount can be
scaled via a multiple or a return rate. In addition, preferred shares may participate in the re-
maining proceeds without having to convert, so-called participating liquidation preferences
(see Metrick and Yasuda (2011)). Such preferences can be limited by a cap. Regarding our
sample, we can observe that a multiple equal to one is most prevalent and multiples larger
than one are rare and do not exceed a value of 2.0.28 With respect to the return rate, there are
just two cases where an explicit return rate on the liquidation preference applies. A feature
26Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) observed IPO ratchets in 17% of the ventures within their sample.
27Generally, liquidation preferences equip preferred shares with a senior claim on exit proceeds, see Metrick and
Yasuda (2011) for an overview.
28This is in line with previous research of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), who report that 92% of the ventures of their
sample have multiples equal to one and only about 7% have multiples between one and two and only 1% above two.
Similarly, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) report that within their sample, multiples above one occurred in 6% of their
sample.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics - contractual data
Provision Yes No Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
Automatic conversion 100% 0% n/a
Autom. convers. exemption 97.5% 2.5% n/a
- Proceeds thres. (mUSD) 95.5% 4.8% 5.0 25.0 30.0 36.8 50.0 200.0
- Valuation thres. / share 74.6% 25.4% n/a, different definitions apply
Autom. convers. ratio (>1) 7.5% 92.5% 1.01 1.07 1.18 1.57 1.94 3.00
IPO ratchet / return 3.0% 97.0% n/a, different definitions apply1
Liquidation preference 100% 0.0% n/a
- Multiple (of OIP2): 1 95.0% 5.0% n/a
- Multiple (of OIP): 1<2 5.0% 95.0% 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0
- Return rate (in %, p.a.) 1.5% 98.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.8% 6.7% 8.4%
- Cap (Multiple of OIP) 18.9% 81.1% 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.0 6.3
- Converting preference 26.8% 73.2% n/a
- Seniority n/a n/a n/a
- Pari passu 43.8% 56.2% n/a
- Strict seniority 35.8% 64.2% n/a
- Mixed 20.4% 79.6% n/a
- Participating 42.8% 57.2% n/a
Cumul. dividends (%, p.a.) 22.9% 77.1% 5.0% 6.1% 8.0% 7.4% 8.0% 8.2%
Optional conversion 100% 0% n/a
- Conversion ratio (>1) n/a n/a 1.01 1.065 1.18 1.57 1.94 3.00
Notes: Data displays values as per share class. The indented line item (sub-category) values calculate with respect to the positive value
of the main item. For a more detailed description of the provisions and retrieved data, see table 3.A.2 in appendix 3.A.; 1 IPO ratchets are
defined in terms of a price or multiple (of a price) threshold or some percentage return rate; 2 OIP: Original issue price;
more frequently used but similar in its mechanism is represented by cumulative dividends.
Cumulative dividends are often designed in a separate section within COIs, however, they
require payout at exit pari-passu to the respective liquidation preference of such shares.29
Within our sample, 22.9% of ventures feature a cumulative dividend. The average rate is
29Such dividends are calculated based on a pre-specified rate applicable to some base, usually the original issue price of
the respective share. Most often, the rate applies on an annual basis from issuance of the shares until exit. Dividends
can be compounding or not.
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7.4% (median 8.0%), where the range is rather narrow.30 With regard to participation, we
observe 42.8% of ventures having preferred shares that are participating. A cap is applied
in 18.9% of the ventures where the absolute cap is often a multiple of the original issue
price. For our sample, the average cap is 2.9 (ranging from 1.5 to 6.3).31 In addition to the
aforementioned, a conversion feature may occur working as follows: The liquidation pref-
erence amount will equal the greater of (i) the pre-specified liquidation preference amount
or (ii) the amount that is determined based on a pro rata allocation across all shares on an as-
converted basis.32 Within our sample, about 26.8% of ventures entail liquidation preferences
conversion feature. Note that due to the blended nature of described claims, we refer to all
senior claims featuring liquidation preference, return rates, participation or conversions as
preferential claim.
If exit proceeds remain after the preferential claim have been served in full, such remainder
is distributed among the shares on an as-converted to common shares pro rata basis. The
remainder is usually allocated among all shares on a pro rata basis.33 Preferred shares are
converted based on the applicable conversion ratio.34 Aside amount and conversion terms,
preferential claims can also be characterized by the allocation procedure, in particular the
ranking of claims: Since oftentimes several share classes of preferred shares are involved,
30This observation is consistent with Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), who stated that cumulative dividends apply for
32% of their sample. In 81.3% of such cases the rate was below or at 8% and in 18.7% it was above. Opposed to
this, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) observe cumulative dividends in only 7% of their sample, however, the reported
average level of applicable rates (8%, median: 8%) is consistent with our observations.
31The occurence of a cap is relatively similar to the observations of Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015), who report that a
cap is included in 23% of their sample.
32Thus, the amount of the liquidation preference itself is stochastic offering some additional upside at a pre-specified
floor.
33Where the participation in the remainder is usually the only claim of the common shares. for such distribution logic
also see Metrick and Yasuda (2011). Note, whenever exit proceeds do not suffice to serve all shares of the respective
liquidation preference, the proceeds are allocated based on the respective share of such shares in the liquidation
preference.
34For our sample, in each case, automatic conversion always links in the conversion section of the COI i.e., the
conversion ratio applied in the IPO-scenario coincides with the applicable conversion ratio in the M&A-scenario.
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the liquidation preferences of these share classes are either served pari passu (as a mutual
preference) or ’stacked’ according to a specified seniority scheme. Such seniority scheme is
usually based on a last-in, first-out logic. For our sample, we observe almost equal shares
of ventures featuring pari passu (43.8%) and strict seniority (35.8%), while remaining al-
location schemes are based on a mixed structure where some liquidation preferences are
pari-passu among others but senior to further preferences.35
3.3.3 Model data
Eventually, we are interested in the valuation of each share of each venture. However,
the database itself does not contain any explicit values per share. Also, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no such database that systematically provides value estimates of shares
of a venture.36 Thus, we apply an indirect pricing approach to derive implied value estimates
based on the MRF, in particular the MRP.37 Assuming that the MRF is priced fairly, we can
derive the implied values of all other shares applying the contractual provisions and related
payoff structures regarding the exit proceeds. Those payoff structures result in asymmetric
payoffs that cannot be modelled appropriately via traditional valuation approaches.38 Thus,
in order to reflect asymmetric payoffs due to contractual provisions, we use a contingent
35Such observation is in line with Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020). The former report
seniority of new-round rights and do not report the entire claim structure. According to Bengtsson and Sensoy
(2015), 42% of new rounds are senior and 57% are pari-passu. Similarly, Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) report that
in 48% of the ventures of their sample include strict seniority. In 49% of the ventures of their sample, the latest
investor is senior to at least some investors and in 32% of cases he is also senior to all investors.
36There are some provider of secondary market platforms such as EquityZen, Inc. and Sharespost, Inc., however, such
markets and respective prices are also very opaque and neither provide liquidity nor do they provide full information
of the respective securities. Still, they present a viable first step in the price discovery process.
37Similar approaches are applied in Leisen (2012b), Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020).
38See, for instance, Keeley et al. (1996) or Leisen (2012a).
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claim based approach well known in the literature, see e.g. Metrick and Yasuda (2011).
Generally, we assume the exit proceeds to be equal to the venture value Vt, which is assumed
to follow a diffusion process. The diffusion process has constant annual volatility σ and
constant annual drift rate of return r, where t denotes the valuation date and t < T . Following









VT denotes the venture value at exit and Z is a standard normal distributed random variable.
The stochastic process is presumed to remain unaffected by the equity capital structure. For
the risk free rate r, we use the value of 2.50%.40 For the volatility of the venture value σ,
we assume a value of 90.0%.41
Table 3.4: Basic model assumptions
Parameter Symbol Value
Risk free rate r 2.5%
Venture value volatility σ 90.0%
Exit rate λ 0.20
IPO proceeds 25.0%
Notes: The above given parameters are assumed to be constant across all ventures.
Regarding the time to exit T − t, we follow the idea of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) by
39See Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Leisen (2012b) or Gornall and Strebulaev (2020). On the general assumptions see
also Hull and White (1988) or Trigeorgis (1996).
40As already noted by Gornall and Strebulaev (2020), this is likely on the upper end of a reasonable range. However,
value estimates monotonically increase as the risk free rate rises, wherefore the choice is relatively conservative.
41The value is based on the results of Cochrane (2005), who estimates the annualized volatility of VC investments at
89.0%. Such value is also applied by Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Leisen (2012b), Gornall and Strebulaev (2020)
and Kaboth et al. (2020).
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modelling the time to exit as a stochastic process which is exponentially distributed, (T−t) ∼
exp(λ), where λ represents the exit rate and 1/λ is the average time to exit. Based on
considerations of Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) assume λ to
be equal to 0.25 i.e., the average time to exit is 4.0 years. In contrast, we apply a somewhat
lower rate of λ = 0.20, which results in a longer average time to exit of about 5.0 years. We
chose a higher estimate due to the structure of our sample: While Gornall and Strebulaev
(2020) examine more later-stage ventures (unicorns), which tend to be larger, more mature
and closer to exit on average, we also include early stage companies. According to empirical
literature, early stage companies usually take longer time to exit, see for instance Giot and
Schwienbacher (2007) and Espenlaub et al. (2015) as well as Metrick and Yasuda (2011).42
The probabilites for each exit scenario are derived on the model provided by Gornall and
Strebulaev (2020).43 Their model considers a period similar to the respective funding dates
of our sample (2007 to 2016). We also followed Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) in setting
the IPO proceeds quota at 25.0%. The IPO proceeds quota is used to derive an estimate on
how much of VT is actually offered at an IPO. The IPO proceeds are a critical value with
respect to the automatic conversion thresholds, see 3.3.2.
In order to determine the implied value of each venture and each share class at the MRF, we
use a five-step modeling approach. First, we simulate a range of venture values and time to
42It is worth noting, that time to exit can vary greatly depending on individual factors of the venture as well as
the economy. For example, Espenlaub et al. (2015) derive an average time to exit for early stage investments of
about 9 years, while Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) derive an average time to exit of 4.6 years for early stage
companies. For expansion stage companies they report average time to exit of 3.4 years and 3 years for later
stage investments. Similarly, Metrick and Yasuda (2011) describe an average time to exit of 5 years for early
stage companies. Espenlaub et al. (2015) explain such difference via comparatively long holding periods in the
period 2007 − 2010. For the remaining period, they derive similar results (5.85 years for early stage, 4.90 years for
expansion stage and 3.92 years for later stage investments).
43Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) analyzed data on reported exits in VentureSource and fitted a piecewise linear function
for the probability of the IPO-scenario for a given value of the venture at exit.
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exit estimates based on the basic models and parameters introduced in this section. Second,
we determine the allocated exit proceed amount per share class for each scenario for the
simulated venture value for the respective time to exit estimate and in accordance with the
contractual data for each venture and share class.44 Third, we weight the allocated exit pro-
ceed amount per share class by the conditional probability weights of each scenario. Fourth,
we discount the exit cashout for each share class using the risk free rate and respective time
to exit and derive the expected value of each share by averaging the discounted weighted
exit proceed amounts. In the last step, we backsolve the model to the MRP by calibrating
the simulation: We require the per-share model-based value of the MRF to be equal to the
MRP. Thereby, we also yield the implied share values for any other share class as well as
the implied value of the venture. The implied venture value equals the total sum of shares at
their implied share values.
To allow for an overall assessment of the valuation results, we denote implied over- and
undervaluation (by PMV) in relative terms as is also done in Gornall and Strebulaev (2020)
and Kaboth et al. (2020). That is, we relate the implied values to the simple and often
used metric of PMV.45 Similarly, on a share level, we relate the implied share values to the
MRP.46 The resulting coefficient is referred to as the implied valuation discount (IVD) which
indicates by how far the MRP misses the (implied) fair value of the share class of the venture.
We refer to such difference as misvaluation. Panel A of table 3.5 provides an overview on the
44More detailed explanations on explicit modelling of such terms can be found in Metrick and Yasuda (2011), Gornall
and Strebulaev (2020) or Kaboth et al. (2020). Note, that most of our valuation models for the implied venture
and share value do not have closed-form solutions since there are several payoff structures, where no closed form
solution exist.
45We subtract the implied venture value from the PMV and divide the difference by the PMV i.e., a positive (negative)
sign of the result indicates overvaluation (undervaluation).
46We subtract the implied share value from the MRP and divide the difference by the MRP i.e., a positive (negative)
sign of the result indicates overvaluation (undervaluation).
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overall results of over- and undervaluation on the venture level as well as on the share level.
On the venture level we observe both, under- and overvaluation where undervaluation is
rather an exception. It is worth noting that undervaluation only occurs for those cases where
the MRF represents a down round.47 In panel B of table 3.5 we provide descriptive statistics
on the respective IVD for the entire sample, whereas histogram in figure 3.1 additionally
illustrates the distribution of the resulting IVDs. The results indicate a formidable range
of IVD values which considerably exceeds the range of over- and undervaluation on the
venture level. This is generally in line with the findings of Kaboth et al. (2020), however,
the range is larger than for the (smaller) sample of Kaboth et al. (2020). To enable a more
detailed view on the results, we group IVD by observations that relate to common shares
and preferred shares. Also, we separate observations by the occasion of a down round in the
funding history of the venture, since we notice that there is a substantial difference between
such groups with respect to the distribution and size of IVDs. In particular, down rounds are
generally perceived as a sign of bad performance of the venture, see e.g., Broughman and
Fried (2010) or Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015). Whenever the MRF represents a down round,
this has at least two effects on the IVDs of the share classes of the venture. First, the basis for
the IVD is rather low and second, preferential claims and allocation is often significantly re-
scheduled and according to Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) much stricter rights are negotiated
and implemented for the preferred shares. The second effect bears on the valuation also for
previous down rounds, since terms then generally remain unchanged, see Bengtsson and
Sensoy (2015). Consequentially, we observe considerable differences among such subsets.
On the one hand, we figure that common shares seem to have higher IVD compared to
47However, not every down round in a MRF results in the venture being undervalued. We refer to a down round as
stated by Bartlett (2003), that is, ’...the issuance of securities [...] at a price that is below the price previously paid
by the company’s investors...’, see Bartlett (2003), p. 23.
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preferred shares, which primarily relates to the fact that they do not have any preferential
claims and solely participate in the remaining (residual) proceeds. On the other hand, our
results suggest, that discounts for observations related to down rounds are more skewed
but not per-se higher than those for the normal (non-down round) observations. Rather,
we observe substantial undervaluation for down round observations of the preferred shares.
Such observations can be explained by the low MRP in case the MRF represents a down
round, but, in particular any other round of the venture represents a down round, in stricter
rights and terms. In addition to the MRP based discount, we recalculated the discount using
the OIP as a reference value, since OIP is often applied and referred to as a conservative
metric to estimate the investment value (per share).48 Our results imply that OIP indeed is
generally an (overly) conservative proxy, nevertheless, it can result in overvaluation.49
As such, the IVD already indicates that MRP is a rather poor estimate for the fair value.
Still, considering the average IVD evens out positive and negative deviations when assessed
in terms of central measures such as the arithmetic mean. In addition, IVD indicates the
error in terms of the MRP and therefore is a bit less intuitive than using the fair value itself
as a reference value. We therefore make use of commonly known test errors such as the
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) to better reflect the performance of the MRP (and
OIP) as an estimate for the fair value. That is, we take the average of the absolute deviation
between the fair value and the MRP (OIP) divided by the fair value. We make use of the
MAPE as our primary error metric which we refer to as misvaluation. In panel C of table 3.5,
we report the MAPE as well as two other commonly known test error metrics; namely, the
48See e.g., Jenkinson et al. (2019) or Barber and Yasuda (2017).; reference to the OIP is only meaningful in case of
the preferred shares, since common shares in our sample usually have virtually no issue price.
49Again, this is the case in down rounds where the fair value of previous shares often drops below their OIP.
167
3 How Much Is Too Much
Figure 3.1: Histogram of implied valuation discounts for the sample





-150% -125% -100% -75% -50% -25% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
















Notes: The histogram shows the distribution of IVDs for our sample of all observations, total size N = 639. We
indicate the median and the mean by vertical lines.
root mean squared error (RMSE) scaled by the mean of the implied share values, referred
to as RMSE%, and the MAE%, determined by the mean absolute error (MAE) scaled by
the mean of the implied share values.50 Overall, misvaluation amounts to 45.67% for the
observations of our sample. As for the IVD, we notice similar differences in the extend of
misvaluation across the different subsets of the preferred and common shares as well as for
the normal and the down round related observations. Still, in contrast to the IVD, we observe
a different extend of such differences in terms of misvaluation. For instance, IVD suggests
overvaluation of 7.28% with respect to the preferred shares down round observations while
misvaluation amounts to 34.96% for the same subset. That is, on average, the misvaluation
50These error metrics are commonly used in prediction model frameworks, see e.g., Bastos (2010), Chai and Draxler
(2014) or James et al. (2017). For a thorough discussion of MAPE, see Kim and Kim (2016).
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for the down round preferred shares observations as such is comparable to those of the
normal preferred shares observations. Skewness in the misvaluation can be observed by
contrasting RMSE% with MAPE or MAE%. Since RMSE% gives a higher weight for larger
errors, we can directly infer that the MRP is especially bad as an estimate for the down round
related observations, since the probability of making a large error is higher for such group.
Interestingly, the RMSE% of the normal preferred shares observations is rather low when
compared to the MAPE. That is, the errors are (on average) larger for shares of lower values.
One explanation relates to the fact that relatively high valued shares usually have superior
rights and therefore the error is smaller when using the MRP, especially in case there is no
down round where the price usually deteriorates. We also calculate and present the same
error metrics applying the OIP as a value estimate, see the bottom of table 3.5. Based on all
of the error metrics, we deem the OIP to be a worse value estimate compared to the MRP,
with one exception: The RMSE% for the down round observations related to the preferred
shares is lower when using the OIP instead of the MRP. Meaning, the probability of making
a large error when using the OIP is lower than when using the MRP. Such observation can be
explained by the considerable decrease in the relative price level, when the MRF represents
a down round. Here, the preferred shares still have preferential claims that are intended to
secure their original investment amounts. Thus, the fair value is more likely to be closer to
the OIP than to the (significantly lower) MRP.
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Table 3.5: Model data results and misvaluation
Panel A: Venture level N Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
Over-/underval. in %
PMV
201 −18.6% 10.5% 16.5% 17.6% 23.7% 60.7%
Panel B: Share class level N Min 1st-Q Median Mean 3rd-Q Max
IVD based on MRP, most recent price
Entire sample 639 -127.01% 13.96% 24.14% 22.67% 36.28% 80.34%
Common share obs. 210 14.04% 24.14% 31.59% 34.77% 42% 80.34%
Normal obs. 159 14.04% 24.22% 30.92% 34.45% 41.81% 80.34%
Down round obs. 51 18.63% 23.64% 32.84% 35.78% 42.29% 75.27%
Preferred share obs. 429 -127.01% 7.37% 18.93% 16.75% 31.6% 77.09%
Normal obs. 253 -32.16% 12.34% 21.42% 23.33% 33.54% 77.09%
Down round obs. 176 -127.01% 0.1% 14.73% 7.28% 26.39% 72.13%
IVD based on OIP, original issue price
Preferred share obs. 429 -11035.81% -228.61% -56.53% -310.26% 0% 94.05%
Normal obs. 253 -11035.81% -238.42% -72.77% -336.82% -16.03% 69.62%
Down round obs. 176 -6810.45% -174.11% -23.69% -272.08% 34.29% 94.05%
Panel C: Error metrics N MAPE MAE% RMSE%
Value estimate: MRP, most recent price
Entire sample 639 45.67% 38.25% 129.56%
Common share obs. 210 63.57% 48.7% 175.57%
Normal obs. 159 61.68% 42.38% 126.87%
Down round obs. 51 69.48% 70.59% 295.4%
Preferred share obs. 429 36.91% 35.05% 115.45%
Normal obs. 253 38.27% 27.61% 47.31%
Down round obs. 176 34.96% 47.21% 183.77%
Value estimate: OIP, original issue price
Preferred share obs. 429 75.72% 61.69% 159.58%
Normal obs. 253 48.84% 62.38% 163.89%
Down round obs. 176 114.37% 60.58% 150.32%
Notes: Over-/undervaluation on a venture level is calculated by dividing the difference of the implied venture value and its PMV by the
PMV of the respective venture. IVD is calculated by dividing the difference of the implied value per share and the MRP by the MRP. RMSE
is the root mean squared error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the implied value of a share. RMSE% is calculated by RMSE
divided by the mean value of the implied share values. MAE is the mean absolute error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the
implied value of a share. MAE% is calculated by MAE divided by the mean value of the implied share values. MAPE is the mean absolute
percentage error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the implied value of a share. In contrast to MAE%, MAPE is calculated
on individual observation level. N denotes the number of observations of each subset. Normal observations represent observations where
no down round occurred in the funding history of the venture, while down round observations refer to those observations where a down
round occurred in the funding history.
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3.4 Empirical model
As stated before, we aim to develop a prediction model that can be applied to derive more
precise estimates for the fair value on a share class level.51As such, a prediction model
should be characterized by high generalization performance.52 Therefore, we carry out and
make use of out-of-sample tests and model fitting to evaluate the generalization perfor-
mance. The approach is related to the study presented in Hutchinson et al. (1994) in that we
also try to make a prediction for values based on a highly complex but otherwise known data
generating process.53 In developing our model, we generally refrain from algorithmic mod-
eling or advanced modeling techniques (e.g., neural networks) in order to keep the model
traceable. In the following, we denote the IVD as the dependent variable dscti j in our model
where i refers to the share class and j refers to the venture and i j identifies each observation.
3.4.1 Independent variables
The set of independent variables employed in our empirical model to predict the IVD is
based on the basic and contractual data outlined in section 3.3.54 In developing the variables,
51We decide to forecast the IVD (the predicted IVD, pIVD) since it represents a relative measure which can be applied
to the MRP in order to derive fair value estimates.
52See Shmueli (2010) for a general treatment on prediction models. See Hastie et al. (2008) or James et al. (2017) for
a general treatment on prediction models and generalization performance. Generalization performance means the
out-of-sample performance which can in turn be assessed in terms of the bias variance trade-off, where bias means
the error from underfitting the model and to miss relevant relations and variance refers to the error from sensitivity
to small changes in the underlying training set due to mistakenly modelled random noise in the model, so-called
overfitting, see e.g. Hastie et al. (2008).
53Hutchinson et al. (1994) analyze the performance of different models to predict Black-Scholes-based option prices as
well as real-world data. Besides Hutchinson et al. (1994), prediction in the area of finance and investment research is
often applied in bankruptcy forecasting, see e.g., Bastos (2010), or time series analysis see e.g., Heaton et al. (2016).
54We enlist variables and definitions in table 3.B.1 in section 3.C of the appendix and present basic descriptive statistics
on the variables in table 3.1. For additional information and correlation analysis of the main independent variables
also see appendix 3.B.
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we take into consideration that information is available only on an aggregated level. That
is, considering a single observation, we only have full information on the underlying share
class and the share class of the MRF; with respect to the other share classes of the same
venture, only the number of shares outstanding as well as the issue prices are supposed to
be known.55 The most apparent difference among the observations of our sample relates to
whether the share class of the observation represents a common or a preferred share. In order
to control for this basic difference, we include an indicator variable copri j which is equal to
one if the share class of the observation represents a preferred share and zero else. We apply
COPRi j in combination with other variables in order to account for their share type and we
also use COPRi j in the model developing process in order to account for any remaining
effects of preferred shares. In our final model, COPRi j was close to zero and statistically
insignificant. A key parameter, in particular for the preferred shares, is represented by the
share class’ OIP. While the price by itself has no direct relation to dscti j, the OIP generally
provides the basis of the preferential claim amounts of the preferred shares and thereby
indirectly relates to dscti j. We include the OIP by dividing the share class price of each
observation by the MRP of the MRF of the respective venture and denote it via prcei j. We
make use of prcei j as a scaling variable for other variables in two ways:
56 On the one hand,
we generally notice a diminishing (non-linear) effect of an increasing prcei j, especially in
case of down rounds i.e., where prcei j > 1. Thus, we rather apply
√
prcei j for scaling.
Another characteristic similar to the OIP is represented by the general seniority level of the
claims of the share class. Each venture’s funding structure has at least two different stacks
55Otherwise the full model could be applied.
56Thus, we do not include prcei j directly but treat the prcei j variable as a general scaling variable for other independent
variables. Being eventually just a matter of variable definition and presentation we decided to keep the variables
as elementary as possible. Moreover, we figured that given the other variables prcei j by itself does not increase
prediction performance of our model.
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of claims (the claim stack of the preferred shares and the claim stack on the remaining
proceeds). Similar to prce, we reflect the seniority of the preferential claim of a share
class via a continuous variable referred to as relative seniority snryi j. snryi j is compiled by
indexing each defined claim stack by descending numbers according to the ordering given
in the COI. We then divide the index number of each observations share class by the highest
index number of each venture i.e., snryi j ∈ [0, 1]. snryi j is generally negatively related to
dscti j, since ceteris paribus, any claim is generally less valuable if it has a lower level of
priority in the stack of claims. Still, the strength of the relation is generally determined by
the underlying preferential claims. Thus, we do not include snryi j in the model per se, but
rather include snryi j as a scaling variable similar to prcei j. The next three variables are
rather basic in that they refer to pricing and overall venture related characteristics and we




, relates the total invested capital to the PMV and is calculated per each venture.
A lower ratio implies higher expected pricing in the MRF which (technically) results in a
lower discount since there are comparatively lower preferential claims. In contrast, a high
ratio is indicative of relatively high preferential claim amounts compared to the current
pricing and more likely to be related to the fact that a down round has occured. That is,
the variable can be seen as a relative performance indicator in that a low ratio represents
higher expected growth potential ceteris paribus while a high ratio is more likely linked to




amounts. We figured that the relation of inv
∑
j
with respect to dscti j is generally positive,
however, the effect is even stronger when scaled by COPRi j :
√
prcei j. Thus, we include
57In fact, the ratio is lower for observations related to a down round, see also descriptive statistics in appendix 3.B.
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variable COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
j
where ":" denotes the general linkage of both variables.58




prcei j results in ceteris paribus lower probability of realizing all preferred claims. Second,
we include the relative size of the MRF calculated as the investment amount divided by the
PMV as an independent variable roundvollastj . We found the variable to be negatively related
to dscti j where the size of the effect is invariant to any scaling. Thus, we include roundvol
last
j
as such. The relation supports the presumption that relatively large MRFs are a sign of rather
positive expectations regarding the overall growth and potential of the venture.59 The third
variable reflects the fact that the MRF represents a down round wherefore we introduce the
indicator variable DWNRlastj . We observe a weak positive relation between the observations
of common shares and DWNRlastj as well as a negative relation between the observations
of preferred shares (dependig on the claim size) and DWNRlastj . Thus, we first included
variable DWNRlastj and COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j . Eventually, we dropped the variable
DWNRlastj from our final model, since the economic impact is low and including the variable
results in overfitting of the model i.e., the test error increased testing the model out-of-
sample.60
Aside the more general characteristics resulting from investment size and pricing perfor-
mance, the preferential claims directly affect the value of the share class of the observation.
In addition, they also have an indirect impact on all other share classes, in particular the




extract weak positive relation with respect to dscti j when adjusting for
√
prcei j : inv
∑
j
or COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
j
at the same time.
59In fact, such relation is in line with findings reported in the study of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) where the size of
the MRF has considerable effect on the extend of overvaluation. According to them, a relative large MRF results in
lower overvaluation of the venture.
60For out-of-sample validation see also section 3.4.2.
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common shares. Considering the preferential claims and in particular preferential claim
amounts, the most basic type is based on the OIP and has no other features. In order to
reflect the basic amount and type, we include variable prcei j : snryi j. With respect to any
additional features, we observe that those are often agreed for all or none of the preferred
shares of the venture.61 The first variable regarding preferential claim amount is mltpi j
which refers to the relative liquidation preference multiple. mltpi j is calculated by dividing
the liquidation preference multiple of the share class of the observation by the liquidation
preference multiple of the MRF.62 As such, variable mltpi j has no relation with respect to
dscti j. In our analysis, we figured that the impact of mltpi j is primarily determined via snryi j
and
√
prcei j, which also reflects the non-linear relation towards dscti j.
63 Therefore, we start
by including
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j in our model. Eventually, we dropped variable
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j, since the economic effect reflected by the variable is rather weak
and resulted in overfitting. In order to reflect the effect of a multiple in the MRF, we include
an indicator variable MLT Plastj where we notice substantial positive relation with respect to
dscti j. In addition to mltpi j and MLT P
last
j , we develop variable retri j, which represent the
accumulated return rate up to the date of the MRF.64 For the same reasons as for mltpi j, we
scale retri j by relative seniority and relative price and include
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j to
account for the relevance of the return feature. The indicator variable RETRlastj reflects the
effect of a return rate for the MRF. Similar to MLT Plastj , we observe considerable positive
relation with respect to dscti j. The participation feature of the share class of an observa-
61We analyzed correlations among the different contractual terms among share classes across each venture. Here, we
found strong or even perfect correlation when considering the individual elements e.g. return rate features, multiples
or caps.
62If there is no explicit consideration of a liquidation preference multiple in the COI, we set it to be equal to one. For
common shares the multiple is equal to zero.
63Note, that an alternative variable such as
√
prcei j : mltpi j also has only a weak negative relation with regard to
dscti j.
64Thus, the variable already accounts for the return periode over which the return rat has already accumulated.
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tion is reflected via the indicator variable PART i j where PART i j is equal to one when the
share class of the observation features participating liquidation preferences and zero else. In
line with the underlying motivation of participation i.e., to participate in the remaining exit
proceeds without having to convert, the relation with regard to dscti j is negative. Similar
to mltpi j and retri j we assess a stronger relation when scaled by
√
prcei j : snryi j. Thus,
we include the variable
√
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j in our model. In addition, we found
that similar to the return rate and multiples, a participation feature of the MRF has an ad-
ditional positive relation with respect to dscti j. Therefore we develop and include another
indicator variable PART lastj , indicating whether the MRF has a participation feature. In or-
der to incorporate the effects of a cap on allocated exit proceeds, we set up a variable that
reflects the relative cap amount capi j. capi j is calculated by dividing the cap amount of the
observation’s share class by the MRP.65 Oftentimes, a cap limits the claims of the respective
share class because there is some participation feature, high return rates or multiples. That
is, solely observing the cap with respect to the IVD results in analyzing opposing effects.
In fact, the direct relation between capi j and dscti j is negative which suggests that a higher
relative cap usually results in a lower implied discount. However, when we control for other
terms and features, we notice that the remaining relation is eventually slightly positive. This
makes sense in that a cap limits parts of the upside participation. We figured that the effect





prcei j : capi j. To reflect any opposing effect resulting from a cap in
the MRF, we develop and include variable CAPlastj in our model. Eventually, we dropped
CAPlastj and
√
prcei j : capi j, since the economic effect reflected by the variables is rather
weak and resulted in overfitting which was suggested by additional analysis of the test error
65If there is no cap, we set capi j equal to zero.
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of the respective model. In addition to scaling and restricting the preferential claim amount
via multiples, return rates, participation and caps, the liquidation preference conversion fea-
ture allows to receive the pro rata mount (if higher) in lieu of the (predefined) preferential
claim amount. We reflect such liquidation preference conversion feature via the indicator
variable LIQPCON i j where LIQPCON i j equals one if present and zero else. The conver-
sion feature generally results in a comparably lower payoff for preferred shares of a venture
that feature high preferential claim amounts but a low pro rata share. This is due to the fact
that shares of lower preferential claims of the venture convert earlier and retain compara-
tively higher payoffs according to their pro rata share where, opposed to other setups, the
difference between such pro rata amount and the predefined preferential claim amount is not
allocated in the remainder allocation where ceteris paribus all other shares participate. In
turn, whenever the preferred shares feature a low price, they benefit from such feature. This
explains that there are actually detrimental relations with regard to dscti j. Therefore, we
include both, the interaction term
√
prcei j : LIQPCON i j to represent the positive relation
and LIQPCON i j to reflect the negative relation towards dscti j.
Generally, in case of an IPO or after preferential claims have been served, preferred shares
are deemed converted to common shares on a one-for-one basis i.e., the conversion ratio
is equal to one. As mentioned in section 3.3.2, this is the case for the majority of share
classes of the ventures in our sample. However, for different reasons, the conversion ratio
is sometimes increased which directly affects the share value (e.g., to counter effects due to
price-based dilution). Considering conversion, we address the relative conversion ratio via
variable convi j, calculated as the conversion ratio of the observation’s share class divided by
the conversion ratio of the MRF. The relation with respect to dscti j is negative, since an in-
crease in convi j directly increases the pro rata share (e.g., in the allocation of remaining exit
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on independent variables
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
0 0 0.4026 0.1812 0.409 10.9819 0.9898
roundvollast
j
0 0.1126 0.2407 0.2015 0.3305 0.9927 0.174
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
0 0 0.204 0 0 3.0921 0.5278
prcei j : snryi j 0 0 0.394 0.3295 0.6631 2.2872 0.3954
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0376 - - - -
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j 0 0 0.0963 0 0 2.5453 0.3238
RETRlast
j
- - 0.1972 - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j 0 0 0.1366 0 0 1.8438 0.3298
PART last
j
- - 0.3646 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - 0.2081 - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j 0 0 0.1467 0 0 3.0496 0.338
exp (convi j) 1 1 1.3362 1 1 20.0855 1.8898
log (prcei j) : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.4804 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable under consideration. Note, that
for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
proceeds) and thus the share class ceteris paribus obtains a larger share in the remaining exit
proceeds. We assess a disproportional relation on dscti j given an increase in convi j. Thus,
we included exp (convi j) in our model. Directly linked to conversion, automatic conversion
exemption thresholds shall prevent share classes (and respective investors) from adverse out-
comes, see section 3.3.2. We reflect the automatic conversion exemption in terms of the IPO
proceeds via variable convthrs
pcds
j
. The variable is calculated by dividing the required IPO
proceed amount stated in the automatic conversion exemption by the PMV according to the
MRF.66 A higher threshold especially protects preferred shares of higher preferential claims,
since they enjoy their preferential claims for a larger range of exit proceed amounts. In addi-
tion, when converting, the seniority of the claims is also waived. In contrast, given relatively
66We also tested the same variable using automatic conversion exemption in terms of the critical IPO valuation, how-
ever, pairwise correlation was rather high and the effect was stronger for the IPO proceeds thresholds, presumably
since the IPO proceeds are a stricter trigger. Note, that the triggger critically depends on the assumption regarding
IPO proceeds quota, which is set at 25.0%.
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low preferential claims, a lower threshold positively affects the value of such shares in terms
of their share in the exit proceeds. Therefore, we scale convthrs
pcds
j
by log (prcei j) as well




dent variable in our model.67 As already mentioned, seniority of claims is a key aspect in
contractual cash flow rights. In addition to the already introduced variable snryi j, we also
reflect the general underlying seniority structure in our model.68 Especially in case of a pari
passu seniority structure there are just two layers of claims, wherefore the variable snryi j is
less meaningful. Thus, we include an indicator variable S NRY
papa
j
where we find a negative
relation with respect to dscti j, since the limited staging results in a more even distribution
of exit proceeds. This is also supported by the fact that the relation is mostly invariant with
respect to scaling e.g., by relative price or seniority.
67We also start our model by including variable convthrs
pcds
i j
itself in order to account for the expected positive relation
with respect to the common shares. However, we dropped convthrs
pcds
i j
from our model, since the economic impact
is low and we also assessed overfitting of the model when including the variable.
68As noted in section 3.3.2, different mechanisms can be observed, see e.g., Bengtsson and Ravid (2009) or Metrick
and Yasuda (2011).
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3.4.2 Prediction model
We summarize the equation for the prediction model of the IVD as follows:
dscti, j = β0 + β1copri j :
√





j + β3copri j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
+ β4 prcei j : snryi j





prcei j : snryi j : retri j + β7RETR
last
j
+ β8 prcei j : snryi j : PART i j + β9PART
last
j
+ β10LIQPCON i j + β11
√
prcei j : LIQPCON i j
+ β12 exp (convi j)







where βn represents the linear regression coefficient of each variable n. In order to assess
the model in terms of out-of-sample performance, we use k-fold cross validation, in partic-
ular, we apply 10-fold cross validation (10-fold CV) for estimating the model coefficients.
Thereby the data is split into 10 partitions where nine partition are used as a training set
to fit the model and the remaining partition is used to test such model, the test set. Such
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procedure is repeated 10 times, whereas each partition serves as a test set once.69 The re-
sults from repetitive model fitting and testing are used to obtain the test error as well as to
estimate model coefficients. For the test error, we consider RMSE and MAE as our primary
test error metrics.70 We report the model coefficients for 10-fold cross validation as well
as the test error metrics in table 3.2. According to the results of MAE and RMSE, the test
errors are both below 10%-points. To set such values into context, we apply two simple but
intuitive benchmarks. First, we assume pIVD to be zero and second, we assume pIVD to be
equal to the average value of the training set. For the first benchmark, pIVD = 0, the MAE
amounts to 28.4% and RMSE is equal to 33.4%. The second benchmark, the training set
average, results in a MAE of 16.2% and RMSE of 24.7%. While the average IVD already
cuts a good amount (43%) of the general error when assuming pIVD is equal to zero, our
model allows to cut the such error by more than 75%. The models prediction power is fur-
ther supported by the relatively stable behavior when running k-fold regression for different
values of k.71
In a second step, we fit the model to the entire data set to assess in how far the model fits
the data in a whole, we refer to the model as the baseline model. The results regarding
69Bastos (2010) used the same approach in order to test his prediction model out-of sample. For a thorough introduc-
tion see e.g., Hastie et al. (2008). k = 10 is a common assumption in the literature and according to Hastie et al.
(2008) is recommended as a good compromise between too much variance (low k) and too much bias (high k). We
also show results in terms of average error for different k in appendix 3.C, figure 3.C.2, where we can also assess the
effect of a decrease in the bias but higher variance given an increase in k, so-called bias-variance tradeoff.
70Often, the mean squared error (MSE) is used instead of the RMSE, however, they coincide in the respective results,
see Hastie et al. (2008) or James et al. (2017). Note, that we do not report and use MAPE, since it does not make
sense in case of a percentage measure where MAPE gets relatively unstable, see e.g., Kim and Kim (2016). For a
detailed discussion on test error metrics see also Chai and Draxler (2014).
71See analysis results in the appendix, in particular figure 3.C.2; in addition, we also re-fit the model including variables
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j,
√
prcei j : snryi j : capi j and CAP
last
j
as well as convthrs
pcds
i j
; however, we notice similar
performance where the standard error of the test error was higher for the larger model, which we interpreted as an
increase in the variance of the model. Since there was no corresponding decrease in the bias, we deem the inclusion
of the variables as a model overfitting. Results of the analysis can be found in table 3.C.2 of section 3.C in the
appendix.
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Table 3.2: Model coefficients - dependent variable: IVD, dsct
10-fold CV Baseline model
Variables Coefficients Coefficients SE t-value
Intercept 0.421 0.421*** (0.0098) 42.875
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
0.1298 0.1298*** (0.0132) 9.862
roundvollast
j
-0.2055 -0.2055*** (0.0237) -8.672
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
-0.091 -0.091*** (0.0235) -3.868
prcei j : snryi j -0.2368 -0.2368*** (0.0286) -8.286
MLT Plast
j
0.1273 0.1273*** (0.0229) 5.563
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j -0.068 -0.068’ (0.0403) -1.686
RETRlast
j
0.1663 0.1663*** (0.0163) 10.175
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j -0.1854 -0.1854*** (0.0332) -5.581
PART last
j
0.1187 0.1187*** (0.0102) 11.631
LIQPCONi j -0.1373 -0.1373*** (0.0357) -3.847
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j 0.1761 0.1761*** (0.053) 3.324
exp (convi j) -0.0647 -0.0647*** (0.0043) -14.981
log (prcei j) : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j











RMS E 9.64% 8.50%
Notes: In the table we report the coefficients and standard errors using robust White standard errors (HC1); stars denote the level of
statistic significance: p < 0.001 : ***, p < 0.01 : ** and p < 0.05 : *. The MAE indicates the absolute deviation of pIVD from the actual
IVD in absolute percentage points. The RMSE indicates the root of the squared deviation of pIVD from the actual IVD in percentage
points. For the baseline model, MAE and RMSE represent in-sample metrics fitted to the entire dataset.
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the coefficients of the baseline model as well as related standard errors and t-values, are
shown in table 3.2.72 Overall, the model shows considerable fit to the data where the ad-
justed R2 amounts to 0.8632.73 We also note that we keep
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j and
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j
in the model although being statistically insignificant.
However, we figured that they improve the generalization performance. The model also
allows to assess the impact of different independent variables on the pIVD: For example,
we can observe that a liquidation preference multiple for the MRF results in an increase of
pIVD of around 12.73% which is similar to the increase in the pIVD of 11.87% whenever
the MRF is participating. However, a return rate feature of the MRF would result in even
stronger increases of the pIVD of around 16.63%. In contrast, a pari passu seniority struc-
ture generally results in a decrease of the pIVD of around 10.02% compared to the other
seniority structures. Still, the interpretation has to be carried out with duly care since the
effects are often interacting and our main purpose is rather to predict than to explain. For
further discussion of potential concerns and additional checks we refer to section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Prediction performance in fair value estimation
Using the prediction error of the simple MRP and OIP-based fair value estimates as a bench-
mark, we assess the model performance in terms of providing more accurate estimates. We
derive the predicted fair values for each share by multiplying the predicted IVD, pIVD with
72For further model diagnostics see appendix 3.C, in particular figure 3.C.1.
73With respect to the general model diagnostics, we identified some heteroscedasticity. Thus, we use robust White
errors for inferences. In addition, we also fitted the model including variables
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j,
√
prcei j :
snryi j : capi j and CAP
last
j
as well as convthrs
pcds
i j
; however, according to t-tests they are statistically insignificant
(in-sample) and also have rather minor economic impact.
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the respective MRP i.e., the predicted fair value (pFV) according to our empirical model
equals (1 − pIVD) × MRP. We calculate the same test error metrics as in panel B and C of
table 3.5 using the pFV. The results are shown in table 3.3. Based on the results regarding
the entire sample, we derive a misvaluation of 9.1% (MAPE) for the overall sample when
using the pFV as a fair value estimate. Comparing the results with respect to the reported
subsets, the misvaluation is lowest for the normal observations of the preferred shares at
around 7.6%. In contrast, the misvaluation is largest for the down round observations of
the common shares amounting to 11.8%. Generally, we notice that the down round related
observations show higher misvaluation. Contrasting MAE% and MAPE, we infer that the
prediction error is relatively even with respect to the underlying fair value except for the
down round related observations where the error seems to be larger for those observations
where the fair value is relatively low since MAPE is larger than MAE%. Similarly, con-
trasting MAPE and MAE% with RMSE%, we infer that there is a difference of the model
prediction accuracy with respect to the different share types. Especially with respect to
the normal observations of common shares the average error is similar to the overall sam-
ple mean, however, due to the high RMSE%, we conclude that the distribution of errors is
somewhat more skewed in relative terms, since the RMSE% generally puts more weight on
larger test errors. One explanation of the differences in the model performance considering
different subsets may result from the more complex effects and interrelations of contractual
terms for the underlying share classes of the down round related observations. Regarding
the common share related observations we point to the fact that their value is solely deter-
mined by the claim in the remaining exit proceeds which is subject to various effects of the
preferred shares where we are not able to identify and reflect the respective relations in our
model.
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Table 3.3: Prediction error in using pIVD for fair value estimation (pFV)
N MAPE MAE% RMSE%
Error metrics for value estimate based on pFV
Entire sample 639 9.07% 7.3% 25.91%
Common share observations 210 9.73% 9.81% 52.19%
Normal observations 159 9.06% 11.15% 58.21%
Down round observations 51 11.83% 5.18% 11.81%
Preferred share observations 429 8.74% 6.53% 15.75%
Normal observations 253 7.6% 6.53% 13.36%
Down round observations 176 10.39% 6.52% 19.35%
Reduction in prediction error and misvaluation: pFV versus MRP based value estimate in %
Entire sample 639 -80.15% -80.92% -80%
Common share observations 210 -84.69% -79.85% -70.27%
Normal observations 159 -85.32% -73.69% -54.12%
Down round observations 51 -82.98% -92.66% -96%
Preferred share observations 429 -76.31% -81.38% -86.36%
Normal observations 253 -80.15% -76.35% -71.76%
Down round observations 176 -70.27% -86.18% -89.47%
Notes: The table shows the prediction error and misvaluation using value estimates based on pIVD. Furthermore, we report the reduction
in prediction error and misvaluation compared to the common practice of using MRP as a fair value estimate. Predictions of the implied
share value are derived by multiplying MRP with (1− pIVD). Reduction in prediction error and misvaluation is based on results presented
in table 3.5. It is calculated by subtracting the value of the respective error metric for the pIVD based estimate from the respective error
metric of the MRP based value estimate divided by the error metric of the MRP based value estimate. RMSE is the root mean squared
error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the fair value. RMSE% is calculated by RMSE divided by the mean value of the actual
fair values. MAE is the mean absolute error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the fair value of a share. MAE% is calculated
by MAE divided by the mean value of the actual fair values. MAPE is the mean absolute percentage error when using the MRP (OIP) as
an estimate for the fair value of a share. In contrast to MAE%, MAPE is calculated on individual observation level. N denotes the number
of observations of each subset. Normal observations represent observations where no down round occurred in the funding history of the
venture, while down round observations refer to those observations where a down round occurred in the funding history.
Despite that, the application of our model-based fair value estimates (pFV) represents a
significant improvement compared to using the MRP as a fair value estimate where the
corresponding misvaluation amounts to 45.7%. That is, we obtain an overall reduction re-
garding the misvaluation of about 80.2% using the pFV. In particular for the common shares,
where we observe rather mediocre performance in terms of absolute misvaluation, we no-
tice considerable reduction in misvaluation in relative terms i.e„ with respect to MRP based
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value estimates. Here, we presume that return rates, multiples and participation features
applied in the MRF have considerable effect which the model controls for via explicit vari-
ables. Reduction in the RMSE%-based metric indicates that this especially holds for the
larger errors where the reduction is above 90%. Based on these results, we deem the appli-
cation of models such as ours can help to substantially reduce the misvaluation in current
VC investment valuation research or analysis as well as reporting in practice. Notably, the
reduction requires relatively few information when considering the size of the model featur-
ing 14 variables. In fact, for the common shares, the model consists of only five different
variables.
In addition, we compare our model’s performance in predicting fair value estimates with the
application of a simple IVD average.74 Results indicate that taking the average IVD already
reduces misvaluation on average, however, the level of misvaluation remains substantial at
around 23.8% on average. Further, the average IVD tends to result in larger errors which is
indicated by high levels of RMSE%.75
3.4.4 Robustness and limitations
A general concern of our model refers to the variable development and variable selection
process. In order to address such concern, we analyzed a broad range of variables linked
to the basic and contractual data, thereby also considering the respective financial model
as well as different configurations and alternative definitions. In particular, we assessed
74That is, we derive value estimates by multiplying the respective MRP of each observation by (1 − ∅IVD), whereas
∅IVD is calculated by taking the average of IVDs from all observations.
75Results are reported in table 3.C.3 in section 3.C in the appendix.
186
3 How Much Is Too Much
the indirect impact of preferential claim amount features of the MRF on the previous share
classes via indicator variables. Additionally, we assessed analogue variables that indicate
preferential claim amount features for any other share classes of the venture. However,
we could not extract any additional economically or statistically significant information.
We admit that the relations are quite complex and often non-linear due to the contractual
structures and its heterogeneity as well as the underlying data generation process i.e., the
model used for deriving the implied share values. With respect to heterogeneity we also
point to the fact, that our sample may not exhibit sufficient variation in individual terms,
so that its difficult to extract additional relevant effects. More data would probably help to
resolve the issue. In addition a different modeling approach may better reflect non-linearity
and unobserved complexity, see e.g., the approaches in Hutchinson et al. (1994) or Heaton
et al. (2016). However, this would make the model less traceable. In general, our model
may also suffer from an omitted variable bias. For example, we do not explicitly adjust for
the underlying economic performance of the venture or the related industry which may also
have an impact on pricing terms or contractual features. However, we do not have access
to comparable information across all ventures regarding such data e.g., revenues, number
of employees. In order to partially mitigate such concerns, we re-estimate our model using
control variables for annual-, industry- and geography-effects via respective factor variables.
For industry variable we applied the industry classification according to GENESIS.76 In
general, we do not find any structurally statistically significant effect with respect to such
control variables. Thus, we infer that there is no statistical significant effect with respect
to these general control variables. In order to adress the issue of potential overfitting, i.e.
76For the state factor variable, we also assess whether there is any impact of the TOP3 states of incorporation -
California, Massachusetts and New York as a separate group and put the remaining states in a single group, since
there were rather few observations for each single state, see table 3.A.1 for the TOP3 states.
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including noise in our model, we employ least absolute shrinkage and selection operators
(lasso) regression (hereinafter lasso-regression).77 In fact, as one of the shrinkage methods,
lasso-regression helps to increase prediction accuracy by directly adressing the bias-variance
tradeoff by increasing the bias, but lowering the variance. The size (and direction) of the
tradeoff is determined by introducing a penalty on the size of coefficients via the shrinking
factor λl.78 Via cross-validation, λl can be estimated so that the resulting model minimizes
some test error metric (e.g., MAE, RMSE), referred to as λl∗, see Hastie et al. (2008). Using
MAE as test error metric we determined λl∗ = 0.000687, so that there is almost no shrinkage
i.e., there is no further potential to reduce the model size (and decrease variance) without
significant sacrifices in prediction bias.79
Other concerns and limitations relate to the underlying model and respective assumptions
which we apply to derive implied share values. Further sensitivity analysis might prove
helpful as the findings of Gornall and Strebulaev (2020) and Kaboth et al. (2020) suggest
considerable variation in valuation effect when changing the underlying assumption. Be-
sides, although being comparably large, the sample is still relatively small compared to the
range of combinations in the different contractual rights and underlying venture characteris-
tics. Additionally, we restrict our analysis to the most common contractual rights which are
generally perceived to have the largest impact on the investment decision, see Metrick and
Yasuda (2011), Bengtsson and Sensoy (2015) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2020). Albeit
77Lasso-regression is a variable selection technique subject to the objective of enhancing prediction accuracy, see
Tibshirani (1996) or Hastie et al. (2008).
78In fact, λl affects the loss function of the ordinary least squares regression by the weighted sum of the coefficients
times λl, see Tibshirani (1996). Increasing λl, the relatively irrelevant variables are shrinked to zero and are eventu-
ally dropped from the model, thereby increasing bias but decreasing variance. At λl = 0 there is no difference with
respect to ordinary ordinary least squares regression.
79A corresponding plot that illustrates the results and additional analysis is provided in figure 3.C.3 in section 3.C of
the appendix; note, that RMSE as an alternative test error metric yields very similar results.
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that, there might still exist other value-relevant cash flow rights such as redemption rights,
milestones or anti-dilution rights. In the same vein, there might be other non-cash flow
rights that had relevant impact on the investment decision such as voting rights, warranties
or protective provisions see also Sahlman (1990) or Kaplan and Strömberg (2003). Simi-
larly, there might be side agreements which are not part of the COI but had relevant impact
and are therefore priced in the investment decision but not reflected in the model.
3.5 Conclusion
The widely applied practice of marking-up values of venture capital investments by the price
of the share class of the most recent funding round results in considerable misvaluation due
to contractual rights that affect the risk and return allocation of the venture value. In this
paper, we analyze a sample of 201 ventures and their respective funding rounds represented
by different share classes with respect to their share value implied by the most recent funding
round of each venture. Interpreting such implied share value as a reasonable fair value
estimate and contrasting it with the most recent pricing, we evaluate respective misvaluation
(in terms of the mean absolute percentage error) on a share class level of 45.7%. Further, we
assess even higher levels of misvaluation for our sample when applying the original issue
price as an alternative value estimate.
Based on the sample and the underlying data providing full information, we fit an empirical
model that is ultimately intended to allow for a more accurate prediction of the share’s fair
values. Looking at the individual components of the model itself, we evaluate that based on
the sample, next to the preferential claim amounts, there are other factors that show a strong
relation with respect to the value of the share class such as the investment volume of the most
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recent funding round, conversion rates and the general seniority structure of the preferential
claims. Regarding the prediction performance, we observe an overall misvaluation of 9.1%.
The model performs particularly well with respect to the preferred shares. Other than the
common shares, they are more distinct in terms of their preferential rights where the related
effects seem to be better reflected in the model. In contrast, common shares per definition
have no preferential rights and solely participate in the residual proceeds being exposed to
different and often complex indirect effects which are more difficult to extract and reflect in a
prediction model. Especially with regard to the issue of complexity, we observe considerable
heterogeneity in the allocation of preferential rights given the occasion of a down round
in the ventures funding history. Overall, compared to the most recent pricing, applying
our model allows to reduce misvaluation by about 80.2% in terms of the mean absolute
percentage error.
As such, our analysis and the empirical model provide useful insights for researchers, prac-
titioners and the public. First of all, our analysis provides additional evidence that current
valuation practices based on the most recent pricing or "at cost"-approaches based on the
original issue price are generally misleading and might not be as conservative as they are
said to be. In addition, our model supports in providing a first benchmark for investment
valuation by giving a more accurate view on investment values for VC related research, for
financial reporting or for other communication purposes. In addition, the model can be used
as a viable tool in funding negotiations to assess the impact of different features on the value
of previous share classes or in case of related secondary transactions. This particularly holds
for those cases where full information is not readily available. Thereby, the model can sup-
port to obtain a more precise view on the fair value of VC investments and prevent inflated
expectations of management, employees or limited partners.
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Still, our model is just another step in making the ecosystem of VC finance more transparent.
There are several avenues of further research. For instance, one could integrate further infor-
mation from secondary transactions if accessible, to improve and verify prediction accuracy.
Additional analysis could also assess the effect of other contractual rights which are often
considered as non-economical terms (e.g., voting rights or protective provisions), but that
have strong implications regarding the exit decision and future funding options. Similarly,
the analysis may also be extended with respect to debt-like instruments which are often not
considered, since they are usually not part of incorporation documents. Both issues have a
significant impact on a venture’s prospects and may considerably affect the equity invest-
ment value. Lastly, alternative and advanced modeling approaches can be evaluated in order




Table 3.A.1: Comparison of sample data
Aspect Total sample Full sample
Average incorp. year 2006 2007
Min/max incorp. year 1977/2017 1993/2017
Average year of MRF n/a 2013
Min/max year of MRF n/a 2004/2019
Top10 Industries Software, 25.4% Software, 26.4%
IT-Services, 13.2% IT-Services, 16.9%
Biotechnology, 12.2% Business Products & Services, 10.0%
Business Products & Services, 9.0% Biotechnology, 8.0%
Medical Devices & Equipment, 6.6% Consumer Products & Services, 8.0%
Consumer Products and Services, 6.1% Medical Devices & Equipment, 7.5%
Electronics & Instrumentation, 3.8% Healthcare Services, 3.5%
Industrial & Energy, 3.6% Financial Services, 3.0%
Semiconductors, 3.5% Telecommunications, 3.0%
Media and Entertainment, 3.4% Electronics & Instrumentation, 2.5%
Top5 States California, 53.1% California, 36.3%
Massachusetts, 16.8% Massachusetts, 34.3%
New York, 4.8% New York, 7.0%
Texas, 3.4% Georgia, 2.5%
Pennsylvania, 2.1% Virginia, 2.5%
Notes: Data shows the relative share of the ventures within the total and the full sample with respect to the year of incorporation, industries
and states of incorporation.
192
3 How Much Is Too Much
Table 3.A.2: Data retrieved for each venture
Item Category Description Data retrieved and coded Source




State General State where the venture is situ-
ated
State indicated in database GENESIS
City General City where the venture is situ-
ated
City indicated in database GENESIS
State (filing) General State where the company has
filed for incorporation
State indicated in the incropo-
ration documents
COIs
Incorp. date General Date of the incorporation of
the venture
Date COIs, tax re-
ports
Industry General Industry the venture is active in Industry/classification as indi-
cated in database, NAIC and
SIC (if provided)
GENESIS
Identifiers General Identifiers (CIK) according to
public SEC database EDGAR
CIK as indicated in datbase GENESIS
Description General General description of the
company
Company description CrunchBase
Homepage General Homepage Homepage CrunchBase
Share class Shares Name of the share class ac-
cording to the CoI, own ID for
database entry
Name of the share class, coded
via venture specific ID
COI
Date of issuance Shares Date when the shares where is-
sued
Date of issuance COI, Form D
Share price Shares Price of the respective share
class






Shares Number of shares that the ven-
ture is authorized to issue
Number of shares COI
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Table 3.A.2: Data retrieved for each venture (continued)
Item Category Description Data retrieved Source
Issued/outstanding
shares
Shares Number of shares that the ven-
ture has issued
Number of shares COIs, tax
reports, Form
Ds
Exit scenario Contracts Whether there is a difference
between scenarios within the
contractual framework (CoI)
with regard to exit proceed al-
location
IPO-scenario (e.g., conversion
of preferred shares), M&A-





Contracts Indicates if conversion in case
of an IPO is mandatory







Contracts Indicates, when automatic IPO
conversion applies; often con-
ditional on the amount of to-
tal exit proceeds and pro rata
value per share
As applicable, for instance:
Amount of total proceeds
and/or value per share
COIs
Conversion ratio Contracts Conversion ratio in case of
each scenario, applicable in
case of conversion of pre-





by dividing the original issue
price by the conversion price
COIs
IPO ratchet Contracts Mechanism that compensates
shareholders in case of an IPO





Contracts Indicates if investors can con-
vert shares on their own behalf





Contracts Indicates is liquidation prefer-
ences exist and how they are
specified
Indication if present, basic
amount, multiple, return rate,
return rate start/stop, cap, con-
version features, seniority, se-
niority level and participation
as well as allocation basis
COIs
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Table 3.A.2: Data retrieved for each venture (continued)
Item Category Description Data retrieved Source
Dividends Contracts Indicates if dividends apply for
any cash flow allocation
Indication if present, dividend
rate, indication if cumulative
and/or compounding, indica-
tion if added to liquidation
preference amount or forfei-
ture
COIs
Anti-dilution Contracts Indication if anti dilution pro-
visions apply
Indication if present or not COIs
Note: COI: Certificate of Incorporation, OIP: Original issue price.
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3.B Appendix: Variables
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Table 3.B.1: Description of explanatory variables
Variable Shortcut Calculation
Relative total investment inv
∑
j
Total investment amount of the venture divided by the post
money value
Relative price prcei j Price of the share class of the observations divided by the
price of the share class of the most recent funding round
Share type indicator COPRi j Equal to 1, if the share class of the observation represents a
preferred shares and zero if it refers to a common share
Down round indicator of the
most recent funding round
DWNRlast
j
Equal to 1, if the share class of the most recent funding
round represents a down round, 0 else
Relative funding round vol-




Investment amount of the share class of the most recent
funding round divided by the post money value
Relative return retri j Calculated as the accumulated (and, if so, compounding) re-
turn rate factor on the liquidation preference or cumulative
dividend factor until the date of the MRF divided by the ac-
cumulated return rate factor of the MRF, which equals zero
by default




Equal to 1, if the share class of the most recent funding
round features a liquidation preference return or accruing
(cumulative) dividend provision, 0 else
Relative liquidation prefer-
ence multiple
mltpi j Liquidation preference multiple of the share class of the ob-
servation divided by the liquidation preference multiple of
the share class of the most recent funding round




Equal to 1, if the share class of the most recent funding
round features a liquidation preference multiple larger than
one, 0 else
Participation indicator PART i j Equal to 1, if the share class of the observation features par-
ticipation, 0 else
Participation indicator of
most recent funding round
PART last
j
Equal to 1, if the share class of the most recent funding
round features participation, 0 else
Relative cap amount capi j Cap amount for the share class of the observation divided
by the share classes price of the most recent funding round




Equal to 1, if the share class of the most recent funding
round features a cap, 0 else
Liquidation preference con-
version indicator
LIQPCONi j Equal to 1, if the share class of the observation features a
conversion option of the liquidation preference, 0 else
Relative conversion rate convi j Conversion ratio of the share class of the observation di-







Amount of total proceeds threshold for automatic conver-
sion exemption divided by the post money value
Relative seniority level snryi j Index level of the seniority of the claim of the share class of
the observation divided by the maximum index level of all
claims of the respective venture





Equal to 1, if the venture features pari passu seniority struc-
ture of preferential claims, 0 else
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Table 3.B.2: Descriptive statistics on independent variables - 1 of 5
Complete sample
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j - - 0.6714 - - - -
prcei j 0 0.0006 0.5487 0.2549 0.6647 9.561 1.0812
√
prcei j 0.0002 0.0243 0.5284 0.5049 0.8153 3.0921 0.5196




0.1385 0.3371 0.5659 0.4334 0.6691 3.5516 0.4178
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
0 0 0.4026 0.1812 0.409 10.9819 0.9898
roundvollast
j
0 0.1126 0.2407 0.2015 0.3305 0.9927 0.174
DWNRlast
j
- - 0.2222 - - - -
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
0 0 0.204 0 0 3.0921 0.5278
prcei j : snryi j 0 0 0.394 0.3295 0.6631 2.2872 0.3954
mltpi j 0 0 0.0203 0 0 2 0.162
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j 0 0 0.0094 0 0 1.4946 0.091
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0376 - - - -
retri j 0 0 0.1485 0 0 1.9196 0.4175
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j 0 0 0.0963 0 0 2.5453 0.3238
RETRlast
j
- - 0.1972 - - - -
PART - - 0.1925 - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j 0 0 0.1366 0 0 1.8438 0.3298
PART last
j
- - 0.3646 - - - -
capi j 0 0 0.3622 0 0 19.122 1.631
√
prcei j : capi j 0 0 0.6073 0 0 59.1267 4.0117
CAPlast
j
- - 0.1628 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - 0.2081 - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j 0 0 0.1467 0 0 3.0496 0.338
convi j 0 0 0.0942 0 0 3 0.4213




0 0.1465 1.0952 0.3952 1.1659 27.854 2.2743
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.4804 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables and its components. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable under
consideration. Note, that for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
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Table 3.B.3: Descriptive statistics on independent variables - 2 of 5
(Normal) common share observations
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j - - - - - - -
prcei j - - 0.0014 0.0001 0.0005 0.0694 0.0061
√
prcei j 0.0002 0.006 0.0204 0.01 0.023 0.2635 0.031




0.1385 0.3294 0.4635 0.4132 0.5992 0.9927 0.1828
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
- - - - - - -
roundvollast
j
- 0.1728 0.3148 0.2845 0.3773 0.9927 0.1944
DWNRlast
j
- - - - - - -
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
- - - - - - -
prcei j : snryi j - - - - - - -
mltpi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j - - - - - - -
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0377 - - - -
retri j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j - - - - - - -
RETRlast
j
- - 0.2516 - - - -
PART - - - - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j - - - - - - -
PART last
j
- - 0.3899 - - - -
capi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : capi j - - - - - - -
CAPlast
j
- - 0.1509 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j - - - - - - -
convi j - - - - - - -




- 0.2673 2.0357 0.9488 2.0939 27.854 3.6434
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.4654 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables based on subsets of variables. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable
under consideration. Note, that for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
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Table 3.B.4: Descriptive statistics on independent variables - 3 of 5
Down round common share observations
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j - - - - - - -
prcei j - - 0.0442 0.0003 0.001 2.1298 0.0061
√
prcei j 0.0004 0.007 0.0576 0.0169 0.0319 1.4594 0.031




0.2415 0.4809 0.8634 0.6823 0.9429 3.5516 0.1828
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
- - - - - - -
roundvollast
j
0.0078 0.1072 0.2773 0.2388 0.398 0.8902 0.1944
DWNRlast
j
- - 0.7059 - - - -
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
- - - - - - -
prcei j : snryi j - - - - - - -
mltpi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j - - - - - - -
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0588 - - - -
retri j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j - - - - - - -
RETRlast
j
- - 0.1961 - - - -
PART - - - - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j - - - - - - -
PART last
j
- - 0.4706 - - - -
capi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : capi j - - - - - - -
CAPlast
j
- - 0.1765 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - - - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j - - - - - - -
convi j - - - - - - -




- 0.1618 1.2185 0.7528 1.4485 11.3207 3.6434
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.3922 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables based on subsets of variables. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable
under consideration. Note, that for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
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Table 3.B.5: Descriptive statistics on independent variables - 4 of 5
(Normal) preferred share observations
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j - - 1 - - - -
prcei j 0.008 0.214 0.4619 0.4206 0.684 1 0.2897
√
prcei j 0.0894 0.4626 0.6377 0.6485 0.8271 1 0.2356




0.1767 0.3127 0.432 0.4082 0.5234 0.9419 0.1648
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
0.0224 0.1539 0.2966 0.2494 0.3982 0.9419 0.1941
roundvollast
j
- 0.1062 0.1911 0.1689 0.2714 0.7138 0.1178
DWNRlast
j
- - - - - - -
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
- - - - - - -
prcei j : snryi j 0.0198 0.305 0.5129 0.4992 0.722 1 0.2643
mltpi j - - 0.0158 - - 1 0.125
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j - - 0.0064 - - 1 0.0689
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0158 - - - -
retri j - - 0.2202 - - 1.737 0.489
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j - - 0.1128 - - 1.2928 0.2796
RETRlast
j
- - 0.1818 - - - -
PART - - 0.2451 - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j - - 0.1476 - - 1 0.2918
PART last
j
- - 0.2569 - - - -
capi j - - 0.2193 - - 5 0.6729
√
prcei j : capi j - - 0.1817 - - 5 0.6058
CAPlast
j
- - 0.1186 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - 0.3874 - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j - - 0.2442 - 0.5478 1 0.3429
convi j - - 0.0174 - - 1.176 0.1377




- 0.1235 0.6269 0.2706 0.6889 9.0785 1.1492
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.5534 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables based on subsets of variables. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable
under consideration. Note, that for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
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Table 3.B.6: Descriptive statistics on independent variables - 5 of 5
Down round preferred share observations
Variable Min 1st-Q Mean Median 3rd-Q Max SD
COPRi j - - 1 - - - -
prcei j 0.0108 0.3246 1.3141 0.6921 1.3687 9.561 1.7801
√
prcei j 0.1041 0.5697 0.9665 0.8319 1.1698 3.0921 0.6182




0.2415 0.3523 0.7646 0.6059 0.8754 3.5516 0.5957
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j
0.0311 0.2088 1.0354 0.4674 0.9552 10.9819 1.7042
roundvollast
j
0.0078 0.1018 0.2346 0.1434 0.3528 0.8902 0.1859
DWNRlast
j
- - 0.6023 - - - -
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : DWNR
last
j
- - 0.7408 0.6296 1.1698 3.0921 0.7846
prcei j : snryi j 0.0409 0.3926 0.6931 0.6364 0.888 2.2872 0.4155
mltpi j - - 0.0511 - - 2 0.2677
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j - - 0.0251 - - 1.4946 0.1516
MLT Plast
j
- - 0.0625 - - - -
retri j - - 0.2226 - - 1.9196 0.5019
√
prcei j : snryi j : retri j - - 0.1876 - - 2.5453 0.4999
RETRlast
j
- - 0.1705 - - - -
PART - - 0.3466 - - - -
prcei j : snryi j : PART i j - - 0.2839 - 0.5006 1.8438 0.479
PART last
j
- - 0.4659 - - - -
capi j - - 1 - - 19.122 2.907
√
prcei j : capi j - - 1.9438 - - 59.1267 7.4595
CAPlast
j
- - 0.233 - - - -
LIQPCONi j - - 0.1989 - - - -
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j - - 0.1818 - - 3.0496 0.4544
convi j - - 0.3172 - - 3 0.742




- 0.1255 0.883 0.2315 0.9633 11.3207 1.653
log prcei j : snryi j : convthrs
pcds
j




- - 0.4148 - - - -
Notes: The table depicts distribution of the variables based on subsets of variables. S D refers to the standard deviation of the variable
under consideration. Note, that for indicator variables we only report the mean value.
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3 How Much Is Too Much
3.C Appendix: Model

























Notes: The left-hand plot shows the actual IVD versus the predicted IVD (pIVD) where the red line indicates the line
through the origin. The right hand plot displays the residuals versus the pIVD. The grey shaded area indicates the
standard error around zero. The plot indicates heteroscedasticity. Additionally, we performed studentized Breusch-
Pagan Test where p-value is well below one percent, indicating heteroscedasticity at such level.
Table 3.C.1: Multicollinearity in the model - variance inflation factor (VIF)
Variable VIF Variable VIF
COPRi j :
√
prcei j : inv
∑
i j








prcei j : DWNR
last
j
4.08 LIQPCONi j 4.59
prcei j : snryi j 6.82
√
prcei j : LIQPCONi j 5.70
MLT Plast
j
1.08 exp (convi j) 1.07
√










Notes: In the table we present the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each variable with respect to the model setup (the baseline model).
Variance inflation factor is used to infer for multicollinearity of variables, where a value of 10 is often seen as an indicator of high
multicollinearity.
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Table 3.C.2: Comparison of out-of-sample model performance - basis model versus ex-
tended model
k MAE SD RMSE SD
Model 3 0.1 0.0095 0.0654 0.0044
Extended model 3 0.1025 0.0105 0.066 0.0046
Delta 2.45% 10.89% 0.89% 5.26%
Model 5 0.0992 0.013 0.0652 0.0059
Extended model 5 0.1007 0.0127 0.0653 0.0058
Delta 1.55% -1.82% 0.15% -1.9%
Model 10 0.0976 0.0172 0.0648 0.0088
Extended model 10 0.099 0.0179 0.0651 0.0086
Delta 1.37% 4.54% 0.37% -1.85%
Model 20 0.096 0.024 0.0648 0.0126
Extended model 20 0.097 0.024 0.0649 0.0123
Delta 1.09% 0.21% 0.18% -1.91%
Notes: In the table we provide the results of a model comparison between the model described in equation 3.4.1 and the extended model
where we also include variables
√
prcei j : snryi j : mltpi j ,
√
prcei j : snryi j : capi j and CAP
last
j
as well as convthrs
pcds
i j
. We use k-fold
cross validation for each model where we varied k (k = 3, 5, 10, 20) in order to mitigate bias in the results with respect to the choice of
a specific k. The results suggest that the models are more or less equal in prediction bias, however, we deem the basic model to perform
slightly better in terms of prediction variance.
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Figure 3.C.2: Out of sample validation: k-fold cross-validation
k − f old
3 5 10 20
3 5 10 20
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Notes: The plots show the RMSE and MAE when cross-validating the model in equation 3.4.1 via k-folds (for k =
2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20). We conducted such cross validation with 50 runs each in order to assess the model generalization
performance. The line plot shows the mean as well as +/− one-time standard deviation in each direction. The plots
indicate that the average error (the bias) decreases when increasing the number of k folds. However, the variance
increases. It is worth noting that there are some spikes when k is low. This is likely to be related to the random
sampling procedure and the higher probability of having observations of high leverage in the respective training (or
test) sets.
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Notes: The plots represents the results from lasso-regression analysis which we introduced in section 3.4.4. The
upper plot shows the value of the test error metric, when the shrinkage factor λl is increased. The optimal value λl∗
is indicated by the dashed vertical line. λl∗ amounts to and is determined by finding the lowest value of the test error
metric for a range of λl. At λl = 0, there is no shrinkage and all variables are included in the model. Increasing λl
will shrink the coefficients of the variables in the model. Thereby, some of the coefficients are shrinked to zero i.e.,
the variables are dropped from the model. At some level of λl, all variables are dropped. The plot at the bottom shows
how many variables are included in the model given the respective range of values for λl. We indicate λl,∗ via the
dashed vertical line. According to the results none of the variables is dropped from the model.
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Table 3.C.3: Prediction error using average IVD for fair value estimation
N MAPE MAE% RMSE%
Error metrics for fair value estimates based on average IVD
Entire sample 639 23.81% 19.77% 70.57%
Common share observations 210 27.9% 19.23% 85.08%
Normal observations 159 26.48% 15.33% 43.01%
Downround observations 51 32.33% 32.76% 167.1%
Preferred share observations 429 21.8% 19.93% 65.71%
Normal observations 253 19.44% 13.98% 29.45%
Downround observations 176 25.19% 29.66% 103.33%
Reduction in misvaluation: average IVD versus MRP based value estimates in %
Entire sample 639 -47.88% -48.32% -45.53%
Common share observations 210 -56.11% -60.5% -51.54%
Normal observations 159 -57.07% -63.82% -66.1%
Downround observations 51 -53.47% -53.59% -43.43%
Preferred share observations 429 -40.94% -43.14% -43.08%
Normal observations 253 -49.21% -49.39% -37.75%
Downround observations 176 -27.93% -37.17% -43.77%
Reduction in misvaluation: average IVD versus pIVD based value estimates in %
Entire sample 639 162.53% 170.92% 172.39%
Common share observations 210 186.75% 96.03% 63.01%
Normal observations 159 192.37% 37.51% -26.11%
Downround observations 51 173.33% 532.6% 1314.72%
Preferred share observations 429 149.33% 205.34% 317.26%
Normal observations 253 155.93% 114% 120.43%
Downround observations 176 142.41% 354.72% 434.07%
Notes: The table shows the misvaluation error using fair value estimates based on the average IVD. Further, it depicts the reduction in
misvaluation compared to the common practice of using MRP as a value estimate as well as the reduction in misvaluation compared to the
pIVD based value estimates. Value estimates based on the average IVD are derived by multiplying the MRP with one minus the average
IVD. Overall, the lower section of the table shows that applying the average IVD compared to the pIVD based value estimates results
in an increase of misvaluation. Reduction in misvaluation is based on results presented in table 3.5 as well as table 3.3. Reduction in
misvaluation is calculated by subtracting the value of the respective error metric for the average IVD based fair value estimates from the
respective error metric of the MRP based fair value estimate divided by the error metric of the MRP based value estimate (accordingly,
we estimate reduction of the misvaluation compared to the pIVD based value estimates); RMSE is the root mean squared error when
using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the implied value of a share. RMSE% is calculated by RMSE divided by the mean value of the
implied share values. MAE is the mean absolute error when using the MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the implied value of a share. MAE%
is calculated by MAE divided by the mean value of the implied share value. MAPE is the mean absolute percentage error when using the
MRP (OIP) as an estimate for the implied value of a share. In contrast to MAE%, MAPE is calculated on individual observation level.
N denotes the number of observations of each subset. Normal observations represent observations where no down round occurred in the
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